THE PRESIDENT'S POWER OF THE PURSE
J. GREGORY

SIDAK*

INTRODUCTION

During the Reagan administration, Congress discovered that it
could intimidate the executive branch by uttering again and again the
same seven words, "Provided, that no funds shall be spent. . . ." This
limitation, attached to numerous appropriations bills, enabled Congress,
under the guise of protecting the public fisc, to frustrate the President's
ability to perform his duties and exercise his prerogatives under the
Constitution.
The predicate for this encroachment by Congress on the Presidency
lies in the appropriations clause: "No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... ,
Despite the importance of enabling public officials to spend money or
incur debts in the name of the federal government, this provision in the
Constitution is one of the least scrutinized. In a recent article entitled
Congress' Power of the Purse,2 Professor Kate Stith of Yale Law School
argues that the Constitution prohibits the "expenditure of any public

money without legislative authorization."'3 This proposition, which she
calls the "Principle of Appropriations Control,"'4 is an elaboration on a
theory of the appropriations clause espoused during the Iran-Contra

hearings and in myriad appropriations laws. 5 This theory encompasses
far more than fiscal responsibility; it envisions the appropriations power

as an omnipresent legislative veto on presidential action, thereby fostering what Professor Stith calls "[t]he genius of regulating executive
branch activities by limitations on appropriations ....-6
* Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1977, A.M., J.D. 1981, Stanford University.
In writing this Article, I have benefited from numerous conversations with my colleague, Thomas A.
Smith, and from the helpful comments of Elliott Abrams, Lilian R. BeVier, L. Gordon Crovitz,
Bruce Fein, Tim W. Ferguson, Brent 0. Hatch, Michael W. McConnell, Bruce M. Owen, Richard
Porter, Richard A. Posner, Martin H. Redish, Melinda Ledden Sidak, and Daniel E. Troy.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
2. Stith, Congress'Powerof the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
3. Id. at 1345.
4. Id.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 26-34, 194-233.
6. Stith, supra note 2, at 1360. A similar, but less ambitious, articulation of this theory of the
appropriations power is Fisher, How Tightly Can CongressDraw the Purse Strings?, 8 AM. J.INT'L
L. 758 (1989). Louis Fisher is a specialist on the separation of powers at the Congressional Research
Service and assisted in preparing the Iran-ContraReport. Professor Stith also introduces a "Princi-

1162

Vol. 1989:1162]

PRESIDENT'S POWER OF THE PURSE

1163

Professor Stith's theory of the appropriations power is flawed for a
number of reasons. Part I of this Article examines the text and history of
the appropriations clause and shows that the text of the clause is more
ambiguous than commonly believed and that historical support for reading the clause to be a legislative veto on presidential action is dubious at
best. A better view of the historical record shows that the appropriations
clause was most likely intended to ensure fiscal responsibility and accountability. Part II argues, in direct contrast to Professor Stith's theory, that the President, without violating the Constitution or statutory
law, may obligate the Treasury provided that Congress has failed to appropriate the minimum amount necessary for him to perform the duties

and exercise the prerogatives given him by article II of the Constitution.
I claim no originality of authorship, for the theory that I articulate here

has been advanced in one form or another by Presidents and their Attorneys General since the Presidency of George Washington. 7 Part III then
examines the limiting principles that constrain the President's implied
power to spend public funds under this theory. And Part IV demonstrates how Congress has tried to use the appropriations power to impose

unconstitutional conditions on the President's performance of his constitutional duties and exercise of his prerogatives. It will be shown that
pie of the Public Fisc," which asserts that "all monies received from whatever source by any part of
the government are public funds." Stith, supra note 2, at 1345. Although I do not agree with all
implications that Professor Stith draws from this proposition, I accept its basic validity.
7. Throughout this Article, I rely (as does Professor Stith in Congress'Powerof the Purse) on
the authority of the published opinions of the Attorney General or the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) in the Department of Justice (as well as veto messages of the Presidents, which often are
prepared or at least reviewed by OLO). Some constitutional scholars believe that these opinions are
insubstantial or lack objectivity, and consequently deserve little weight in scholarly analysis. See,
eg., Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1231 (1988).
I disagree for two reasons. First, these opinions represent official interpretations of the Constitution
by one of the three branches of the federal government. Therefore, they should be entitled to considerable weight when the Department of Justice is interpreting the powers of the President under
article II. Their probable bias, which is entirely predictable, does not limit their usefulness.
Second, these opinions often are harbingers of theories that the Court itself ultimately will embrace, as I show in the text of my argument. The Court never gets to opine on many separation of
powers problems that, despite the granting of standing to Members of Congress, end up being resolved politically rather than legally. Cf Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (members of
House of Representatives have standing to challenge President's attempted pocket veto of legislation). On the other hand, the Attorney General can provide advisory opinions on separation of
powers problems relatively quickly. These opinions form a valuable stock of precedent, even if it is
not judicially created.
One also cannot ignore that many members of this and prior Courts (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
Jackson, and Thurgood Marshall, for example) served in high positions in the Justice Department
before elevation to the Court. Other Justices, like John Marshall, were Cabinet secretaries before the
birth of the Justice Department; and indeed Justice Taft was formerly the President. I like to think
that it was because these lawyers from the Executive Branch had wisdom on constitutional controversies that they were asked by the President and the Senate to start publishing their opinions in the
U.S. Reports.
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these efforts, if successful, undermine the unitary Executive sought by the
Framers.
Part V argues that Professor Stith reads the appropriations clause so
broadly that it would replace the unitary Executive with a plural one,
thereby swallowing the principle of the separation of powers. Part VI
examines the exception with which Professor Stith proposes to cure the
absence of a limiting principle in her Principle of Appropriations Control. She argues that necessity might justify the President spending public funds in the absence of appropriations. However, I argue that a
justification of necessity might make lawless spending by the President
more likely to occur.
In conclusion, I argue that the fundamental principle animating the
Constitution-the separation of powers-dictates a unitary Executive,
and that a unitary Executive cannot tolerate congressional encroachments that, under the pretext of guarding the public purse, deny the
President the funds necessary to perform the duties and exercise the prerogatives conferred on him by article II.

I.

THE PROBABLE MEANING OF THE APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE

The most plausible purpose of the appropriations clause is to encourage efficiency in the production of public goods by the federal government and to impose fiscal accountability on both Congress and the
President. The people are entitled to know who spent how much of the
public monies and for what purpose. Justice Joseph Story, writing in
1833 in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, supports this interpretation of the appropriations clause: "The object is apparent upon the slightest examination. It is to secure regularity,
punctuality, and fidelity, in the disbursements of the public money." 8
Admittedly, Justice Story recognized that the appropriations clause implicates the separation of powers, since "the executive would possess an
unbounded power over the purse of the nation" in the absence of the
clause and thus "might apply all its monied resources at his pleasure." 9
Still, Justice Story's principal focus seems to have been on the promotion
of "unshrinking honesty" in the disbursement of public funds and the
prevention of "profusion and extravagance." 10
Of late, it has become fashionable to characterize the appropriations
clause as a power of Congress-namely, the "power of the purse." The
8. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 681, at 486
(1833) (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds. 1987).
9. Id. This theme can be found in the history of Parliament's appropriation power in England. P. EINZIG, THE CONTROL OF THE PURSE 82-83 (1959).
10. J. STORY, supra note 8, § 681, at 486-87.
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CongressionalRecord over the past decade contains literally hundreds of
references to this phrase during debates over the appropriation of
funds."1 There is a sense, though, in which the "power of the purse"
becomes a tautological concept as one interprets it more broadly. During
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Wilson of Pennsylvania
observed: "War, Commerce, & Revenue were the great objects of the
Genl. Government. All of them are connected with money." 12 Speaking
of money in a broader sense, David Hume wrote at the time of the American Revolution:
Money is not, properly speaking, one of the subjects of commerce; but
only the instrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. It is none of the wheels of
trade: It is the oil13 which renders the motion of the wheels more
smooth and easy."
To say that it takes "money" (which is to say that it takes scarce resources of capital and labor) to operate a national government is to state
the obvious and ignore why such inputs are needed-namely, to produce
through collective action certain public goods that private parties acting
individually would be unlikely to produce. Thus, it is stretching the argument to the breaking point to assert that because it takes money to
make public goods, Congress is entitled to regulate the production of
each of them. It takes money for the Judiciary to decide cases or controversies, or for the President to negotiate treaties, but the necessity of certain inputs of capital and labor to the production of those public goods
does not of consequence empower Congress to constrain or direct the
exercise of discretion by the Judiciary or the President in the course of
their respective functions under the Constitution.
This part analyzes the text and history of the appropriations clause
to correct the misconception created by the popular notion of Congress's
"power of the purse." As section A shows below, the references to the
public "purse strings" found in the debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1787,14 and the subsequent debates in the states over ratification
11. Eg., 135 CONG. REc. 5949 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1989); 134 CONG. REC. S11,198 (daily ed.
Aug. 9, 1988); 133 CONG. REc. S10,663 (daily ed. July 24, 1987); 132 CONG. REC.H4853 (daily ed.
July 24, 1986); 131 CONG. REc. H9551 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1985).
12. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 445 (1840)

(1966 ed.).
13. D.

HUME, Of Money, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 281 (1777) (E.
Miller rev. ed. 1987); cf J. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 277 (1954) (money

serves "the modest role of a technical device that has been adopted to facilitate transactions" involving goods and services).
14. See, ag., J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 444-45 (such references to the public purse strings

are generally, as here, made in the context of raising public funds, not spending them); see also infra
text accompanying notes 27-33.
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of the Constitution, as demonstrated in section C,15 support the conclusion that the current understanding of the "power of the purse" is overdrawn. This historical record, at a minimum, rebuts any claim that the
Framers intended to give Congress a broad "power of the purse." This
argument is buttressed by section B, which reviews the plan, rejected by
the Framers, for a congressionally appointed treasurer; this provides
more historical support for the proposition that Congress does not enjoy
exclusive control of public monies. Finally, section D canvasses the history of the appropriations clause during the Presidency of George Washington and finds that, rather than being a source of congressional veto
power, the appropriations clause was intended to be and initially did
serve as a tool for fiscal responsibility.
A.

The Text and History of the Appropriations Clause

The appropriations clause appears in section 9 of article I, the same
section that enumerates various limitations on the use of federal legislative power such as the prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws. None of the provisions in section 9 grant affirmative powers
to Congress; rather, the enumerated powers of Congress appear in section 8. Therefore, simply as a matter of interpreting article I in an internally consistent manner, the appropriations clause should be seen as a
further limitation on the legislative power. It cannot be cast as an enlargement of congressional power at the expense of the people, the states,
or the other branches of the federal government. Furthermore, the constraint that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law," represents something of a
departure from the less specific language used in the Articles of Confederation, which provided: "The United States in Congress assembled shall
have authority.., to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised
for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the
same for defraying the public expenses ....",16 In light of this context,
Congress's "power of the purse" under the Constitution more accurately
would be described as the "duty to guard the purse."
The language of the appropriations clause and other provisions in
the Constitution bears out this interpretation. Congress has the power to
collect revenues by taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.17 It also has the
15. See J.MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at 14346 (1961) (detailing anti-federalist concerns along with amendments presented at state ratifying conventions); see also infra text accompanying notes 69-78.
16. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 5, cl.3.

17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1.
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power to "borrow money on the credit of the United States." 1 8 Having
taken possession of funds from these various sources, the federal government has a fiduciary duty to use the funds efficiently and to account to
the people as to how these funds have been, or are going to be, used to
advance a public purpose.' 9 The need for such care was obvious by the
middle 1780s, for the United States was heavily in debt; 20 as historian
William Culbertson wrote, when Alexander Hamilton took office as the
first Secretary of the Treasury, "[t]he finances of the country were a total
wreck." 2' Thus, it is not surprising that the Framers included two provisions in the appropriations clause to give the government the means it
needed to control its finances and advance the purposes of efficiency and
fiscal accountability.
1. "'Appropriationsmade by Law. " The first such provision is the
requirement that the drawing of public funds be made "in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law." 22 This language imposes the simple
but powerful requirement that public spending be governed by the rule of
law.2 3 In this respect, the appropriations clause simply reflects the ideal
of Adams, Hamilton, and other Framers that, through the rule of law,
the arbitrariness of government action can be restrained. 24 That there
must be a showing of legal authority in order to draw funds from the
Treasury ensures that the people will have notice of the spending decisions of government. If the appropriation of funds were solely a matter
of political discretion, the use of such funds would be less amenable to
scrutiny by the people.
But the phrase "in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law"
also raises several questions that tend to be ignored by those who assert
in a conclusory fashion a congressional "power of the purse." For exam18. Id. cl.2. During the Revolutionary War, there was another form of implicit borrowing in
the form of "certificates" (essentially IOUs) issued by the quartermasters and commissaries of the
Continental Army upon the impressment of private goods and services. See E.J. FERGUSON, THE
POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 57-69 (1961).

19. That the use of the funds must be for a public, rather than private, purpose would seem selfevident. However, the point has not always been obvious in the jurisprudence of the takings clause.
See Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 5.
20. 1 F. THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (1901).
21. W. CULBERTSON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AN ESSAY 64 (1911).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 7 (emphasis added).
23. An outstanding discussion of the rule of law in American constitutional history (upon
which I rely in the following pages) is F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 162-92 (1960),
which amplifies the discussion in F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-87 (1944). See also J.
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-73 (1980); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE

235-43 (1971).
24. See G. STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 56-63 (1970).
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ple, even if one acknowledges that appropriations must be made under
the rule of law, what sources of legal authority does the phrase "by Law"
regard as legitimate? "Law" can consist of the Constitution, legislation,
treaties, the common law, and contract. 25 But the conventional notion of
Congress's "power of the purse" rests on an unstated (and unsubstantiated) assumption that "by Law" envisions only legislation.
This assumption, addressed in Part IV below, underlies the contemporary view of many Representatives and Senators that Congress may
limit, through its decision to appropriate or withhold funds, the ability or
discretion of the President to perform duties and exercise prerogatives
explicitly imposed on him by the text of article II. This view acquired a
certain imprimatur in November 1987, when the House and Senate
jointly published the Iran-ContraReport.26 The report asserted: "The
power of the purse, which the Framers vested in Congress, has long been
recognized as 'the most important single curb in the Constitution on
Presidential Power.' "27 The core of the congressional report's theory of
the power of the purse is captured in the following statement: "The appropriations clause was intended to give Congress exclusive control of
funds spent by the Government, and to give the democratically elected
representatives of the people an absolute check on Executive action re'28
quiring expenditure of funds."
In support of this proposition, the Iran-ContraReport relies not just
on the appropriations clause as evidence on congressional control; it further cites the power (of the House) to raise revenues and related statements as evidence that Congress possesses a plenary "power of the
purse," one that has roots beyond the appropriations clause. The IranContra Report, to anchor its assertion of "exclusive control" of government funds, quotes James Madison's FederalistNo. 58 and a statement
by George Mason during the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
Neither source, however, supports the proposition that the Framers intended Congress to have exclusive control over the expenditure of funds
by another branch or an "absolute check" on the President's ability to
25. See, ag., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 213 (1979).
26. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION & HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS
WITH IRAN, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) [hereinafter IRANCONTRA REPORT].
27. Id. at 411 (quoting E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 101

(3th ed. 1975)).
28. Id. at 412 (emphasis added). This theory is presented as well in a subsequent article by a

principal draftsman of the Iran-ContraReport. See Fisher, supra note 6, at 761-65.
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act, based on the simple reason that his actions might be characterized as
requiring the expenditure of public funds.
The Iran-Contra Report notes that Madison wrote the following
statements while explaining the tension between the House and the
Senate:
The House of Representatives alone can propose the supplies requisite
for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse ....
This power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete
and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people for obtaining a redress of every griev29
ance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
However, in the sentence quoted above that the Iran-ContraReport abbreviated with ellipses, Madison alluded to the potential threat to the
separation of powers created by the broad power given the House to control the means for raising 30 (and thereby disbursing) revenues:
They, in a word, hold the purse-that powerful instrument by which
we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and
humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of
its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to
have wished, all 3the
overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of
1
the government.
Considering that the Framers were departing significantly from the British tradition of an unwritten constitution, and given the numerous statements elsewhere in the debates and in The FederalistPapers regarding
the separation of powers, it seems far-fetched to suppose that Madison,
so wary of the power of the House to control the raising of revenues, was
endorsing in The FederalistNo. 58 the proposition that the House of
Representatives, through the "power of the purse," ought to have exclusive power to judge when the balance of powers between the three
branches (and between the House and the Senate) had reached the correct state of equipoise.
Furthermore, George Mason's remark at the Convention-that
"[tihe purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands
whether Legislative or Executive" 32-would seem on its face to undercut, rather than bolster, the extravagant claim of the Iran-ContraReport
about the power conferred to Congress through its broadly defined
"power of the purse." Indeed, the context of Mason's remark confirms
this interpretation, for in the immediately preceding sentence he said:
29. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 356, 359 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)); see
also Fisher, supra note 6, at 761 (quoting same).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 356, 359 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis
added).
32. J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 81.
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"The Executive power ought to be well secured [against] Legislative
'33 It is simply disingenuous for the drafters of the
usurpations on it."
Iran-ContraReport to quote Mason's remark as support for the proposition that the appropriations clause "was intended.., to give the democratically elected representatives of the people"-though the Report
seems to ignore that the President is also a democratically elected representative-"an absolute check on Executive action requiring expendi'3 4
tures of fund."
Another approach to disambiguating the phrase "in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law" is to ask whether the phase implies that
only Congress may appropriate funds, as the Iran-ContraReport asserts.
This is really another way of asking whether "Law" for purposes of the
appropriations clause means just legislation. As Hamilton observed in
The FederalistNo. 71, "It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and
another to be dependent on the legislative body."13 5 It might seem obvious that, since the appropriations clause is placed in article I, it must be
referring only to legal action taken by Congress. For example, Louis
Fisher writes: "On the basis of the Constitution and traditional legislative prerogatives, Congress lays claim to exclusive control over the
purse."'3 6 Even the Supreme Court asserted matter-of-factly in United
States v. Lovett that "Congress under the Constitution has complete control over appropriations. ' 37 This claim simply cannot be literally true,
for even if "by Law" means strictly "by act of Congress," the President
still must sign the appropriations legislation (or have his veto overridden)
before such legislation can become the "Law." Therefore, it is not correct to state that Congress "has complete control over appropriations,"
even if one construes the phrase "Appropriations made by Law" in the
most restrictive manner possible.
Whether that claim is valid under a less literal interpretation is
highly debatable on both textual and historical grounds. As a textual
matter, article I addresses more than the powers of, and limitations on,
Congress. Section 10 of article I imposes limitations on the states, and
section 7 outlines the President's veto power.3 8 Based on a generous
reading of article I as a whole, therefore, one could argue that the appropriations clause establishes the general rule that when any one of the
33. Id. Louis Fisher, supra note 6, at 762, also neglects to quote this sentence, although he
quotes the following remark by Mason.
34. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 26, at 412.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 433 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
36. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 110 (1972).
37. 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946).
38. Conversely, the advice and consent powers of the Senate are found in article II, section 2,
clause 2.
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three branches (not just Congress) spends public funds, it must have a
legal authorization for doing so-that is, it must be constrained by the
rule of law, however defined.
As a historical matter, moreover, the scant discussion of the appropriations clause at the Constitutional Convention does more to cast
doubt than to remove it when determining whether the Framers intended
Congress to have the exclusive ability to approve the disbursement of
public monies. On July 5, 1987, the Grand Committee reported to the
Convention the first draft of what was to become the appropriations
clause.39 It read: "[N]o money shall be drawn from the public Treasury,
but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st branch," 4
by which the Committee meant the House of Representatives. During
the following month at the Convention, the language of the appropriations clause changed slightly, but the essential meaning of the clause did
not. On August 6, 1787, the Committee of Detail reported to the Convention a printed draft of the Constitution that contained the language:
"No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance41of
appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.
On August 13, 1787, the Convention considered this version of the
appropriations clause. The ensuing debate is instructive for what it does
not contain. It does not contain any suggestion that the appropriations
clause was to function as a lever to be used by Congress on the President.
To the contrary, the Framers feared that the House might abuse its
power to originate money bills. Thus began what historian Gordon
Wood has called the "long wrangle in the Convention involving the Senate's authority over money bills." 42 James Wilson of Pennsylvania
warned: "The House of Reps. will insert other things in money bills, and
by making them conditions of each other, destroy the deliberative liberty
of the Senate." 43 Similarly, George Mason of Virginia (who ultimately
39. J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 237-38.
40. Id. Max Farrand reported the text to read "by the first Branch." 1 M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 524 (1911) (emphasis added). Though it does
not appear to be significant, this difference continues in the respective records of the Convention.
Compare J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 298 with 2 M. FARRAND, supra, at 14.
41. J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 386.
42. G. vOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 555 (1969); see
also id. at 241-44 (discussing bicameralism and money bills in state constitutions before 1787).
43. J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 444. Madison further reported of Wilson:
He stated the case of a Preamble to a money bill sent up by the House of Commons in the
reign of Queen Anne, to the H. of Lords, in which the conduct of the displaced Ministry,
who were to be impeached before the Lords, was condemned; the Commons thus extorting
a premature judgmt. without any hearing of the Parties to be tried, and the H. of Lords
being thus reduced to the poor & disgraceful expedient of opposing to the authority of a
law, a protest on their Journal agst. its being drawn into precedent.
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refused to sign the Constitution 4 ) was concerned that the House would
adopt "the practice of tacking foreign matter to money bills." 4 5 But it
appears that this debate of August 13 was directed primarily, if not exclusively, at the raising of revenue rather than the appropriation of public
funds. The draft language regarding the origination of money bills in the
House was rejected. 46 Although no recorded debate took place that day
on the draft version of the whole appropriations clause, it too was rejected, by a vote of ten to one. 47
The Convention did not consider the appropriations clause again
until less than two weeks before the final version of the Constitution was
signed. On September 5, 1787, a committee of eleven of the Framers
presented the Convention with a compromise regarding the origination
of money bills in the House. The new language included a redrafted
appropriations clause that, with the exception of changes in capitalization subsequently made by the Committee on Style, became the language
finally adopted in the Constitution: "[N]o money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." 48 Debate was postponed on the compromise section until September 8. At
that time, the only debate centered on revising language regarding the
Senate's ability to amend money bills originating in the House; no debate
is recorded to have occurred on the wording of the appropriations
49
clause.
This history from the Constitutional Convention provides little insight into the meaning of the appropriations clause, since debate on the
clause almost always was overshadowed by the more controversial issue
of the role of the Senate in introducing and amending legislation to raise
revenues. However, one interpretation of the appropriations clause that
finds no historical support in the 1787 proceedings in Philadelphia is one
claiming that the ability to authorize the disbursement of public funds
was a power granted exclusively to Congress, so as to give Congress in
effect a veto over the Executive in its performance of any of its constitutionally assigned functions.
2. "'Statementand Account of... Expenditures." The second
provision of the appropriations clause that promotes efficiency and fiscal
accountability is the requirement that "a regular Statement and Account
44. Id. at 659.

45. Id. at 443.
46. Id at 449-50.
47. Id. at 450. Massachusetts was the sole state favoring the draft. Id.
48. Id at 580.
49. Id. at 606-07. The Committee of Style adhered to this wording in its drafts of September
10-12, 1787. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 40, at 568, 596.

Vol. 1989:1162]

PRESIDENT'S POWER OF THE PURSE

1173

of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time." 50 This language first appeared on September 14,
1787-only three days before the Constitution was signed. Initially,
George Mason proposed requiring that "an Account of the public expenditures should be annually published."' 5' Debate ensued over the
practicality of this requirement. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania objected that the requirement "wd. be impossible in many cases."' 52 Rufus
King of Massachusetts agreed and elaborated: "[T]he term expenditures
went to every minute shilling. This would be impracticable. Congs.
might indeed make a monthly publication, but it would be in such general statements as would afford no satisfactory information.15 3 James
Madison then made a motion to replace "annually" with "from time to
time," which he believed "would enjoin the duty of frequent publications
and leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature." 54 His remarks
underscore the need for accountability in the expenditure of public funds:
"Require too much and the difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing.
The articles of Confederation require half-yearly publications on this
subject. A punctual compliance being often impossible, the practice has
ceased altogether. '5 5 Madison's motion was approved, and as thus
amended, Mason's proposal to require a periodic statement of accounts
56
was adopted without further debate.
The debate over this portion of the appropriations clause underscored the desire for greater accountability in public spending, which, as
Madison emphasized, had been lacking under the Articles of Confederation.5 7 The debate also suggests that the Framers presumed that Congress rather than the President would prepare the requisite periodic
report, although it is less clear that this expectation meant that they also
expected that Congress alone would have the power to authorize the expenditure of public funds.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, cl.7.
51. J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 641.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. This concern over accountability is consistent with the concern in 1787 and 1788 over the
difficulty of achieving a satisfactory accounting by the Confederation Congress for all of the public
funds drawn from the Treasury during the Revolutionary War. See 2 W. SUMNER, THE FINANCIER

214 (1891) (quoting 1788 report that, "Considerable sums have been paid out of the treasury, of which no appropriation is to be found on the
public journal of Congress.").
AND THE FINANCES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
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The Abortive Planfor a CongressionallyAppointed Treasurer

The debates over one of the provisions deleted from the final draft of
the Constitution cast further doubt on the proposition that the Framers
intended Congress to have exclusive power to authorize the expenditure
of public funds. The printed draft constitution distributed to the Convention on August 6, 1787, contained, as one of the enumerated powers
of Congress, the power "To appoint a Treasurer by ballot." 58 George
Read of Delaware "moved to strike the clause, leaving the appointment
of the Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive."5 9 "The Executive
being responsible would make a good choice," he argued. 60 In opposition, George Mason of Virginia "desired it might be considered to whom
the money would belong; if to the people, the legislature representing the
people ought to appoint the keepers of it. ' ' 61 Read's motion to strike did
not pass.
This provision was not further debated until September 14, 1787. It
seems that two issues were debated simultaneously: (1) whether the
Treasurer should be appointed by Congress or the President, and (2) if by
Congress, whether Congress should vote jointly (thereby diluting the relative influence of the Senate) or sequentially, as in the case of ordinary
votes on bills. At that time, John Rutledge of South Carolina moved to
strike this congressional power of appointment altogether and, as Read
had done, proposed that "the Treasurer be appointed in the same manner
with other officers." ' 62 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania argued in
support that "if the Treasurer be not appointed by the Legislature, he
will be more narrowly watched, and more readily impeached. ' 63 However, Roger Sherman of Connecticut disagreed: "As the two Houses appropriate money, it is best for them to appoint the officer who is to keep
it; and to appoint him as they make the appropriation, not by joint but
several votes." 64 And Charles Pinckney of South Carolina had the last
word: "The Treasurer is appointed by joint ballot in South Carolina.
The consequence is that bad appointments are made, and the Legislature
will not listen to the faults of their own officer."' 65 Rutledge's motion to
strike the appointment power in its entirety passed, eight to three, with
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia dissenting.
58. J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 389.

59. Id. at 472.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id
Id. at 636.
Id.
Id. at 637.
Id.
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The debate over the appointment of the Treasurer is fairly inconclusive as far as the appropriations clause is concerned. Roger Sherman
espoused the view that Congress alone may appropriate public funds, but
he did so in the context of defending a provision that ultimately was
stricken from the Constitution. However, this debate does have some
interpretative significance on the margin because it shows that the Framers considered and rejected, three days before the signing of the Constitution, a proposal that would have enhanced Congress's role (and
concomitantly reduced the President's role) in managing public funds
and accounting for their use. Moreover, on the basis of the remarks
made by Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney, it appears that the
rationale for this decision was to make the Treasurer more susceptible to
congressional scrutiny and thus more accountable.
This resolution of the Treasurer appointment issue is consistent with
the decision by the Framers not to adopt the proposal made August 20,
1787 by Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania that would have explicitly
created a "Secretary of Commerce and Finance." The proposed officer
would serve in the President's "counsel of State" and have the "duty to
superintend all matter relating to the public finances, to prepare report
plans of revenue and for the regulation of expenditures, and also to recommend such things as may in his Judgment promote the commercial
interests of the U.S. ' ' 66 This proposal followed more general demands
made earlier in the Convention presuming that the President, at a minimum, would need secretaries of finance, war, and foreign affairs. 67 The
Framers evidently envisioned the need for a member of the Executive
Branch to wield such powers (and indeed the enumeration of activities in
Morris' proposal accurately describes what Alexander Hamilton subsequently did as the first Secretary of the Treasury); yet, they ultimately
refrained from including in the Constitution any discussion of the size,
composition, or function of the office serving the President in the belief
that to do so would provide the President a means of reducing his ulti68
mate personal accountability for decisions.
C.

The AppropriationsClause and the Ratification Debates

The ratification debates in the states reinforce the interpretation that
the appropriations clause was designed to promote fiscal accountability
rather than provide Congress a general veto over certain of the Presi66. Id. at 487.
67. Id. at 324 (Morris); id. at 481 (Elseworth); id. at 509-10 (Rutledge); 2 M. FARRAND, supra
note 40, at 158 (Committee of Detail).
68. 2 G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

408-09 (1863).
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dent's enumerated duties and prerogatives. On November 29, 1787, John
McHenry presented the Constitution to the Maryland House of Delegates. 69 Of the appropriations clause, he simply said: "When the Public
Money is lodged in its Treasury there can be no regulation more consistent with the Spirit of Economy and free Government that it shall only
be drawn forth under appropriation by Law and this part of the proposed
Constitution could meet with no opposition as the People who give their
'70
Money ought to know in what manner it is expended.
It appears that the only other discussion of the appropriations clause
in the state legislatures occurred in Virginia, where James Madison defended the Constitution and George Mason warned of its deficiencies.
However, even the Madison-Mason debate does not cast any doubt on
the proposition that the appropriations clause was intended to advance
fiscal responsibility. Madison began his explanation of the appropriations clause on June 12, 1788 by stating:
The congressional proceedings are to be occasionally published, including all receipts and expenditures of public money, of which no part
can be used, but in consequence of appropriations made by law. This
is a security which we do not enjoy under the existing system. That
part which authorizes the government to withhold from the public
knowledge what in their judgment may require secrecy, is imitated
from the confederation-that very system which the gentleman
adxocates.71

The "gentleman" to whom Madison referred was evidently Mason, who
debated the appropriations clause (and other provisions of the Constitution) with Madison before the Virginia Convention on June 17, 1788.
'Renewing the concern that he expressed at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia the preceding September, Mason objected to the ambiguity of the phrase "publication from time to time."' 72 The rationale
for ambiguity was to give Congress flexibility in disclosing sensitive matters. "In matters relative to military operations, and foreign negotia'73
tions," Mason conceded, "secrecy was necessary sometimes."
However, he opposed the wording of the appropriations clause in the
belief that it frustrated fiscal accountability:
[Hie did not conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public
money ought ever to be concealed. The people, he affirmed, had a
right to know the expenditures of their money. But that this expression was so loose, it might be concealed forever from them, and might
69. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 40, at 144.

70. Id. at 149-50.
71. Id. at 311 (reprintedfrom D. ROBERTSON, DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA,

1788, at 236 (2d ed. 1805)).
72. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 40, at 326.

73. Id.
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afford opportunities of misapplying the public money, and sheltering
those who did it. He concluded it to be as exceptionable as any clause
in so few words could be.74
Madison responded that "if the accounts of the public receipts and expenditures were to be published at short stated periods, they would not
be so full and connected as would be necessary for a thorough comprehension of them, and detection of any errors. ' 75 Madison thought that
simply permitting Congress to publish such accounts "from time to
time" not only would suffice in terms of affording adequate public disclosure, but also would reduce the extent of erroneous reporting of tentative
information. 76 In response, Mason doubted that this reporting arrangement "might be safely trusted" 7 7 and considered a requirement of
monthly publication of receipts and expenditures to be "infinitely better
than depending on men's virtue to publish them or not, as they might
78
please."
Like the debates during the Convention of 1787, these contemporaneous statements by McHenry, Madison, and Mason focus exclusively on
the issue of fiscal accountability. There is no indication from these ratification debates that the Framers intended the appropriations clause to
provide Congress a generic source of political leverage to use over the
President.
D. The AppropriationsClause in PracticeDuring George Washington's
Presidency: The Emerging Dispute Between Federalistsand
Republicans RegardingItemization and Executive Discretion
The manner in which public officials construed the appropriations
clause during George Washington's Presidency does not support the
view that the Framers, many of whom served in the first Congress or in
Washington's administration, 79 intended the clause to be a legislative
veto rather than a means of achieving fiscal accountability. If anything,
Washington's actions-and Congress's reaction to them-tend to establish an early precedent that the President may exercise a large degree of
discretion in making unappropriated disbursements necessary to effect
his constitutional duties and prerogatives.
74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 327.
78. Id. at 326.
79. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (discussing interpretive significance of
post-ratification remarks of the Framers).
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President Washington exercised, with Congress's acquiescence,
broad fiscal discretion. 80 Judge Abraham Sofaer notes that the Legislature deferred to the Executive in a number of ways:
Congress quickly granted the executive branch broad control over
funds by making appropriations in lump sums; by allowing the Secretaries of Treasury and War to shift such funds as were specifically appropriated from one category to another; by appropriating funds to
cover deficiencies in categories for which appropriations had been expended; and by ratifying expenditures on authorizedpurposesfor which
no appropriationhad been made,
such as the expedition to suppress the
81
so-called Whiskey Rebellion.
During this time, from 1789 until January 31, 1795, Alexander Hamilton
served as Washington's Secretary of the Treasury and, in the view of his
82
detractors, as the "prime minister" during Washington's second term.
In his capacity as Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton drafted the nation's first appropriations act at the express direction of the House, which
requested that he produce "an estimate of sums requisite to be appropriated."'8 3 He did so in four days; and eight days thereafter, Washington
signed the Act.8 4 The appropriations Act consisted of four lump-sum
categories and did not mention Hamilton's estimates or contain any further itemization or conditions on the use of the appropriate funds.8 5 The
8 6
appropriations acts for 1790 and 1791 followed the same process.
Washington's unappropriated spending to suppress the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania clarifies an important essay on the meaning of the appropriations clause that Hamilton published November 11,
1795, shortly after resigning as Secretary of Treasury. The essay-entitled simply Explanation8 7-- construes the appropriation clause as
follows:
The design of the Constitution in this provision was, as I conceive, to
secure these important ends, that the purpose, the limit, and the fund
of every expenditure should be ascertained by a previous law. The
public security is complete in this particular, if no money can be ex80. L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

326-28 (1948).

81. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and ForeignAffairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 16 (Spring 1976) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., L. CALDWELL, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THEORIES OF HAMILTON & JEFFERSON 2
(1944) (noting that Hamilton "assumed a leadership in the formulation of policy that lead enemies to
charge that he presumed the role of 'prime minister' ").
83. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 929 (Sept. 17, 1789) (J.Gales ed. 1834).
84. 1 Stat. 95 (Sept. 29, 1789); see L. WHITE, supra note 80, at 324.
85. L. WHITE, supra note 80, at 326-37.
86. Id. at 327.
87. A. HAMILTON, Explanation (Nov. 11, 1795), reprintedin 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 400 (H. Syrett ed. 1973).
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to an extent, and out of a fund, which the
pended, but for an object,
88
laws have prescribed.
It is most noteworthy that Hamilton would describe the appropriations
clause in these terms after having countenanced unappropriated expenditures a year before to quell the Whiskey Rebellion. That historical circumstance lends meaning to the most enigmatic portion of Hamilton's
model of the appropriations function.
It is simple to identify the "object" of the expenditures to suppress
the Whiskey Rebellion. It was to quell insurrection, which (as is shown
in Part II) is a responsibility of the Executive that finds its legal authority
in several specific provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, the Whiskey
Rebellion exemplified Hamilton's general observation that "appropriations laws... are generally distinct from those which create the cause of
expenditure. ' 89 It is only slightly more difficult to understand the meaning of "to an extent" in the case of the Whiskey Rebellion, although this
is a subject considered in greater detail in Part III. The "extent" of appropriations that could be had for quelling the Whiskey Rebellion must
have consisted of the minimum amount necessary to get the job donenamely, to restore order and the authority of the federal government.
Using Hamilton's model, it would make no sense for the disbursement of
funds from the Treasury to be, say, only half of what was projected as
necessary to suppress the uprising. An expenditure of a half-hearted "extent" simply would deplete the public purse without restoring domestic"
peace and the authority of the federal government.
The hard question remaining within Hamilton's paradigm, therefore, is to identify the fund that financed the Whiskey Rebellion expedition. Hamilton asserted with respect to his rule: "Public convenience is
to be promoted, public inconveniences to be avoided. The business of
administration requires accommodation to so great a variety of circumstances, that a rigid construction would in countless instances arrest the
wheels of government." 90 Thus, he believed that disbursements from the
Treasury could be made not only for the payment of debts for which
appropriations already had been made, but also as an advance on, or
advanced in anticipation of, appropriations that Congress reasonably
could be expected to make. 9 1 "With regard to the expediency of an advance," Hamilton argued, "in my opinion, the right of judging is exclu88. Id. at 405.
89. Id. at 405. For further discussion of the uprising, see THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST
AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES (S.Boyd ed. 1985); H. BRACKENRIDGE, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN
INSURRECTION IN WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONLY CALLED THE WHISKEY INSURREC-

1794 (1859).
90. A. HAMILTON, supra note 87, at 405.
91. Id.

TION,
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sively with the head of the Department," by which he meant the
Secretary of the Treasury. 92 From this, it is evident that Hamilton (and
presumably Washington) believed that the fund from which disbursements would be made for the Whiskey Rebellion expedition was a fund
that Congress would create at a future time, in recognition of the constitutional justification for spending for the object and to the extent that the
President had identified.
Hamilton believe that the ability of the Secretary of the Treasury to
make advances on appropriations need not compromise the objective of
fiscal accountability, for he provided that "sum unapplied must be accounted for and refunded. ' 93 He elaborated:
The distinction here again is between an advance and a payment.
More cannot certainly be finally paid than is equal to the object of an
appropriation, though'the sum appropriated exceed the sum necessary.
But more may be advanced, to the full extent of the appropriation,
than may be ultimately exhausted by the object of the expenditure, on
the condition, which always attends an advance, of accounting for the
application, and refunding an excess. This is a direct answer to the
question, whether more can be paid than is necessary to satisfy the
object of an appropriation. More cannot be paid, but more may be
94
advanced on the accountability of the person to whom it is advanced.
The significance of this statement by Hamilton does not turn on whether
it has survived as the prevailing interpretation of the appropriations
clause; as will be seen, the Anti-Deficiency Act put significant constraints
on this theory. Rather it is alone significant that during Washington's
Presidency, the Secretary of the Treasury acted on a theory of the appropriations clause that emphasized fiscal accountability and claimed, in an
expansive manner, that the President had the authority to spend public
funds even when Congress had not clearly appropriated money for that
purpose beforehand. Moreover, the fact that a Congress containing
many members who also were delegates to the Constitutional Convention
acquiesced to Hamilton's interpretation would seem to suggest an early
precedent that is antithetical to the view currently espoused by Congress
in the Iran-ContraReport.
Of course, not everyone in Congress in the 1790s favored Hamilton's view of the President's authority to make unappropriated disbursements from the Treasury. One such opponent, Albert Gallatin,
published A Sketch of the Finances of the United States 95 in 1796, the
92. Id. at 421.
93. Id. at 407.

94. Id.
95. A. GALLATIN, A Sketch of the Finances of the United States (1796), reprintedin 3 THE
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 69 (H. Adams ed. 1879).
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year he entered the House of Representatives and five years before he
became Secretary of the Treasury under Jefferson. Gallatin's starting
point for interpreting the appropriations clause was similar to Hamilton's. "Two things constitute the appropriation: 1st, the sum of money
fixed for a certain expenditure; 2d, the fund out of which the money is to
be paid." 96 However, Gallatin's central thesis was at odds with Hamilton's Explanation: "The executive officers can neither change the appropriation by applying money to an expense (although the object of that
expense should have been authorized by law) for which no appropriation
has been made, nor spend upon an authorized object of expense more
than the sum appropriated, nor even that sum, unless the fund out of
97
which it is payable is productive to that amount."
Gallatin was clear that his interpretation of the appropriations
clause would prohibit even unappropriated spending by the President in
furtherance of his article II duties, for he directly criticized the funding
of the Whiskey Rebellion expedition:
Although the President of the United States was authorized to call out
the militia in order to suppress insurrections, no moneys were appropriated for that service. When the western insurrection took place,
until Congress had covered the expenditures of the expedition by an
appropriation made only on the 31st of December, 1794, the expenses
were defrayed98 out of the moneys appropriated for the military
establishment.
On a more specific level, Gallatin objected to the President's use of funds
appropriated for another object:
Yet even the principle by which the specific appropriations for the several objects of the military establishment have been considered as a
general grant for the whole could not authorize the application of a
part of that grant to the expenses of that expedition. No farther discretion has been claimed by virtue of that principle than that of indistinctly applying the whole sum appropriated by law to any of the
objects enumerated and specified under distinct heads in the law itself.
But, as the militia called out to suppress an insurrection make no part
of the military establishment, the expenses attending such a call were
not amongst the various objects enumerated in the law making appropriations for the military establishment; the only item applicable to
militia being expressly confined to the defensive protection of the frontiers. The moneys drawn from the Treasury on that occasion were
paid out of a fund appropriated for other and distinct purposes; they
were not drawn agreeable to the Constitution, in consequence of any
appropriation made by law.99
96. Id. at 109.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 117.

99. Id. at 117-18.
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Gallatin then concluded with an expansive interpretation of Congress's
appropriations power, an interpretation predicated on a view of the separation of powers that squarely conflicts with Hamilton's:
It might be a defect in the law authorizing the expense not to have
provided the means; but that defect should have been remedied by the
only competent authority, by convening Congress. The necessity of
the measure may in the mind of the Executive have superseded every
other consideration. The popularity of the transaction may have
thrown a veil over its illegality. But it should by no means be drawn
hereafter as a precedent. "°
Under Gallatin's influence, military appropriations for 1797 were defined
so that sums appropriated for one object could not be applied to another
object; but Congress abandoned the practice the following year.101 Hamilton's successor at the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, wrote to Hamilton in
1798 that Gallatin "is evidently intending to break down" the Treasury
"by charging it with an impracticable detail" in appropriations
legislation.1 02
When Thomas Jefferson became President, he sought to implement
Gallatin's theory of the appropriations clause and repudiate the prevailing view espoused by Hamilton, who by that time was Jefferson's political and philosophical adversary. Jefferson stated in his first annual
message to Congress in December 1801 that "in our care of the public
contributions intrusted to our direction, it would be prudent to multiply
barriers against the dissipation of public money by appropriating specific
sums to every specific purpose, susceptible of definition; by disallowing
all application of money varying from the appropriation in object or transcending it in amount, but reducing the undefined field of contingencies,
and thereby circumscribing discretionary powers over money, and by
bringing back to a single department all accountabilities from money
10 3
where the examination may be prompt, efficacious, and uniform.'
Hamilton wrote a harsh critique of Jefferson's message, stating that
"nothing is more wild or of more inconvenient tendency than to attempt
100. Id. at 118. Gallatin believed that the President's treaty-making power, for example, could
be limited by Congress's power to spend. See Fisher, CongressionalParticipationin the Treaty Process, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1511, 1520 (1989); see also id. at 1520-21 (noting that "[a]lthough the
Constitution-continues to exclude the House from the treaty process, the dependence of treaties on
appropriations makes the House a major player").
101. R. WALTERS, ALBERT GALLATIN: JEFFERSONIAN FINANCIER AND DIPLOMAT 94 (1957);
Sofaer, supra note 81, at 17 n.19.
102. Letter from Oliver Woleott to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 5, 1798), reprintedin 2 0. WOLCOTT, MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND JOHN ADAMS 44-45 (G. Gibbs
ed. 1846).
103. First Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801), reprinted in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 326, 329 (J. Richardson ed. 1897); see also L. FISHER,
supra note 36, at 60-61.
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to appropriate 'a specific sum for each specific purpose, susceptible of
definition,' as the Message preposterously recommends."
II.

THE

1 4
0

PRESIDENT'S "MINIMUM OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY" TO
FUNCTION IN THE ABSENCE OF APPROPRIATIONS

The responsibilities of the Executive under the Constitution can be
grouped into two categories. In the first category are the duties that article II explicitly imposes on the President. In the second category are the
President's prerogatives, also enumerated in article II. This Part argues
that the President has the right under the Constitution to perform these
explicit duties and exercise these explicit prerogatives even if Congress
has not appropriated funds for him to do so. The Constitution commands the President to act with respect to the subjects listed in article
II-even if,
as in the case of the President's prerogatives, the command is
to exercise discretion. The Constitution does not condition its commands in article II on Congress periodically granting the President permission to act. This insight leads to the conclusion that the President has
an implicit power to encumber the Treasury in the name of carrying out
the responsibilities assigned to him by the plain text of article II.
In the alternative, one might argue that, even accepting that Congress cannot withhold appropriations for article II duties and prerogatives, it does not follow that the President may spend money in the
absence of appropriations. Under the system of checks and balances, one
branch can frustrate another's ability to fulfill its constitutional functions, as when Congress refuses to confirm the President's nominees, the
President declines to enforce laws he disfavors, or the Judiciary strikes
down an act of Congress. Recent Supreme Court decisions on the separation of powers have emphasized two themes in disputes between Congress and the President. First, the Court has looked to the -interference
another branch suffers in its ability to perform constitutionally assigned
functions. Morrison v. Olson, for example, established that congressional
efforts to impede the President's performance of his duty to faithfully
execute the law do not violate the principle of separation of powers if
they do not (1) "impermissibly undermine" the powers of the Executive
Branch,10 5 or (2) prevent the Executive Branch from "accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions." 10 6 The second theme concerns the
104. A. HAMILTON, Lucius Crassus, The ExaminationNo. 11 (Feb. 3, 1802), in 25 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 515 (H. Syrett ed. 1977).

105. 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2621 (1988) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 856 (1986)). The meaning of this conclusory phrase baffled Justice Scalia in his dissent.
108 S. Ct. at 2637, 2641 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
106. Id. at 2621 (citing Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
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aggrandizement of one branch by its acquiring powers assigned to the
other branches. For example, as the Court wrote in Bowsher v. Synar,
for Congress to order the Executive to refrain from "executing the laws
in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress," is to exert the
"kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws [that, as]
Chadha makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible."'' 0 7 It would exemplify what the Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor called "the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense
of a coordinate branch." 10 8
Given this, one could hardly assert, as the Court concluded of the
independent counsel law in Morrison, that denying the President the
funds with which to perform a duty or exercise a prerogative specified by
article II "does not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own
power at the expense of the Executive Branch."' 10 9 The Constitution is a
roadmap designed by practical people for dealing with practical
problems of self-government. It may not always yield juridically precise
answers to real-world problems, but that is not its principal function.
The purpose of the Constitution is to make representative government
work and endure. The quest for intellectual elegance cannot excuse reading the text of the Constitution-including the appropriations clause-in
counterintuitive ways that permit the government itself to collapse or
become paralyzed by conflict or indecision, as it could be if Congress
could defund the President. The Constitution is not, to borrow a familiar
phrase in constitutional law, a suicide pact. 110 Therefore, I do not believe that Congress may impose conditions on the funding of article II
duties and prerogatives; nor do I believe that such conditions lie in some
indeterminate zone of action whose propriety is judged by the current
balance of political power between Congress and the President rather
than the language of the Constitution and the separation of powers that
its structure is intended to effect.

107. 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986); see also id. at 722 ("Constitution does not contemplate an

active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts"); cf Springer v. Government of the Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (" 'Legislative

power' as distinguished from 'executive power' is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce
them .... ).
108. 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986).
109. 108 S.Ct. at 2620.
110. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (choice
"is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. The[ ] danger is that, if the Court does
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact.").
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Duties, Prerogatives,and the President'sImplied Power to Spend
Public Funds
1. Article II Duties. Any article II duty is a mandatory task of
the Presidency. By "duty" I simply mean a responsibility that the text of
the Constitution says the President shall perform, as opposed to one that
the text says he may perform or has the power to perform. The duties
include the making of appointments, the faithful execution of law, the
receipt of ambassadors, and the making of recommendations to Congress. The President's role as commander in chief, I would argue, is also
a duty, although (unlike these other duties) the "shall" at the beginning
of article II, section 2, clause 1 is not followed by a transitive verb: The
President simply "shall be" in charge of the armed forces. (Of course,
one could argue that this clause could simply be read to mean "the President shall command" the armed forces.) The incurring of a charge
against the Treasury in the course of performing each of these article II
duties is lawful Executive action regardless of whether Congress has appropriated adequate funds for that purpose.
Implicit in the Constitution's assignment of duties to the President
under article II must have been the expectation on the Framers' part that
Congress would appropriate at least the minimum amount necessary for
the President to perform those duties. As a Framer of the Constitution
and an author of The FederalistPapers, Alexander Hamilton advocated
granting the President the "power" necessary to carry out his responsibilities effectively. He despised ineffectuality in any branch of the federal
government, writing in The FederalistNo. 23: "Not to confer in each
case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the
most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust
the great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success."11' 1 Hamilton expressed this general
belief even more forcefully in the specific case of the Executive, writing in
The FederalistNo. 73 that a principal "ingredient towards constituting
the vigor of the executive authority is an adequate provision for its support."1 1 2 Hamilton believed that the Executive could be rendered ineffectual if the President lacked adequate financial resources or, worse, if
he could be manipulated by Congress because of his need for adequate
funds:
It is evident that without proper attention to this article, the separation
of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the
salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 155 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 441 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. They
might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by
largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations
.... [I]n the main it will13be found that a power over a man's support is
a power over his will.1
Therefore, Hamilton could not "commend too highly"' "14 the provision
in article II that "[tihe President shall, at stated Times, receive for his
Services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall
not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them."" t5 It should be clear from Hamilton's statements in The FederalistPapers that he would abhor the proposition that
the appropriations clause empowered Congress to direct certain Executive functions as a condition of its appropriating the funds necessary to
support the President.
There is a less textual (and more arduous) way to reach the same
Hamiltonian conclusion regarding the President's implied power to fund
the execution of his duties and prerogatives. "If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers" conferred on the federal
government by the constitution, wrote Alexander Hamilton in his opinion on the constitutionality of a national bank, "and if the measure have
an obvious relation to that end and is not forbidden by any particular
provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the
compass of the national authority."' 16 Hamilton, of course, was addressing the powers of the federal government vis-d-vis the states; and Chief
Justice Marshall adopted virtually this same formulation twenty-eight
years later in McCulloch v. Maryland"17 when the Court construed Congress's authority to legislate under the necessary and proper clause. 1 18
113. Id.; see also L. CALDWELL, supra note 82, at 28 ("Hamilton saw that without a basis for
compensation protected from legislative manipulation,- the independence of the executive branch
would be merely nominal.").
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 441 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
115. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. In 1795, Hamilton wrote: "The manifest object of the
provision is to guard the independence of the President from the legislative control of the United
States or of any State, by the ability to withold, lessen, or increase his compensation." A. HAMILTON, supra note 87, at 410. Hamilton made this same argument with respect to the analogous
provision in article III, section 1 regarding the compensation for federal judges: "In the general
course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." THE
FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
116. A. HAMILTON, Opinion on the Constitutionalityof an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23,
1791), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 107 (H. Syrett ed. 1965).
117. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see J. COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 92 (1982); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97-104 (11th ed. 1985).
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However, the power of this reasoning transcends the necessary and
power clause. It legitimates the inference of constitutional authoritywhether it is the authority of the federal government to act or the authority of one of the three branches of the federal government to act within
the scope of the responsibilities assigned to it by the text of article I, II,
or III.
If one extends the Hamiltonian premise of McCulloch v. Maryland
to the separation of powers, then it becomes clear that the President has
the power, implicit in the delegation of duties and prerogatives to him by
the people under article II, to spend funds to perform his constitutional
responsibilities. 1 9 Indeed, Hamilton believed that the President's duties
and prerogatives enumerated in sections 2 and 3 of article II "ought...
to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of executive power; leaving the rest to flow from
the general grant of that power, interpreted in conformity with other
parts of the Constitution."' 120 Madison similarly argued that "the Executive power being in general terms vested in the President, all power of an
Executive nature not particularly taken away must belong to that department." 12 1 Thus, the contemporaneous writings of the principal draftsman of the Constitution, as well as those of his principal co-author of
The FederalistPapers, would seem to support the following proposition:
The assignment to the President of enumerated duties and prerogatives
in article II implicitly conferred on the President the ability to have the
funding necessary for him to carry out those duties and prerogatives. So,
for example, Hamilton specifically believed that the Constitution's grant
to the President of powers and prerogatives in foreign affairs precluded
Congress from having any discretion to withhold funding for the execution of treaties as a means of controlling the Executive in foreign policy.
Likening Congress's lack of discretion in this respect to its inability to
manipulate the salaries of federal judges, Hamilton wrote that the House
of Representatives "cannot deliberate whether they will appropriate and

119. Justice Jackson's disparagement of the implied powers theory in Youngstown rested on his
quite accurate observation that the President had no constitutional authority, inherent or explicit, to
confiscate private property. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640, 647, 64950 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
120. A. HAMILTON, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), reprintedin 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 39 (H. Syrett ed. 1969); cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926)
("The executive power was given general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was
regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed .
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv 210-11 (2d ed. 1988).
121. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), reprinted in 5 ThE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 405, 405-06 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
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pay the money" for the execution of treaties; rather "the mode of raising
122
and appropriating the money only remains [a] matter of deliberation."'
Thus, the availability of implied funding for executing the President's duties and prerogatives did not depend on the relative necessity of
each such enumerated duty or prerogative. As Hamilton pointed out in
his opinion on the constitutionality of a national bank, arguments over
the degree of necessity are fractious and ultimately beg the constitutional
question:
The degree in which a measure is necessary can never be a test of the
legal right to adopt it; that must be a matter of opinion, and can only
be a test of expediency. The relation between the measure and the end;
between the nature of the means employed towards the execution of a
power, must be the criterion of constitutionality, not the more or less
of necessity or utility.123
Therefore, I believe that a President who acts to discharge his article II
duties when Congress has failed or refused to provide him appropriations
for that purpose does not violate the appropriations clause. He need not
cite necessity or any other legal defense to justify his expenditure of funds
to the extent necessary to execute the particular duty at issue.
2. Article II Prerogatives. The prerogatives of the President in article II also have a textual basis for their implicit source of funding. The
pardon power, the power to negotiate treaties, and the power to make
recess appointments are all preceded by the following words: The President (or "he") "shall have Power . . . to" perform the function.
Although it is a fine point, this language is considerably more specific
than simply saying "the President may grant pardons" or "the President
is authorized to negotiate treaties." The text of article II makes clear that
the people have given the President something more than merely the permission or the authority to perform these functions. He "shall have
Power" to perform them as well. Indeed, John Locke's Second Treatise
on Government, which influenced the Framers' thinking on separation of
powers, defined executive prerogative to be "nothing but the Power of
doing public good without a Rule." 124 The Constitution itself must give
the President the ability to fund the exercise of his enumerated prerogatives, for otherwise the recurring statement in article II that the President
"shall have Power" to perform certain explicit responsibilities would be122. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Smith (Mar. 10, 1796), reprintedin 20 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 72 (H. Syrett ed. 1974); see also L. CALDWELL, supra note 82,

at 38.
123. A. HAMILTON, supra note 116, at 104.
124. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, § 166, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 425
(1690) (P. Laslett ed. 1960).
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come meaningless whenever Congress refused him the necessary appropriation of funds. The power to negotiate treaties, for example, would be
reduced to the precatory statement that it would be nice if the President
could negotiate treaties now and then. Of course, this reasoning holds a
fortiori in the case of the explicit duties imposed on the President by
article II.
B. Minimum ObligationalAuthority
Attorney General Caleb Cushing opined in 1853 that "when the
Constitution of the United States... authorizes and requires the President to do a thing, which involves the expenditure of public money ....
the legality of an engagement of the President to have the thing done,
that is, of a contract for its performance, is wholly independent of the
question whether there is, or is not, an adequate appropriation by Congress for the object." 125 Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti rendered a
similar opinion to President Carter in January 1981. Because "the President performs not only functions that are authorized by statute, but functions authorized by the Constitution as well," he opined, Congress
"[m]anifestly could not deprive the President of this power" to perform
his constitutional responsibilities "by purporting to deny him the mini126
mum obligational authority sufficient to carry this power into effect."
Attorney General Civiletti reasoned that this "minimum obligational authority" to expend public funds in the absence of appropriations could be
justified "in connection with initiatives that are grounded in the peculiar
institutional powers and competency of the President."' 127 No activities
of the Presidency better fit that definition than the duties and prerogatives that the Framers imposed on the office through the explicit text of
article II. Civiletti specifically cited the example of the President's exclusive power in article II, section 2, clause 1 "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment."' 128 But this principal is probably most evident in the context of national defense.
1. President Lincoln's UnappropriatedExpenditures at the Outbreak of the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln believed that if a
President is called upon to defend the Union, then it is inconsequential
125. Contracts for the Extension of the Capitol, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 28 (1853).
126. Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in
Appropriations, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 5-6 (1981).
127. Id. at 6-7.
128. Id. at 5. Attorney General Civiletti's model of "minimum obligational authority" seems to
resemble Professor Louis Henkin's distinction between "obligatory appropriations" and "voluntary
spending." L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 115 (1972).
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that he might violate formalities like the appropriations clause in the process. "Is it possible," he asked in 1864, "to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?" 12 9 Lincoln obviously believed that the
possibility could not be seriously entertained: "By general law, life and
limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;
but a life is never wisely given to save a limb."13 0 Therefore, he concluded, "measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by
becoming indispensableto the preservationof the Constitution through the
131
preservation of the nation."
Probably no event before or since the Civil War so threatened the
preservation of the national government in the United States, not to mention the life and property of its citizens. 132 But it hardly would require
the President to break the law in order to summon the resources by
which to respond decisively to a crisis of such proportion when Congrdss
had made no appropriations for it. The oath of office imposes the duty
on the President to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States."1 33 And indeed Lincoln believed he acted within his constitutional authority:
Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene
them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the
existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided,
I should let the Government fall at once to ruin or whether, availing
myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of
insurrection, I would make an effort
to save it, with all its blessings, for
34
the present age and for posterity.'
Lincoln recognized that he and every other President had been vested by
the Constitution with a preexisting duty as the Commander in Chief and
the Nation's highest law enforcement officer. He believed that he was
not acting above the law, but in compliance with the rule of law as expressed in the Constitution itself.
129. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to A.G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), reprinted in 10 COMPLETE
65, 66 (J. Nicolay & J. Hay eds. 1894) [hereinafter Lincoln's Letter
to Hodges].
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

130. Id.

131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. The war claimed more American lives than all other wars in the nation's history-including, of course, the life of the President who sought to keep the nation together. See J. McPHERSON,
THE BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 854 (1988) (620,000 Union and Confederate
soldiers killed).
133. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
134. Letter of Abraham Lincoln to the Senate and House of Representatives (May 26, 1862),
reprinted in 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3278, 3279 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Lincoln's Letter to Congress]. Congress did not actually declare war
against the Confederacy until several months after hostilities had begun. Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 2,
12 Stat. 255.
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Ironically, if the Iran-Contra Affair is any indication, it is conceivable that Congress today would impeach a President for what Lincoln did
in 1861, for his unauthorized (and undisclosed) expenditures of $2 million for war material were made to four individuals (in violation of an
express statute) and were not disclosed to Congress until a year later,
even though Congress had long since returned to session. 135 Not knowing the extent of Lincoln's involvement in such spending decisions, Congress issued a resolution of censure of Secretary of War Simon Cameron
when it learned that he had given public funds to a private citizen for the
procurement of military supplies. 136 Lincoln explained to Congress that
the importance of undertaking unappropriated spending did not cause
him to disregard the objective of fiscal accountability embodied in the
appropriations clause. To the contrary, Lincoln suggested that he attempted to deviate from the principle of fiscal accountability embodied in
the appropriations clause to the least extent necessary for him to effectuate the actions he deemed necessary for preserving the nation:
I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that crisis,
some of which were taken without any authority of law, the Government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the
public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such misdirection occurred to me as objections 1to
those extraordinary
37
proceedings, and were necessarily overruled.
Lincoln offered to share the censure that Congress had directed at Secretary Cameron, but he did not apologize to Congress or ask that it ratify
after the fact "whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed," 138 for
Lincoln obviously thought that there had been none.
That President Lincoln had acted within his article II powers was
also the Supreme Court's conclusion in the Prize Cases.139 The Court
faced the question whether a congressional declaration of war would be
necessary for the President to use military force to put down a civil
war-in particular, to capture neutral ships violating the Union blockade
of Southern ports ordered by President Lincoln in 1861. The Court
135. Lincoln's Letter to Congress, supra note 134, at 3279; see also B. HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR 37-38 (1970). Consider

also President Franklin Roosevelt's "Destroyer Deal" with Britain before the entry of the United
States into World War II. In order to avoid the statutory restrictions of the Neutrality Act,
Roosevelt conveyed government property to the British (namely American warships) in exchange
for consideration that consisted of receiving leases for British bases in the western Atlantic-and
hence the responsibility for defending them. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POW-

ERS, 1787-1948, at 288-89 (1948).
136. Lincoln's Letter to Congress, supra note 134, at 3280.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).

1192

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1989:1162

found the seizures lawful, concluding that Lincoln did not need prior
congressional authorization to respond to war as opposed to initiating or
declaring it. "However long may have been its previous conception,"
wrote Justice Grier, the rebellion had "sprung forth suddenly from the
parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war," such that "[tihe
President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without
waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name." 14 0 Whether the war
began by the invasion of a foreign nation or by a domestic rebellion was
irrelevant, for "the President is not only authorized but bound to resist
force by force, ... bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any
1 41
special legislative authority."
2. President Wilson's Least Restrictive Means Approach to Achieving Fiscal Responsibility. President Woodrow Wilson made a similar
argument about implied funding in 1920 when presented with an appropriations bill for fiscal year 1921 providing that "no journal, magazine,
periodical or similar Government publication shall be printed, issued or
discontinued by any branch or officer of the Government service unless
the same shall have been authorized under such regulations as shall be
prescribed by the Joint Committee on Printing." 142 Wilson stated in his
veto message that "the obvious effect of this provision would be to give to
that committee power to... determine what information shall be given
to the people of the country by the executive departments."' 143 Foreshadowing the reasoning in Youngstown that expediency in managing the federal government is no justification for sacrificing the separation of
powers, 144 Wilson stated that, although he was in "entire sympathy with
the efforts of the Congress and the departments to effect economies in
printing and in the use of paper and supplies,"1 45 Congress could readily
accommodate its fiscal concerns by a means that did not "impose a flat
146
prohibition against the exercise of executive functions."
Without explicitly saying so, Wilson in effect proposed a least-restrictive-alternative analysis to appropriations controversies between
Congress and the President that resembled Lincoln's approach: "If we
140. Id. at 669.
141. Id. at 668.
142. H.R. 12,610, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1920). The best account of this episode is by Wilson's Secretary of the Treasury, David Houston. See 2 D. HouSTON, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON'S CABINET, 1913 TO 1920, at 71-82 (1926).
143. Veto Message of Woodrow Wilson (May 13, 1920), in 17 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 8845 [hereinafter Wilson Veto Message].
144. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
145. Wilson Veto Message, supra note 143, at 8845.
146. Id. at 8846. Interestingly, Wilson overruled his Solicitor General, who did not believe the
rider to be unconstitutional. 2 D. HousToN, supra note 142, at 74-76.
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are to have efficient and ecoriomical business administration of Government affairs, the Congress, I believe, should direct its efforts to control of
public moneys along broader lines, fixing the amounts to be expended
and then holding the executive departments strictly responsible for their
use." 147 It appears, in other words, that Wilson was suggesting that Congress could achieve fiscal accountability and protect the public purse
from a profligate President simply by appropriating X dollars to the President for the specific purpose of executing the laws, Y dollars for negotiating treaties, Z dollars for making presidential recommendations, and
so forth. It would be up to the President to decide how to divide those
respective lump sums. This view, of course, was the converse of the recommendation that Jefferson had made in 1801 in favor of identifying
categories of appropriation for "every specific purpose, susceptible of
148
definition."
Wilson's veto message shows why it is impermissible for Congress to
defund the performance of a particular duty or prerogative of the Executive by appropriating an unrealistically low amount. Congress could not,
for example, appropriate only one dollar for the President to negotiate
treaties with foreign heads of state. Nor, for example, could it refuse to
appropriate any funds for the President to study and, in his discretion,
order the issuance of a pardon to any person convicted of a crime committed while employed in the Executive Office of the President. It should
be clear that, as the amount appropriated for the performance of a particular article II duty approaches zero, it becomes less credible for Congress
to assert that it must restrict spending in that manner in order to conserve public funds. Surely, for example, Congress could not deny the
President the funds for the pen by which he intended to veto a piece of
legislation. 149 And if it did, could the President use his own pen? For
him to do so, of course, would be to deny Congress ultimate control over
all factors of government production-which Professor Stith, for example, asserts that Congress is entitled to have under the appropriations
clause.1 50 If Congress succeeded in banning all appropriations for pens
in the Executive Branch, could the President then accept a 99¢ gift from
a political supporter to buy a ballpoint pen by which to sign the veto
message? Obviously, the dollar amount of a restriction on such spending
would be trivial compared to the magnitude of other expenditures. Thus,
147. Wilson Veto Message, supra note 143, at 8846.
148. See supra text accompanying note 103.
149. Daniel E. Troy and Professor Michael McConnell each independently suggested this example to me. Cf L. HENKIN, supra note 128, at 115 ("Congress cannot impose conditions which
invade Presidential prerogatives to which the spending is at most incidental ... .
150. Stith, supra note 2, at 1374.
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the presumption that Congress was acting within its article I duty to
ensure fiscal accountability would disappear, and there would arise the
contrary presumption-as Wilson insinuated in 1920-that Congress's
action was undertaken to interfere with the President's performance of
one of the duties or prerogatives imposed on him by the Constitution.
III.

WHAT PRINCIPLE LIMITS THE PRESIDENT'S IMPLIED POWER
OF THE PURSE?

The interpretation of the appropriations clause that I have presented
distills to the proposition that the President has an implied power to incur claims against the Treasury to the extent minimally necessary to perform his duties and exercise his prerogatives under article II. The rule of
law implies that some principle must limit the President's implied power
to spend, but it is hardly obvious from the text of the Constitution what
that principle would be. Therefore, what follows here in Part III should
be regarded more as explorations of the question, rather than an assertion that I have identified a principle capable of delineating permissible
from impermissible assertions of implied spending power by the
President.
Some persons no doubt will view my claim of the President's implied power of the purse with trepidation, fearing that like Charles I's
efforts to rule without Parliament and levy taxes on his subjects, 1 5' the
President's routine assertion of an implied power to fund his duties and
prerogatives would transform the Executive into a despot. To these
skeptics, it would be little comfort that the British view of the King's
prerogative over spending narrowed considerably over time,15 2 eventually eclipsing even Locke's general definition that executive prerogative is
nothing more than the power to do public good in the absence of a
rule. 153 To justify the concern about a despotic President with his own
source of funding, one might assert that everything the President does is,
in one way or another, a constitutional duty or prerogative of the Executive for which the President could claim a implied source of lawful fund151. See, ag., I T. COOLEY, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 332
(rev. 3d ed. 1884); 6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 41 (2d ed. 1937) ("in 1626

Charles, being hard pressed for money, attempted to compel his subjects to lend specific sums of
money named by himself.").
152. During Queen Victoria's reign, one legal historian observed that "if we consider how the
crown is impoverished and stripped of all its ancient revenues, so that it must greatly rely on the
liberality of parliament for its necessary support and maintenance, we may perhaps be led to think
that the balance is inclined pretty strongly to the popular scale, and that the executive magistrate has
neither independence nor power enough left to form that check upon the lords and commons which
the founders of our constitution intended." 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 151, at 334.
153. See Locke, supra note 124.
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ing. Therefore, it would seem that there would be no rule of law to limit
the President's ability to disregard appropriations bills whenever Congress had not appropriated what the President deemed to be "adequate"
funds to effect what the President, in turn, deemed to be the public good.
With no limiting principle, the President's implied power to incur public
debts would swallow the separation of powers as easily as would the extravagant interpretation of Congress's appropriations power contained in
the Iran-ContraReport and embodied in the numerous appropriations
riders imposing conditions on spending by the Executive.
I believe that this characterization has been shown by history to be
an exaggeration. Furthermore, I believe that history also has shown that
this concern is far less justified than is the concern over the demonstrable
inclination of Congress to use the appropriations power to usurp the
President's powers. This potential for the Executive to abuse its implied
spending power must be evaluated in terms of the likelihood that the
power would have to be exercised and the means available to Congress
and the people for containing such spending if it did occur. On the first
point, I would expect that unappropriated spending by the President
would be the rare exception and not the general practice. Although the
text and history of the appropriations clause does not demonstrate an
intent by the Framers to create a legislative veto, they obviously do
demonstrate an intent to give Congress the principal and recurring responsibility for raising public funds and directing their use. The primary
value of the President's implied power to fund his duties and prerogatives, therefore, is like that of the veto: It is a strategic deterrent to opportunistic behavior by Congress, one that consequently gives the
President bargaining strength vis-d-vis Congress in the ordinary course of
154
setting the direction and magnitude of specific national policies.
In the first instance, therefore, the political process imposes a limiting principle on the President's unappropriated spending. The President
is not a king. Hamilton's proposal at the Constitutional Convention of a
President who would serve for life on good behavior was never
adopted; 155 to the contrary, Jefferson thought that the Constitution was
flawed in not limiting the number of terms that a President could
154. However, as I have argued analogously with respect to the President's recommendation
duty, the President would unlawfully delegate his duty to Congress if he acquiesced to the complete
defunding of his ability to perform any of the duties enumerated in article II. See Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2126-28 (1989).
155. J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 136, 138. Indeed, Hamilton subsequently stressed that the
President had to stand for election every four years, a constraint that created "a total dissimilitude"
between the President and the King of England. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 415, 416 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also id. at 422.
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serve 156-a view that ultimately prevailed, producing a corrective
amendment in 1951.157 Like any rarely used but strategically potent constitutional power (such as the power to suspend habeas corpus, exercised
by Lincoln), the President must be able, as a political matter, to persuade
the people (from whom, of course, all powers under the Constitution
have been delegated to the federal government) that his actions are necessary and proper to carrying out a responsibility that article II plainly
imposes on him. In an era that has witnessed Presidents Johnson, Nixon,
Ford, and Carter either denied reelection or driven from office (and President Reagan politically immobilized for the remainder of his second
term once the story of arms shipments to Iran broke in the fall of 1986),
there should be little doubt that the electoral process will provide a check
on the President (and his party) if such an assertion of spending power
appears to be unsupportable.
In addition to this potential political cost incurred in the electoral
process, there would be a political cost to the President in terms of Congress's ability to use its own prerogatives in a retributive manner. So, for
example, Congress might delay confirmation of appointees, as it did during the last year of the Reagan administration with respect to numerous
positions for federal judges and commissioners (such as on the Federal
Communications Commission, which operated from late 1987 until the
summer of 1989 with only three of five commissioners, thereby creating a
two-to-one majority for the Democrats on the Commission). 58 The confirmation hearings that would be permitted to proceed might emulate the
acrimony of Judge Robert Bork's confirmation hearings. There are, of
course, many other ways (some of dubious constitutionality themselves)
by which Congress is able to burden Executive Branch officials through
its investigative powers.' 59
In addition to these political constraints, there are two legal principles that limit the President's ability to spend in the absence of appropriations. Both principles can be traced to Hamilton's Explanation of the
appropriations clause, if not to more general ideas espoused in preceding
years by the Framers. First, the object of the unappropriated spending
156. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (Jan. 6, 1805), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 338, 339 (P. Ford ed. 1897); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (May 27, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19, 20 (P. Ford ed.
1895).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
158. President Reagan is reported to have agreed with congressional leaders during 1987 and
1988 not to exercise his prerogative to make recess appointments.
159. See, eg., Olson, The Impetuous Vortex CongressionalErosion of PresidentialAuthority, in
THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

(L.G. Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989).

225, 235-42
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must be a textually demonstrable duty or prerogative of the President
under article II, such as the duty to faithfully execute the laws or the
prerogative to negotiate treaties. The President could not, for example,
order unauthorized spending for the launch of a scientific space probe
because such an undertaking, although possibly beneficial to the general
welfare, could not be derived from any duty or prerogative of the Executive contained in article II.
Second, the extent to which the President may spend public funds in
furtherance of such an object is defined by the minimum amount necessary to successfully produce the desired public good. The performance
of the President's duties and prerogatives under article II can be viewed
as different kinds of public goods-enforcing the law, negotiating treaties, sending and receiving ambassadors, commanding the armed forces,
making recommendations to Congress, issuing pardons, and so forth.
Professors James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock have observed that the
optimal size of a jurisdiction depends on the extent of the externality and
the production technology of the public good used to address it.160 In a
similar manner, the amount of unappropriated funds that the President
may spend would depend on the production technology of each particular public good. Thus, the minimum amount of spending needed for the
President to make recommendations to Congress and report on the State
of the Union would be relatively low (because the marginal cost of using
information already in the President's possession for this purpose is low).
On the other hand, the minimum amount of spending needed to protect
the security of American citizens at home and abroad (for example,
through the ability to execute a successful hostage rescue in Iran or apprehend the Achille Lauro hijackers) is likely to run into the billions of
dollars. If Ronald Reagan honestly believed that deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative were "minimally necessary" to defend the United
States from nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, could he have encumbered the Treasury for billions of dollars? One's visceral reaction is that
this result would be preposterous. But the reasoning required to reach
that conclusion is less obvious.
As I argued earlier with respect to Hamilton's Explanation, it serves
no useful purpose for the President to make disbursements of an amount
of unappropriated funds. that is too little to successfully discharge his
duty or exercise his prerogative under article II. It makes no sense to
disburse funds to send an envoy only as far as Paris if the arms reduction
negotiations to which the President wishes to send his envoy are taking
place in Geneva. Thus, the President must be permitted to spend enough
160. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK,

THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT

111-14 (1965).
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unappropriated funds to produce the minimally necessary level of public
output required by the faithful performance of his article II duties or the
reasonable exercise of this article II prerogatives.
In other words, the President must identify the necessary level of
public output implied by article II and then seek to minimize the cost of
producing that level of output. This responsibility is analogous to a familiar problem in the theory of the firm. 161 However, there may be discontinuity or nonmonotonicity in the marginal productivity of the labor
or capital employed to negotiate a treaty.1 62 In the case of discontinuity,
small expenditures of capital and labor may have a zero marginal product. As mentioned above, the President's expenditure of only enough
resources to send an envoy as far as Paris does not make any contribution to the production of a foreign treaty when negotiations are to be held
in Geneva.
Nonmonotonicity is slightly different. The President's decision to
send an envoy to Geneva to negotiate with the Soviets presumably might
have increasing marginal productivity of labor initially: The value of
staying for a third day of talks might be even greater, in its incremental
contribution to the successful negotiation of a treaty, than was staying
for the second day of talks. However, the 100th day of talks might contribute less (on an incremental basis) to the successful negotiation of a
treaty than did the 99th. In such a case, there would be diminishing
marginal productivity of labor and capital to the production of a

treaty. 163
These concepts of continuous and monotonic production functions
borrowed from the theory of the firm obviously are too abstract to yield a
workable legal test for determining the permissible level of presidential
161. See. eg., J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIc THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL
APPROACH 65-67 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing contrained cost minimization). In economic terms, one
can think of the President as having the responsibility to identify the isoquant corresponding to the
quantity of the public good demanded and to use the least-cost combination of inputs (capital and
labor) necessary to attain the isoquant. Thus, he must keep the federal government on the expansion
path, which is the locus of points of tangency between each isoquant and each isocost function. See
id at 67; A. CHAING, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 414-15 (2d ed.

1974); M.

INTRILIGATOR, MATHEMATICAL OPTIMIZATION AND

ECONOMIC THEORY

192-93

(1971).
162. In other words, the expansion path has a step or an S-shaped bend in it with respect to total
output. See J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, supra note 161, at 55-57. For further discussion of
continuous and monotonic functions, see id. at 391; A. CHAING, supra note 161, at 156-57, 181-82.
163. Of course, as Bruce Owen has pointed out to me, there is no reason to suppose that most
activities that the President has an implied right to fund under article II should be discontinuous or
nonmonotonic in their production technology. The size of the envoy's staff or the magnitude of her
entertainment allowance might provide continuous and monotonic measures of marginal productivity over the relevant range.
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expenditures on an unfunded article II duty or prerogative. 164 Nonetheless, the analogy helps one to conceptualize the President's role in managing the production of certain public goods that article II directs him to
produce. It helps as well to illustrate why allegations that the President
has abused his implied power to spend public funds in certain circumstances are better suited to evaluation through the political process rather
than through judicial review. The President's choice of the minimum
necessary level of output presupposes that the quality level of the public
good already has been defined satisfactorily. A federal law enforcement
policy that seeks to prosecute every incident of unlawful racial discrimination will be more costly than one that seeks to prosecute ninety percent
of such incidents, let alone one that seeks to prosecute only those in
which prosecutors believe there is a high probability of satisfying the relevant evidentiary requirements. Similarly, a national defense system that
seeks to destroy all incoming nuclear missiles will be more costly than
one merely seeking to destroy ninety percent of them. Surely the choice
of quality level-particularly in matters of prosecutorial discretionmust be a matter of political discretion left to the President in the first
instance and non-reviewable by the Judiciary.
Hamilton's concern in his Explanation that every appropriation
must come from a specific fund, raises an additional level of complexity
when one attempts to find a limiting principle for the President's implied
power to spend. Suppose hypothetically that Congress made total appropriations in a given year of $1,000 billion, 165 but that it specifically declined to appropriate a dime for the President to perform certain article
II duties and prerogatives. One could argue that the President could
fund these duties and prerogatives, and yet still respect the total budget
constraint established by Congress, simply by diverting funds from one
Executive Branch line item to the account necessary for paying for the
execution of the unfunded duties and prerogatives. In this respect, the
President would still respect fiscal accountability and public efficiency in
the sense that he would not be obligating the Treasury in excess of the
total spending level that Congress had approved through its enactment of
appropriations.
As discussed in Part I, disputes over such transferring of funds between accounts was the impetus for Gallatin's pigeonholing proposals of
164. Indeed, such a test becomes considerably more complicated in its economic treatment if one
considers economies of scope that might arise from the President's production of multiple public
goods. See Sidak, supra note 154, at 2085-89, 2103-05. On the implications of economies of scope,
see generally W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).

165. See 1989 EcONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 399 Tab. B-77 (total estimated federal
outlay of $1,151 billion for fiscal year 1990).
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the 1790s, as well as his (and Jefferson's) proposal for greater line-item
specificity in appropriations. Congress subsequently incorporated these
features into the early, and existing, versions of the Anti-Deficiency
Act.166 Clearly, pigeonholing and excessive specificity were both discretion-limiting developments. It is striking that their constitutionality has
never been challenged, other than by President Wilson in his 1920 veto
message. Surely it would not be a frivolous interpretation of the fiscal
accountability principle contained in the appropriations clause to assert
that Congress's power to control appropriations extends no farther than
the setting of a spending ceiling (the nation's budget constraint) and a
number of general subdivisions of spending, including perhaps affirmative statements that "$X shall be spent" to build a particular dam or
aircraft carrier and so forth.
One might argue, however, that congressional control over the nation's aggregate budget constraint is not enough in terms of the constitutional allocation of power. Rather, the argument would run, the
appropriations clause envisions Congress as having the power to rank the
preferences (and intensities of preference) for the production of the various public goods that compete for the taxpayers' dollars. Under this
view, if the President were to take funds earmarked for a congressionally
identified object in the Executive Branch and use those funds instead to
pay for the execution of unfunded article II duties and prerogatives, then
he would be frustrating Congress's putative right under the Constitution
to produce the ranking of consumer preferences for national public
goods. I am skeptical that Congress has so superior a position in the
national government when it comes to responding to the electorate's revealed preferences for the production of public goods.1 67 It is not at all
clear, in light of the debates during the Convention of 1787 and the early
budgetary practices from 1789-1792, that the Framers intended Congress
to control the composition of public spending to such detail and thereby
diminish the President's discretion. If one assumes nonetheless that the
Framers did so intend, there arises another provocative issue relating to
the constitutionality of the statutory means by which Congress has limited the President's ability to redirect public expenditures while still complying with the budget constraint imposed by the overall appropriations
ceiling.
At the lowest point of President Nixon's political power, Congress
enacted over his veto the statutory prohibition against presidential impoundment of spending, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
166. 31 U.S.C. § 1342-1349; see also L. WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER (1943).,
167. See Sidak, supra note 154, at 2108-10 (discussing whether the Executive or Congress has
the comparative advantage in ascertaining the electorate's preferences for governmental outputs).
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Control Act of 1974.168 The constitutionality of the impoundment ban
takes on new significance when one searches for a way to reconcile the
President's implied power to fund the execution of his article II duties
and prerogatives with the object of fiscal accountability and efficiency
embodied in the appropriations clause. Suppose that the President determines that he needs $100 million to pay for the execution of his unfunded
article II duties and prerogatives. If he were to impound .01 percent of
the entire $1,000 billion appropriated by Congress and use those funds to
execute his unfunded duties and prerogatives, the President would
neither exceed the aggregate spending level setby Congress nor disturb
Congress's relative ranking of preferences for public goods (other than
for those defunded Executive activities). (The President would seem to
be on even firmer ground if the pie whose size he was reducing by impoundment were solely the appropriations already made for the Executive Branch, or even the Executive Office of the President.) Of course,
the President's assertion of such a right under article II would directly
attack the constitutionality of the statutory prohibition on impoundment.
In light of these considerations, I propose the following limiting
principles on the President's implied ability to spend public funds to execute his duties and prerogatives:
1. The object of spending must relate to a textually demonstrable duty or prerogative of the President under article II.
2. The permissible extent of spending depends on the minimal
output of the public good whose production is necessary to execute the
article II duty or prerogative. Determinations as to minimum output
and quality should be matters of Executive discretion.
3. Congress's interest in ensuring fiscal responsibility does not
enable it to prohibit the President from creating a source of funds,
either by transfer between Executive Branch accounts or by impounding a small percentage of aggregate appropriations, to finance
the execution of article II duties or prerogatives.
4. A President claiming the right to fund the execution of unappropriated duties and prerogatives must comply, in the interest of fiscal
accountability, with the requirement contained in the appropriations
clause of publishing a statement and account of his disbursements from
the Treasury, as well as his understanding of the legal authority by
which his actions are justified.
There are other principles, or canons of construction, that one can envision. For example, as I have argued elsewhere, 69 Congress may not forbid the President from executing duties or prerogatives that have a zero
168. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 622-688 (1982); see also Abascal &
Kramer, PresidentialImpoundment Part I- Historical Genesis and ConstitutionalFramework, 62
GEO. L.J. 1549, 1552-53 (1974).
169. Sidak, supra note 154, at 2106.
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marginal cost; as the cost of executing one of those duties or prerogatives
gets closer to zero dollars, there can be no justification that withholding
funding for that duty or prerogative is necessary to achieve fiscal accountability or efficiency in the production of public goods.
These principles are tentative and surely will need refinement. They
are my attempt to balance two competing objectives under the Constitution: the protection of the public purse and the endowment of the President with the power and resources necessary to perform his job
effectively. I propose them as a means by which to stimulate debate, and
not as any claim that I have solved a puzzle that has engaged constitutional scholars since the time of Hamilton and Jefferson.
IV.

WHAT THE APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE

Is NOT:

THE

MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE "POWER OF THE PURSE"

AS A LEGISLATIVE VETO BY WHICH TO ERODE
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

The appropriations power does not empower Congress to impair,
through the defunding of certain Executive activities, the President's
ability to perform those duties and exercise those prerogatives, whether
they are routine or extraordinary. To interpret the appropriations clause
in this manner would destroy the principle of the unitary Executive. In
other words, the Union does not have to be on the brink of civil war or
invasion or reeling from natural disaster for the President, lacking appropriations, to be able to spend funds or obligate the Treasury in order to
perform the duties and exercise the prerogatives constitutionally assigned
to him under article II. Nonetheless, Congress has been intent in recent
years on advancing an interpretation of the appropriations clause that
would undermine the unitary Executive-a tendency evidenced not only
by the reasoning of the Iran-ContraReport (discussed earlier), but also
by numerous riders in recent appropriations legislation and by the 1989
Bipartisan Accord on Central America.
A.

The Virtue of a Unitary Executive

The American Constitution inherited from philosophers such as
172
Locke1 70 and Montesquieu,1 7 1 and from British constitutional theory,
the principle of separation of powers. However, after the failure of the
Articles of Confederation, the Framers of 1787 made a significant varia170. Locke, supra note 124, §§ 143-148, at 409-12.
171. C.L. DE S. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, book 9, ch. 6, at 201-13 (1784) (D.
Carrithers ed. 1977); see also P. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA, 1769-1801, at 134-37 (1940).
172. 10 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 151, at 713-24.
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tion on that theory by creating a unitary Executive that differed fundamentally from England's Parliament and from the Confederation
Congress. The relationship of the appropriations clause to the unitary
Executive is self-evident: Without sufficient funds to perform the duties
and exercise the prerogatives of the Executive, the President would witness his office become "feeble,'; to borrow Madison's and Hamilton's adjective, 173 and thus be transformed into a plural Executive.174
Consequently, the use by Congress of the appropriations power as a lever
on the President concerns something far more fundamental to American
constitutionalism than the admirable goal of controlling government
spending. To understand why it matters that the unitary Executive is not
undercut, it is necessary to retrace briefly the practical political rationale
by which the Framers concluded that a unitary Executive was necessary
to an effective federal government and why, in particular, history has
demonstrated that unitary executive action is essential to the successful
execution of foreign affairs.
I begin by asserting that the purpose of the Constitution is to
achieve a tempered mixture of individual liberty and collective strength.
The goal of preserving individual liberty is served, of course, not only by
the Bill of Rights and the limitations on legislative power of article I, but
also by the diffusion of power-effected by federalism and by the separation of powers among Congress, the President, and the Judiciary. The
goal of collective strength is served by ensuring that the three branches of
government have the ability to perform their respective functions (particularly those relating to national defense and foreign policy) in a efficacious manner. A unitary Executive is indispensable to that purpose.
The Framers did not fear a strong Executive. To the contrary, they
feared the tyranny and irresolution to which legislatures before 1787 had
proven themselves to be vulnerable. 175 In a famous passage from Notes
on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1781:
All powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result
to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is
precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no allevia173. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST
No. 70, at 423 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
174. Cf McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decreesto Insulate Policiesfrom Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 319 (discussing the President's inability to "bargain away"

his "constitutionally vested" powers).
175. As Charles Warren wrote in a noted essay: "When, in 1787, the Federal Convention met to
frame a new Constitution for the United States, the danger of this predominance of the Legislative
power had become so well recognized, that the Convention deliberately designed a Federal Government in which the Legislative should be restricted and the Executive enhanced." Warren,Presidential Declarationsof Independence, 10 B.U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1930). See also Rostow, President, Prime
Ministeror ConstitutionalMonarch?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 747 (1989).
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tion that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not
by a single one. One hundred and seventy three despots would surely
be as oppressive as one.... An elective despotism was not the government we fought for, but one which should not only be founded on free
principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided
and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could
transcend their legal limits, without being effectively checked and re-

strained by the others.176
Madison quoted this passage in its entirety in The FederalistNo. 48 177
and offered there his own equally famous warning on legislative power:
"The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all powers into its impetuous vortex." 17 8 But the concern over legislatures was not simply, as Madison and Jefferson argued,
that they tended to usurp power, but also (as Hamilton believed) that
they failed to get the business of government accomplished efficiently.
The danger of a weak Executive was abundantly clear to the Framers, for national defense had suffered under the Articles of Confederation, 179 particularly by the inability of the Confederation Congress to
deal effectively with the British army in North America.1 80 After the
Revolutionary War, Great Britain was obliged to relinquish its forts
along the Great Lakes pursuant to the Treaty of Paris. It refused to do
so, however, and the Confederation Congress was unable to produce a
policy of sufficient clarity and unity to dislodge this foreign army from
America's borders. 181 George Washington wrote in 1784 that "if the
British Government can no longer hold the western posts under [the]
cover" of the United States not respecting the terms of the Treaty, "I
shall be mistaken if they do not entrench themselves behind some other
expedient to effect it."182 In its day (given the limited technology of
weaponry, transportation, and communications) the situation would be
176. T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, at Query XIII (1782), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 214, 223-24 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310-11 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
178. Id. at 309.
179. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 152, 154 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
180. Cf.R. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 196 (1987) ("Of allpostwar
problems confronting the Confederation, the most exigent stemmed from differing interpretations of
the Definitive Treaty on the part of the United States and Great Britain.").
181. See I J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION, 1783-1793, at 73, 78
(1969); F. MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CON-

sTrrTION (1973); R. MORRIS, supra note 179, at 201; C. RITCHESON, AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION: BRITISH POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1795, at 49, 141-43, 151-63 (1969); J.
WRIGHT, BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1783-1815 (1975); see also THE FEDERALIST

No. 25, at 163 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
182. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Dec. 14, 1784), reprinted in
28 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-

1799, at 9, 10 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1938).
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analogous to Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba-a prospect,
of course, that drove President Kennedy to the brink of war in 1962.
This experience of the British forts in the 1780s-along with Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786 183-motivated the Framers to endow
the Executive with attributes that would enable him to respond quickly
and decisively to threats to national security. Of course, as the Cuban
Missile Crisis demonstrates, the threat of war in a nuclear age manifests
itself with greater suddenness and destructive potential than in 1787.

Thus, the need for unity and decisiveness in matters of national defense
has grown, not diminished, since 1787.184
The nature of the Legislature, however, prevents Congress from
providing that desired unity and decision. The potential for moral hazard and deadlock attendant to decisionmaking by committee, articulated

in economic terms today by public choice theorists, 185 was described intuitively by a frustrated Alexander Hamilton, who criticized the weaknesses of the Confederation Congress and praised the advantages of
instead having a President with "energy."' 18 6 Similarly, Hamilton argued
that the accountability of an energetic, "unitary" President helped to
protect individual liberty. He wrote in The FederalistNo. 70 that "a
plurality in the executive.., tends to conceal faults and destroy responsi-

bility" and "adds to the difficulty of detection" of untrustworthy conduct. 187 Thus, a suspicion of legislative power, and a dissatisfaction with

the ineffective execution of national policy under the Articles of Confed183. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 178 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); G. LYCAN,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON & AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 32-33 (1970); J. MAIN, supra note 15, at
105; G. WOOD, supra note 42, at 412-13, 465; Brown, Shays's Rebellion and the Ratification of the
FederalConstitution in Massachusetts, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION:

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITU-

TION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 113 (R. Beeman, S. Botein, & E. Carter eds. 1987).
184. It is instructive that, after the failed coup attempt in October 1989 to oust General Manuel
Noriega from power in Panama, some in the United States questioned whether Congress had dulled
the President's resolve to confront risky foreign policy situations for fear of paralyzing his administration in Iran-Contra-style congressional hearings and possible criminal prosecutions. See, e.g.,
Abrams, Panama: How America Lost Its Will to Act, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 1989, at BI, col. 4 (editorial by former Assistant Secretary of State).
185. See J. BUCHANAN & G.§TULLOCK, supra note 160, at 111-12; M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 53 (1964).
186. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427-28 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Letter
from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400, 404 (H. Syrett ed. 1961) ("Another defect in our system is want of method and
energy in administration. This has partly resulted from . . . the want of a proper executive.").
Edmund Burke had similar observations in France about the executive branch there: "The office of
execution is an office of exertion. It is not from impotence we are to expect the tasks of power." E.
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 235 (1790) (T. Mahoney ed. 1955).

187. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427-28 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2638 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The President is directly dependent on the people and since there is only one President, he is responsible. The people know whom
to blame ... ").
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eration, led the Framers to implement a separation of powers in both the
text and structure of the Constitution' 8 8 that envisioned the "energetic"
and "unitary" President praised at length by Hamilton in the The Federalist Papers.189

B.

The Contemporary Predilection of Congress to Read the
Appropriations Clause To Be a Legislative Veto on

PresidentialAction
It is generally accepted-rather unquestioningly in light of the history of the appropriations clause-that Congress may enact or repeal
substantive legislation by means of a rider to an appropriations bill. 190
But the Supreme Court's decision in the bill of attainder case, United
States v. Lovett, makes clear that Congress cannot use its appropriations

power indirectly to accomplish an unconstitutional objective. 91 Lovett
does more than forbid Congress to use its appropriations power to violate
the constitutional rights of individual citizens: It also prohibits Congress
from using that authority to achieve any unconstitutional end, including
the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of the Executive or the Judiciary. This is no great stretch of constitutional interpretation; as explained earlier, the rationale for separating the power of the
three branches in the first place is to protect the rights of individuals by
diffusing political power. 192 In particular, therefore, I read Lovett-as

did Attorney General William P. Rogers in 1960193 -to mean that Con188. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see also Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("this does not
mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power"); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635, 668 (1862) ("The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power."); A. HAMILTON, supra note 120, at 39.
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423-31 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (praising the concept of separation of
powers, claiming that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the
same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny").
190. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940); City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556
F.2d 40, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, this conventional view presumes the constitutionality of
logrolling, which has not been squarely addressed by a federal court.
191. 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) ("Congress has
plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction.") (citation omitted); Authority of Congressional Committees to Disapprove Action of Executive Branch, 41 Op. Att'y Gen.
230, 233 (1955) (Congress "may... impose conditions with respect to the use of the appropriation,
provided always that the conditions do not require operation of the Government in a way forbidden
by the Constitution").
192. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
193. Mutual Security Program-Cutoff of Funds from Office of Inspector General and Comptroller, 41 Op. Att'y, Gen. 507, 527-28 n.33 (1960) [hereinafter Cutoff of Funds] (also citing United
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gress may not use the appropriations power to impair the President's
ability to perform duties or exercise prerogatives the Constitution imposes on him.
1. UnconstitutionalConditions Containedin Recent Appropriations
Legislation. The Constitution does not establish a process by which
Congress declares, through its willingness or unwillingness to appropriate funds, that some of the President's article II duties and prerogatives
are at a given moment "indispensable" and others "dispensable." 194
Nonetheless, members of Congress routinely insert unconstitutional conditions into annual appropriations bills in a manner that would make the
appropriations power an all-purpose legislative veto on actions of the
President. Several provisions found in the appropriations acts for fiscal
year 1990 and for recent preceding years demonstrate this phenomenon.
For sheer absurdity, no such provision can rival section 119 of the
Department of the Interior Appropriations Act of 1990, a law signed by
President Bush on October 23, 1989. The law provides: "This section
shall be effective only on October 1, 1989. None of the funds available
under this title may be used to prepare reports on contacts between employees of the Department of the Interior and Members and Committees
of Congress and their staff." 19 5 Originally, section 119 did not contain its
first sentence and, so drafted, plainly interfered with the President's ability to manage the operations of the Executive Branch. On October 2,
1989, the House and Senate conferees agreed to limit the applicability of
section 119 to one day-October 1, 1989.196 The insertion of the first
sentence to section 119 might have provided Congress a way to gut the
rider without declaring defeat in the face of the President's objections,
197
but it did so in a manner that arguably created an ex post facto law,
given that the legislation did not become law until twenty-two days after
the one day that section 119 was to have been in effect.1 98 The other
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)); see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104-05 (1968).
194. I completely agree with Professor Michael McConnell, who argues: "There is no calculus
for determining which of the President's constitutional powers are more important than the others."
McConnell, supra note 174, at 320.
195. Pub. L. No. 100-121, § 119, 103 Stat. 701, 722 (Oct. 23, 1989).
196. 135 CONG. REC. H6398 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1989); see also 135 CONG. REC. H6515 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1989) (remark of Rep. Yates).
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
198. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138 (1810) ("An ex postfacto law is one which
renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed.")
(Marshall, C.J.). As I explain below, see infra text and notes accompanying notes 351-54, the violation of an appropriations rider could result in the criminal prosecution of an Executive Branch
official. Of course, one might argue that no ex post facto law had been created because the Interior
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unconstitutional conditions contained in the appropriations legislation
for fiscal year 1990 are less farcical than section 119, and considerably
more threatening to the separation of powers.
a. The appointments power. The President's appointment power
is one Executive prerogative upon which Congress has imposed conditions under the 1990 appropriations legislation for the Executive Office of
the President. Article II of the Constitution places on the President the
duty to nominate, "and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" appoint, ambassadors, judges, and other officers of the United
States.1 99 Article II also empowers the President to make recess appointments, without Senate approval: "The President shall have Power to fill
up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. ' '200 So, to take a concrete example, if during the Senate's 1989 Labor Day recess President Bush had made a recess appointment of
William Lucas to be Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department (after the Senate Judiciary
Committee rejected Lucas' nomination to the civil rights job by a sevenseven vote and voted against sending his nomination to the Senate
floor 20 1), Mr. Lucas would be able to serve in that office until the end of
the second session of the 101st Congress, or roughly until the end of
1990.
The 1990 appropriations act for the Executive Office of the President in effect has rewritten article II's appointments powers for fiscal
year 1990. Section 606 of the act provides: "No part of any appropriation for the current fiscal year contained in this or any other Act shall be
paid to any person for the filling of any position for which he or she has
been nominated after the Senate has voted not to approve the nomination
of said person. ' 20 2 This provision appears to be an attempt by Congress
to use its appropriations power to prevent the President from freely exercising his prerogative to make recess appointments of politically contro20 3
versial persons.
Department funds could not be "available under" the law until the President had signed it (or had
his veto overriden), which could not possibly occur until after October 1, 1989.
199. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
200. Id. cl. 3.
201. Johnson, Senate Committee Bars Bush's Choice from Rights Post, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2,
1989, at Al, col. 4.
202. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-136, 103 Stat. 783, 817 (Nov. 3, 1989).
203. Technically, in Mr. Lucas' case the Senate Judiciary Committee voted not to refer the nomination to the Senate floor; therefore, the Senate as a whole never voted "not to approve the nomination." Johnson, supra note 201, at A14, col. 1. Of course, if Congress were subsequently to maintain
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Moreover, as drafted, section 606 also would impose unconstitutional conditions on the President's ability to nominate and appoint officers subject to the usual Senate confirmation process. For example,
Judge Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court was rejected by
the Senate in 1987. The language of section 606 would seem to prevent
the President from being able to pay Judge Bork if he were nominated
and confirmed, for example, to the position of Secretary of Agriculture
or, for that matter, if Judge Bork were simply reappointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. This possibility exists because the appropriations rider does not restrict the payment of a rejected nominee only if the Senate has rejected "the [said]
nomination of said person." To the contrary, any nomination to any
position of a rejected nominee would seem to result in the President being denied funding to pay the salary of the person (assuming rather unrealistically that the person would be willing to take office under such
hostile circumstances). Moreover, given the rule against voluntary service contained in the Anti-Deficiency Act, 2°4 it is not even clear that a
person lawfully could serve the President free of charge under such
circumstances.
b. The recommendation duty. The 1990 appropriations bills also
contain a number of muzzling provisions that violate the recommendation clause.205 One of the most egregious examples is section 506 of the
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1990, the Act
that contains appropriations for the Department of Energy. 20 6 This
muzzling law prohibits the use of any funds available under any law "for
the purposes of conducting any studies relating or leading to the possibility of changing from the currently required 'at cost' to a 'market rate' or
any other noncost-based method for the pricing of hydroelectric power
by the six Federal public power authorities ....-o7 So, for example,
section 506 would prohibit the President or his officers from recommending, with respect to government hydroelectric facilities, the adoption of a pricing regime that would depart from conventional rate-ofreturn regulation. This muzzling provision escaped the notice of Presithat the vote of an individual committee of the Senate was sufficient for purposes of section 606, this
rider would be an even more egregious rewriting of the President's power to make recess
appointments.
204. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient"). See generally Sidak, supra note 154.
206. Pub. L. No. 101-101, 103 Stat. 641 (Sept. 29, 1989).
207. Id. § 506, 103 Stat. at 666.
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dent Bush, who signed the Act without any comment on this particular
20 8
section.
A similar muzzling provision appears in the appropriations act for
the Executive Office of the President. Throughout the Reagan administration, and now during the Bush administration, Congress has resisted
the efforts of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), acting pur2 9
suant to Executive Order 12,291 issued in 1981 by President Reagan,
to review federal regulations promulgated by Executive Branch departments to ensure that they are able to pass a simple cost-benefit test. In
particular, Congress inserted into annual appropriations legislation a
muzzling provision that prevented OMB from subjecting agricultural
marketing orders to cost-benefit scrutiny, presumably because many such
price support programs imposed costs on consumers or taxpayers that far
exceeded their benefits. 2 10 Again for 1990, Congress has conditioned appropriations for OMB as follows: "Providedfurther, That none of the
funds appropriated in this Act for the Office of Management and Budget
may be iised for the purpose of reviewing any agricultural marketing orders or any activities or regulations under the provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 .... ,,211 Muzzling the
President in this manner is plainly unconstitutional. As I have argued
elsewhere at length, Congress has no constitutional authority to restrict
the content of presidential recommendations. 21 2 In a sign that perhaps
the resolve of the White House to resist such congressional encroachments is on the rise, President Bush, while not explicitly mentioning the
recommendations clause, asserted in his signing statement accompanying
the Act that "[t]hese restrictions ... raise constitutional concerns because they impair my ability as President to supervise .the executive
branch." 2 13

208. Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1990, 25
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1472 (Sept. 29, 1989).
209. 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981); see also DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1986); Sidak, supra note 154, at 2079, 2111.
210. E.g., Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1984: Joint Resolution Making Further Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-151, § 575, 97 Stat. 964, 973 (1983) (incorporating
by reference H.R. 4139, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 514 (1983)).
211. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-136, 103 Stat. 783, 792-93 (Nov. 3, 1989).
212. Sidak, supra note 154, at 2106, 2122; Sidak, How Congress Erodes the Power of the Presidency: The AppropriationsMuzzle, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1989, at A8,col. 3.
213. Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1669, 1670 (Nov. 3, 1989) [Treasury Signing
Statement].
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c. The power to negotiate treaties.2 14 The Constitution envisions
that, through the ratification process, the Senate will participate in making of treaties. However, the Senate's role does not extend to the negotiation of treaties. John Jay wrote in The FederalistNo. 64 that the need for
secrecy and dispatch made the Senate an inappropriate body for negotiating treaties: "[T]here doubtless are many . . . who would rely on the
secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate,
and still less in that of a large popular assembly." 2 15 The nature of diplomacy requires that the nation speak confidentially, with one voice to foreign powers. "The convention have done well," Jay concluded, "inso
disposing of the power of making treaties that although the President
must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet
he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as
prudence may suggest.

'2 16

Despite the clarity of this reasoning in The FederalistPapers, many
in Congress evidently agree, in the treaty negotiation context, with Professor Tribe's view that Congress "may simply refuse to appropriate
funds for policies it deems unsound" and "may condition appropriations
in ways that limit presidential foreign policy choices. '2 17 Certain legislators again displayed for fiscal year 1990 an inclination to use the appropriations power to rewrite the President's power to negotiate
international agreements. On July 31, 1989, Representative Bill Richardson of New Mexico offered an amendment to H.R. 2991, the appropriations bill covering the Department of State.21 8 The amendment
would "prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for any meeting of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as
214. 1 wish to acknowledge Bruce Fein for suggesting to me the following discussion of encroachments on the President's power to make treaties.
215. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392 (3. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
216. Id. at 392-93. Similarly, Hamilton wrote that "[t]he constitution... considers the Power of
Treaty as different from that of Legislation." A. HAMILTON, CamillusNo. XXXVI (1796), reprinted
in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 319 (H. Syrett ed. 1974). He wrote that, "while the
Constitution declares that all the legislative powers which it grants shall be vested in Congress, it
vests the power of making Treaties in The President with consent of the Senate." Id.
217. L. TRIBE, supra note 120, at 221-22. Similarly, Louis Fisher writes:
It is conventional to say that Congress, in adding conditions and provisos to appropriations
bills, may not achieve unconstitutional results. But this merely restates the issue. What
types of conditions are unconstitutional? It is false to assume that conditions on appropriations bills are proper for domestic legislation but improper for legislation governing foreign
affairs and the war power. In foreign affairs as in domestic affairs, Presidents acknowledge
that Congress can use conditions to tailor its spending power.
Fisher, supra note 6, at 762-63 (citing L. HENKIN, supra note 128, at 114). Cf J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 282 (1980) ("The most potent congressional
weapon against executive encroachment is the power of the purse.").
218. 135 CONG. REC. E2756 (daily ed. July 31, 1989).
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the Helsinki Commission .... ,,219 The Congressmen complained that
"the Department of State has precluded the participation of Congress in
'22 0
the important substance of the conference.

Although the House ultimately passed H.R. 2991 without this
amendment, Representative Richardson's proposal is hardly aberrant in

illustrating how the power of the purse has been viewed by some in Congress as encompassing the power to rewrite the President's power under
article II to negotiate treaties. A more striking example took place in
1987, when Speaker of the House Jim Wright headed a congressional

delegation in Moscow that conferred with Mikhail Gorbachev on the
subject of arms control.2 21 Shortly thereafter, the House of Representatives passed, 208-178, a supplemental appropriations bill for the Depart-

ment of Defense containing a rider that would require President Reagan
to comply with the unratified SALT II treaty regarding numerical limits
on nuclear weapons and test bans, 222 thus limiting President Reagan's

ability to proceed with work on the Strategic Defense Initiative, which
might in turn affect the bargaining power of the United States in future
arms negotiations with the Soviets.
This expansionary interpretation of the power of the purse was

doubly illegitimate. First, it interfered with the President's treaty-making power in a manner that is impossible to reconcile with Justice Sutherland's statement in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that
"the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation. 2 2 3 Second, it asserted a role for the House (thus en-

croaching on the proper role of the Senate) in the ratification of treaties
despite the fact that the Framers intentionally excluded the House from

having any role in the making or ratification of treaties, as Hamilton
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Keller, House Group in Soviet Union Hopeful on Arms, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1987, at A14,
col. 1.
222. Gordon, In a Setback to Reagan'sPolicy, House Votes to Halt Nuclear Tests, N.Y. Times,
May 20, 1987, at AlO,-col. 3; see also Fuerbringer, House Leaders Drop Two Curbs on Arms from
Budget Bill, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, at A2, col. 3 (Democratic leadership in Congress agrees to
drop provision in supplemental budget requiring President Reagan to adhere to the weapons limits
of the unratified 1979 SALT II treaty).
This attempt by the House to use the appropriations power to insinuate itself into the treaty
process is reminiscent of the effort by the House in 1796 to condition the appropriation of funds for
the execution of the Jay Treaty on the House being given access to the papers pertaining to negotiation of the treaty. President Washington refused to turn over the documents, and the House eventually appropriated the requisite funds by a close vote. See L. WmTE, supra note 80, at 63-64.
223. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). For a recent assertion of this principle by President Bush, see
Message to the Senate Returing Without Approval the Bill Prohibiting the Export of Technology,
Defense Articles, and Defense Services to Codevelop or Produce FS-X Aircraft with Japan, 25
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1191, 1192 (July 31, 1989).
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explained unambiguously in The FederalistNo. 75.224 It is a classic example of the House's misuse of its exclusive power to originate money
225
bills, which, as described earlier, was a great concern to the Framers.
d. A legislative veto over regulations. The preceding examples of
Congress's misuse of the appropriations power demonstrate efforts to replace a unitary Executive with a plural Executive. Perhaps none of the
unconstitutional conditions contained in the appropriations bills for fiscal
year 1990 better illustrates this objective than section 610 of the bill appropriating funds for the Executive Office of the President: "None of the
funds made available pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall be used
to implement, administer, or enforce any regulation which has been disapproved pursuant to a resolution of disapproval duly- adopted in accordance with the applicable law of the United States. ' 226 This provision
amounts to a legislative veto over the President's execution of the law,
for it does not require that the congressional resolution be ajoint resolu227
tion subject both to bicameralism and presentment to the President.
There are, of course, one-house resolutions that can be said to be made
"inaccordance with the applicable law of the United States" in the sense
that they are passed pursuant to the formal rules of the House or Senate, 228 but obviously they do not have the force of law because of
229
Chadha.
The President should veto appropriations bills that contain this kind
of unconstitutional condition on his ability to discharge his duties and
exercise his prerogatives. If a veto is politically unworkable because it
would leave part of the Executive Branch unfunded, the President could
sign the appropriations bill into law and assert a power of excision, declaring the rider restricting his article II power to be unconstitutional
224. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton justified
the exclusion of the House as follows:
The fluctuating and ...multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it
those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the
same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and
dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous.
Id.; see also A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 136-39 (1848) (H.S. Commager ed.
1947).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
226. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-136, § 610, 103 Stat. 783, 819 (Nov. 3, 1989).
227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.3.
228. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H. DOC. No. 248, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 396-397 (1988).

229. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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and severable. 230 While the Constitution does not expressly give the
President such power, the President, however, does have a duty not to
violate the Constitution. The question is whether his only means of defense is a veto of the entire bill.
President Bush quite clearly answered that question in the negative.
On November 3, 1989, he signed H.R. 2989, the appropriations bill funding the Executive Office of the President, but he noted that "numerous
provisions.., purport to condition my authority, and the authority of
affected executive branch officials, to use funds otherwise appropriated
by the Act on the approval of various committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate. '23 1 He then asserted that the provisions were
void and possibly severable:
These provisions constitute legislative veto devices of the kind declared
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Accordingly,
I will treat them as having no legal force or effect in this or any other
legislation in which they appear. I direct agencies confronted with
these devices to consult with the Attorney General to determine
whether the grant of authority in question is severable from the unconstitutional condition. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678,

684-87

(1987).232

Excision of appropriations riders that trespass on the President's duties and prerogatives under article II would be different from the lineitem veto. As discussed in the context of controlling federal spending,
the line-item veto is characterized as a way for the President to excise
perfectly constitutional provisions in a spending bill that he finds objectionable merely because they conflict with his policy goals. The excision
of unconstitutional conditions in an appropriations bill would be an Executive power of far more limited applicability. One could argue that it
is not an assertion of an item veto at all for the President, by exerting a
power of excision, to resist unconstitutional conditions in legislation that
violate the separation of powers. Rather, such action might simply be
characterized as the President's determination as to how the Constitution
and its prior interpretations by the Supreme Court require him to faith23 3
fully execute the laws.
230. I recommendeded in an editorial on November 2, 1989 that President Bush consider such a
course of action with respect to this and other riders contained in the Treasury, Postal Service and
General Government Appropriations Act of 1990. See Sidak, Spending Riders Would Unhorse the
Executive, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1989, at A18, col. 3.
231. Treasury Signing Statement, supra note 213, at 1669.
232. Id.
233. This question is explored further in Sidak & Smith, FourFacesof the Item Veto: A Reply to
Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 1990).
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2. The 1989 Bipartisan Accord on Central America. In March
1989, Secretary of State James Baker unveiled an agreement between the
Bush Administration and Congress--called the Bipartisan Accord on

Central America-whereby Congress would provide limited nonmilitary
funding to the Nicaraguan opposition to the Sandinista government
through February 28, 1990. In a secret side agreement, the President
gave each of four congressional committees the unilateral power to halt
that funding after November 30, 1989.234 Presidential Counselor C. Boy-

den Gray argued to President Bush that this contract constituted an unconstitutional legislative veto, one even more illegitimate than the

legislative veto in Chadha, which at least required bicameral action by
both full houses of Congress. 235 The legal authority supporting Mr.
234. Weinraub, Bush and Congress Sign Policy Accord on Aid to Contras, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25,
1989, at Al, col. 6. The official statement signed by President Bush and five congressional leaders on
March 24, 1989 contains no mention of the legislative veto provision. Bipartisan Accord on Central
America, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 420, 420-21 (Mar. 24, 1989). Nor did the public statements issued by President Bush or Secretary Baker disclose this fact, Transcriptof White House
Remarks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at A6, col. 3, even though the New York Times reported the
following day that there existed ancillary "secret agreements under which Mr. Bush would yield
considerable leverage to Congress." Id. at A6, col. 6. Even H.R. 1750, the bill to enact the Bipartisan Accord, does not specify the nature of the legislative veto. See 135 CONG. REc. H1 178 (daily ed.
Apr. 13, 1989) ("Congressional oversight within the House of Representatives and the Senate...
shall be within the jurisdiction of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representative
and the Senate [and other enumerated committees] .... "). This omission suggests a question of
whether Congress fully complied with the requirement to "keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
Even the draft letter from the Secretary of State to congressional leaders that was eventually

published in a House report is remarkably vague. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIPARTISAN ACCORD
ON CENTRAL AMERICA OF MARCH 24, 1989, H.R. REP. No. 23, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989)
("This assistance has been authorized and appropriated but will not be obligated beyond November
30, 1989, except in the context of consultation among the Executive, the Senate Majority and Minority leaders, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader, and the relevant
authorization and appropriations committees and only if affirmed via letter from the Bipartisan leadership of Congress and relevant House and Senate authorization committees and appropriation subcommittees.") (emphasis added).
235. Pear, Unease Is Voiced on Contra Accord, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 5; Seibin,
White House Reaffirms ContraAid Plan After Bush's Counsel Expressed Doubts, Wall St. J., Mar. 28,
1989, at A20, col. 1; Weinraub, White House Rebukes Counsel on Pact, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1989,
at 6, col. 1. The requirement of bicameralism is articulated, somewhat obliquely, in the presentment
clause-article I, section 7, clause 2. Nonetheless, the necessity of the requirement is evident from
the structure of articles I and II and was clearly remarked on by the Framers. THE FEDERALIST
No. 5L, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-51
(1983) ("[Ihe Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presidential
clause would serve essential constitutional functions. The division of the Congress into two distinct
bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and
debate in separate settings."). Indeed, bicameralism was the object of the Great Compromise at the
Constitutional Convention. Id. at 950.
Four Members of Congress asserted that the Bipartisan Accord was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. 135 CONr. REc. H1194 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (Reps. Robert
Dornan, Dan Burton, Chuck Douglas, and Henry Hyde). They subsequently filed suit in federal
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Gray's position consisted not only of Chadha, but also precedent within
the Executive Branch: President Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, Jr., had opined in 1955 that a statute then enacted by
Congress and containing a legislative veto vested in either of two con2 36
gressional committees violated the principle of separation of powers.
Indeed, it is worth asking whether President Bush's excision of legislative
veto provisions on November 3, 1989, implicitly repudiated the Bipartisan Accord on Central America.
Mr. Arthur Liman, who served as Chief Counsel to the Senate Select Committee for the Iran-Contra investigation, vigorously defended
the constitutionality of Secretary Baker's agreement after the editors of
the Wall Street Journal had denounced it.237 Not surprisingly, thereasoning of Mr. Liman's defense of Secretary Baker echoed the expansive,
but textually and historically unsubstantiated, interpretation of the appropriations clause contained in the Iran-ContraReport:
The Constitution did not even attempt to define the outer bounds of
either executive or legislative power over foreign affairs, but those powers clearly intersect and overlap. The president was made deliberately
dependent on Congressfor funds. The Constitution forbids the president to spend money unless it has been appropriated by Congress.
And if Congress has the sole power to declare war, what lawyer (even
a president's counsel) could argue seriously that Congress cannot promote peace by refusing to appropriate aid to rebel forces. That is what
the Boland Amendments did-they cut off appropriations and expenditures for the Contras.

court to invalidate the agreement. Congressional standing, of course, remains a highly controversial
issue. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
236. Authority of Congressional Committees to Disapprove Action of Executive Branch, 41 Op.
Att'y Gen. 230 (1955); see also Wilson Veto Message, supra note 143, at 8845 ("I do not concede the
right, and certainly not the wisdom, of the Congress endowing a committee of either House or ajoint
committee of both Houses with power to prescribe 'regulations' under which executive departments
may operate."). In addition, President Franklin Roosevelt wrote a confidential memorandum to
Attorney General Robert Jackson in 1941 stating that a legislative veto provision in the Lend-Lease
Act, which Roosevelt had signed into law, was "clearly unconstitutional." Memorandum for the
Attorney General from President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Apr. 7, 1941), reprinted in Jackson, A
PresidentialLegal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1357 (1953).
Louis Fisher candidly suggests how, notwithstanding Chadha, Congress could avoid presentment and replicate through the appropriations process the effect of the legislative veto:
With regard to war powers in general, Congress may.pass a concurrent resolution (not
subject to the President's veto) stating that it shall not be in order in either House to
consider any bill, joint resolution or amendment that provides funding to carry out any
military actions inconsistent with an enabling statute, such as the War Powers Resolution.
Under the ruling ofINS v. Chadha, concurrent resolutions may not direct the President or
the executive branch, but they can control the internal procedures of Congress.
Fisher, supra note 6, at 763.
237. Liman, The Constitution and the Contras, Wall St. J., May 12, 1989, at AI5, col. 1. The
newspaper's editorial was Holy Roman Bipartisanship,Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1989, at AI0, col. 1.
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Mr. Gray's concern that the accords provide for a legislative veto
by any of four congressional committees ignores the fact that Congress
already had turned off aid for the Contras. The accords turned the aid
that gave Conback on. It was not Mr. Baker, but the Constitution, 238
gress the sole right to grant or decline appropriations.
Mr. Liman concluded that "Secretary Baker has exhibited a far more
sensitive appreciation of the Constitution and of how to wield executive
power effectively than critics with a crimped view of congressional
power."

239

I disagree. The Bipartisan Accord subverted the -rule of law. As
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison: "The powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits many not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing,
if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"'24° The Bipartisan Accord presumed the validity of an assertion of congressional power over appropriations that was illegitimate
from the start: Congress cannot condition appropriations on its ability to
veto subsequent Executive decisions. Compounding this constitutional
infirmity, the secret contract that evidently effectuates this legislative
veto violates the principle of bicameralism. Of course, Congress and the
President took these actions in the name of political expediency, bipartisanship, and pragmatism but these are the same genre of reasoning that
the Court vigorously rejected in Youngstown. The net effect of the Bipartisan Accord is to erode the unitary Executive by ceding power from the
President to Congress; to subordinate the separation of powers to ephemeral political objectives; and thus to stray farther from the ideal that the
people of this country consented to be governed by "a government of
'2 41
laws, and not of men.
C.

UnconstitutionalConditions on the Unitary Executive

The preceding examples show the recurrent attempt by Congress in
recent years to impose conditions on appropriations in a manner that
would transform the Presidency from a unitary to a plural Executive.
President Rutherford B. Hayes provided in 1879 perhaps the most artic238. Liman, supra note 237, at A15 (emphasis added).
239. Id.
240. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Discussing the extent of legislative
power, Locke wrote: "[Tihe Ruling Power ought to govern by declared and received Laws, and not
by extemporary Dictates and undetermined Resolutions." J. LOCKE, supra note 124, § 137, at 405.
241. MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. XXX (1780); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803) ("the distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if
those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts
allowed, are of equal obligation").
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ulate attack on the impropriety and unconstitutionality of this use of the
appropriations clause.
During Reconstruction, former slaves in parts of the South were
subjected to violence and intimidation when they attempted to vote or
assemble peacefully for political purposes. 242 President Ulysses S. Grant
responded to the situation in 1874 by sending General Philip Sheridan
and the U.S. Army into Louisiana, where two rival groups (one obviously hostile to blacks) claimed to have been legitimately elected to the
same public offices. 243 By the summer of 1875, however, President
Grant's support for former slaves had flagged in the face of enormous
political pressure from white supremacists in both the North and South,
and he refused to send any more federal troops into the South to protect
black voters. 244 The year 1877 brought the inauguration of Rutherford
B. Hayes, the return of home rule in the South, and diminished protection of blacks there.2 45 Congressional resistance to the renewed use of
federal troops had hardened, and Congress began to use its power of the
purse to try to prevent the use of U.S. Army troops as aposse comitatus.
By April 1879, Hayes had vetoed the first of five separate appropriations bills 246 that contained riders prohibiting, under threat of criminal
penalties, the use of any appropriated monies to deploy federal troops as
aposse comitatus-aprohibition that would have prevented the President
from using such troops to maintain peace and prevent fraud at polling
places in furtherance of the fifteenth amendment. 247 Hayes considered
the situation extremely grave, writing in his diary on July 30, 1879:
242. See, e.g., Crouch, Postbellum Violence, 1871 in 3 CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DocUMENrED HISTORY, 1792-1974, at 1689 (A. Schlesinger & R. Burns eds. 1975).
243. See E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
554-56 (1988); W. GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869-1879, at 121-35 (1979).
244. E. FONER, supra note 242, at 560-63; W. MCFEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY 417-19
(1981); Crouch, supra note 242, at 1712.
245. W. GILLETTE, supra note 243, at 346; cf. W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA 484 (1935).
246. H.R. 1, 46th Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 2252, 46th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 2382, 46th Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 4924, 46th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1880).
247. See E. MASON, THE VETO POWER: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTION IN THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1789-1889), at 47-49 (1890); Veto Message of Rutherford
B. Hayes (Apr. 29, 1879), in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4475, 4475-80 (J.

Richardson ed. 1897) [hereinafter Hayes Veto Message]. For further commentary on President
Hayes' veto controversy, see K. DAVISON, THE PRESIDENCY OF RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 162-63
(1972); A. HOOGENBOOM, THE PRESIDENCY OF RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 74-78 (1988); W. TAFT,
OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 25 (1916). Historian William Gillette argues that

Hayes' vetoes were politically expedient in the sense that, looking forward to the election of 1880,
they would prop up the Republican Party in the South, which had suffered from the disenfranchisement of blacks. W. GILLETTE, supra note 243, at 353-54.
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No doubt the Government is a good deal crippled in its means of enforcing the laws by the proviso attached to the Army Appropriations
Bill which prohibits the use of the Army as posse comitatus to aid

United States officers in the execution of process. The States may and
do employ state military force to support as a posse comitatus the state
civil authorities. If a conflict of jurisdiction occurs between the States
and the United States on any question, the United States is thus placed
as a great disadvantage. But in the last resort, I am confident that the
ample power to enforce obedience to United
laws give the Executive
248
States process.

Reflecting this concern, Hayes vetoed each of five consecutive appropriations bills that contained riders forbidding his use of the Army to protect
the polls.
It seems clear that President Hayes had the Constitution on his side.
The fifteenth amendment provides that no citizen shall be denied his
right to vote on the basis of race. 249 Two other rights expressly guaranteed by the federal government under the Constitution are the protection
of the states against domestic violence and the guarantee of a republican
form of government. 250 It is not difficult to envision that the infringement of voting rights because of racial animosity would undermine the
republican process by which the authority exercised by government receives its legitimacy. 251 In addition, the President has a constitutional
duty to faithfully execute the laws 252 and defend the Constitution 25 3provisions that require the President to enforce the fifteenth amendment
and the guarantee clause of article IV, regardless of whether Congress
has enacted legislation and appropriated funds specifically for that purpose. 2 54 Moreover, the President, as the Commander in Chief of the
armed forces, 25 5 has the power to dispatch federal troops for this purpose; the foreign policy powers granted to Congress 2 56 are clearly irrele248. 3 DIARY AND LETrERS OF RUTHERFORD RICHARD HAYES (July 30, 1878) 492, 492-93 (C.
Williams ed. 1924).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389 (1881) ("Beyond
question the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had the effect, in law, to remove.., that provision [of state law] which restricts the right of suffrage to the white race.").
250. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See generally Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New
Interpretationof the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984) (by Thomas A. Smith) (arguing
that federal courts, under the auspices of the guarantee clause, should police state governments in
their compliance with their respective state constitutions).
251. Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-58, 662 (1884).
252. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
253. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
254. Cf In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1890) (recalling episodes of executive action undertaken
pursuant to textual provisions of the Constitution without congressional implementing legislation).
255. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
256. E.g., id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (power to regulate commerce with foreign nations); id. cl. 11
(power to declare war); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Senate ratification of treaties and confirmation of
ambassadors).
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vant to this domestic use of military forces pursuant to the guarantee
clause.
Hayes recognized the scope of the problem and the scope of his
powers. The first of his five veto messages is extraordinary, for it resem257
bles a lengthy Supreme Court opinion on the separation of powers.
Opportunistic use of the appropriations power by the House of Representatives, Hayes argued, would usurp the power of the Senate, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary: "The enactment of this bill into a law
will establish a precedent which will tend to destroy the equal independence of the several branches of the Government. Its principle places not
merely the Senate and the Executive, but the Judiciary also, under the
coercive dictation of the House. ' '2 58 Hayes thought it perverse that the
House of Representatives, by virtue of its power of the purse, could elevate itself to the position of ultimate arbiter of constitutional disputes:
"The House alone will be the judge of what constitutes a grievance, and
also of the means and measure of redress. ' 259 This remark harkened
back to the original concern expressed at the Constitutional Convention
about the danger of the House abusing its exclusive power to originate
money bills. 260 Hayes' following remark was prophetic of the attempt by
Congress in 1987 to use the appropriations clause to force President Reagan to abide by a particular interpretation of the unratified 1979 SALT II
treaty with the Soviet Union:
An act of Congress to protect elections is now the grievance complained of; but the House may on the same principle determine that
any other act of Congress, a treaty made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, a nomination or appointment to office,
or that a decision or opinion of the Supreme Court is a grievance, and
that the measure of redress is to withhold the appropriations26required
1
for the support of the offending branch of the Government.
Hayes' original reasoning received further refinement in 1933, when
Attorney General William Mitchell opined that Congress cannot defund
the President's performance of his various duties: "Congress holds the
purse strings, and it may grant or withhold appropriations as it chooses,
and when making an appropriation may direct the purposes to which the
appropriation shall be devoted and impose conditions in respect to its
use, provided always that the conditions do not require operation of the
257. The grandiosity of the controversy does not necessarily mean that conditions improved
appreciably for blacks in the South as a result of Hayes' stand. See W. GILLETrE, supra note 243, at
434 n.69.
258. Hayes Veto Message, supra note 247, at 4483-84. Ultimately, Congress relented and

presented Hayes an appropriations bill without the rider. E. MASON, supra note 247, at 49.
259. Hayes Veto Message, supra note 247, at 4484.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 4245.
261. Hayes Veto Message, supra note 247, at 4484 (emphasis added).
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Government in a way forbidden by the Constitution.", 262 Attorney General Mitchell in effect anticipated the Court's holding in Lovett by articulating a theory of unconstitutional conditions in the context of separation
of powers: "Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations,
provide for a discharge of the functions of Government in a manner not
authorized by the Constitution. '2 63 Like Hayes, Mitchell feared an imperial Congress using its appropriations power to subordinate the coequal branches:
If such a practice were permissible, Congress could subvert the Constitution. It might make appropriations on the condition that the executive department abrogate its function. It might, for example,
appropriate money for the War Department on condition that the direction of military operations should be conducted by some person designated by Congress, thus requiring
the President to abdicate his
264
functions as Commander in Chief.
Thus, President Hayes and Attorney General Mitchell understood the
inherent tension between the separation of powers and the appropriations
clause, and they recognized the underlying fallacy of the expansive notion, now commonly accepted, of Congress's "power of the purse": If
the appropriations power may serve as a legislative veto, it has no selflimiting principle.
This insight eluded the drafters of the Iran-ContraReport but not
the drafters of the accompanying Minority Report, who stated that "Congress may not use its control over appropriations, including salaries, to
prevent the executive or judiciary from fufilling Constitutionally mandated obligations." 265 The Minority Report stated in simple terms the
broader constitutional principle at stake:
Congress may not condition an authorization or appropriation upon
any other procedural requirements that would negate powers granted
to the President by the Constitution. What Congress grants by statute
may be taken away by statute. But Congress may not ask the Presi262. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 61
(1933) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Mitchell Opinion]; see also Appropriations Limitations for
Rules Vetoed by Congress, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 731, 733-34 (1980). In 1957, President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops (and "federalized" the Arkansas National Guard) to keep peace and
protect the constitutional rights of black citizens when riots erupted following the issuance of a
federal court order to desegregate Central High School in Little Rock. Attorney General Herbert
Brownell relied expressly on the rationale used 78 years earlier by President Hayes and counseled
President Eisenhower that he had "grave doubts as to the authority of the Congress to limit the
constitutional powers of the President to enforce the laws and preserve the peace under circumstances which he deems appropriate." President's Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement of Federal Court Orders-Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 331

(1957).
263. Mitchell Opinion, supra note 262, at 61.

264. Id.
265. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 26, at 476 (Minority Report).
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dent to give up a power he gets from the Constitution, as opposed to
one he gets from Congress, as a condition for getting something,
2 66
whether money or some other good or power from Congress.
I believe that President Hayes, Attorney General Mitchell, and the minority draftsmen of the Iran-ContraReport were plainly correct in their
reasoning. If they were wrong, Congress could, in the name of protecting the public purse, prevent the President from fulfilling any of his duties, including protecting the rights guaranteed or reserved to the people
under the Constitution. The President's prerogatives likewise would be
jeopardized, for he would lack any discretion with which to exercise
them. As a consequence, the unitary Executive would be converted into
a plural Executive, the entire scheme of separation of powers would be
subordinated to the appropriations power, and the boundaries of individual liberty would depend at any moment on the ephemeral passions of
Congress.
V.

PROFESSOR STITH'S THEORY OF THE APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE

Professor Stith's theory of the appropriations clause would emasculate the Presidency and upset the separation of powers in precisely the
manner that President Hayes and Attorney General Mitchell feared.
Ironically, Professor Stith concedes at the outset of her argument that
article I, clause 9 does not give Congress the authority to do anything
that it cannot already do by virtue of its enumerated powers in clause 8:
"While section 8 of article I enumerates the powers of the legislative
'' 267
branch, the appropriations clause in section 9 is not a grant of power.
However, a few pages later Professor Stith reads the appropriations
clause as a sweeping grant of power far more potent than the necessary
and proper clause, 268 a grant of power so great as to enable Congress to
usurp the duties and prerogatives of the President by imposing specific
conditions on how he may perform or exercise those duties and
prerogatives.
Professor Stith's Principle of Appropriations Control-the proposition that the President is prohibited from making any "expenditure of
any public money without legislative authorization" 269-is obviously
266. Id. Based on this reasoning, the Minority Report made the following recommendation:
"Require Congress to divide continuing resolutions into separate appropriations bills and give the
President an item veto for foreign policy limitation amendments on appropriations bills." Id. at 585
(italics suppressed).
267. Stith, supra note 2, at 1348.
268. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining IncidentalPowers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal
Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 102 (Spring 1976).
269. Stith, supra note 2, at 1345 (emphasis added).

Vol. 1989:1162]

PRESIDENT'S POWER OF THE PURSE

1223

anti-presidential. That alone would not be a valid criticism, for one can
argue that a number of provisions in articles I and III are intentionally
anti-presidential in order to effect the separation of powers. Thus, Pro-

fessor Stith's theory might simply embody the "interdependence" and
"reciprocity" between the separate branches that Justice Jackson de-

scribed in Youngstown, 270 and which the Rehnquist Court in turn has
cited recently in support of its decisions in Morrison v. Olson 271 and Mistretta v. United States.2 72 On closer examination, however, it is clear that
Professor Stith's theory would diminish radically the President's article
II powers under the pretext of guarding the public purse; the theory
would make the Presidency an arm of Congress, rather than a coequal
branch, and thus violate the principle of separation of powers far more

than did, say, the legislative veto at issue in INS v. Chadha.273 It is
ironic, therefore, that although Professor Stith readily acknowledges that
"the First Amendment imposes a limitation upon the exercise of...
Congress' appropriations power, '274 she fails to recognize that the separation of powers acts as a limitation on Congress's appropriations power.

The political controversy to which Professor Stith repeatedly refers
in explaining her theory of the appropriations clause is the private funding of the Contras-the opponents of the Marxist regime in Nicaraguathrough both private contributions and diversions of profits made on the
secret sale of arms to Iran. She considers whether Congress, having denied President Reagan the aid he requested for arms to the Contras,
should have to tolerate individual citizens who, with the assistance of
270. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
271. 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2620 (1988).
272. 109 S.Ct. 647, 659 (1989).
273. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
274. Stith, supra note 2, at 1350; cf Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding, as violative of the first amendment, the "Armstrong Amendment," which made expenditure of funds appropriated for the District of Columbia contingent on the adoption by the District's
city council of a measure that would have permitted Georgetown University, a private institution
affiliated with the Catholic Church, to discriminate against homosexuals); News Am. Publishing
Corp. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding, as violative of the first amendment, an
appropriations rider that limited the discretion of the FCC to re-examine its policy for granting
waivers to its rule prohibiting cross-ownership of newspapers and television stations in the same
region). Similarly, but more broadly, Louis Fisher writes:
The congressional power of the purse is not unlimited. Congress cannot use appropriations
bills to enact bills of attainder, to restrict the President's pardon power or to establish a
national religion. The Constitution prohibits Congress from diminishing the salaries of the
President or federal judges. Congress would overstep its boundaries if it "refused to appropriate funds for the President to receive foreign ambassadors or to make treaties."
Fisher, supra note 6, at 762 (quoting Stith, supra note 2, at 1351) (citations omitted)). Nonetheless,
Fisher plainly views the appropriations power as a legislative veto on important functions of the
President in both domestic and foreign affairs. Id. at 762-63.
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Executive Branch employees, donate time and money to support armed
resistance against the Sandinista government.2 75 Professor Stith believes

that even if privately funded initiatives to overthrow'the Sandinistas imposed no incremental cost on the Treasury, Congress has the authority
under its appropriationspower to prohibit them. From the Iran-Contra
controversy, Professor Stith thus attempts to fashion a broad theory of
the appropriations clause.

Apart from whatever light it may shed on the conduct of foreign
affairs, the Iran-Contra controversy is an unlikely starting point for interpreting the appropriations clause. There is obviously a great deal of disagreement regarding the desirability and propriety of helping the Contras

to dislodge a Marxist military government in Nicaragua. 276 Indeed, the
disagreement often has been bitter.2 77 This polarity and tendentiousness

complicate the task of trying to derive from the circumstances of this
controversy a neutral rule for interpreting the appropriations clause.2 78

That difficulty should be manifest when the constitutionality of the underlying congressional attempts to constrain the President's management
of foreign policy in Central America (through the Boland Amendment)
275. On July 18, 1989, the Senate approved an amendment sponsored by Senator Moynihan that
would add language to a foreign aid bill to criminalize the solicitation of private contributions to
fund activities forbidden by Congress. Dewar, Senate Bans 3rd-Country Fund Raising, Wash. Post,
July 19, 1989, at Al, col. 6; see also 135 CONG. REC. S8107-10 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (discussing
Amendment No. 268 to S. 1160) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan). President Bush vetoed legislation
containing such a prohibition. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 1990, 25
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1783 (Nov. 19, 1989). He later signed a bill with a diluted form of the
prohibition. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1810 (Nov. 21, 1989).
276. United States policy toward the Government of Nicaragua shall be based upon the
government's responsiveness to continuing concerns affecting the national security of the
United States and Nicaragua's neighbors about... Nicaragua's close military and security
ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies including the presence in
Nicaragua of military and security personnel from those countries and allies ....
Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 203(a), 100 Stat. 1783, 178396 (1986).
277. Consider, for example, the acrimonious exchange over whether the Sandinista regime endorsed the massacre in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. CompareFellow Travelers, Wall St. J.,
June 7, 1989, at A32, col. I (reporting a story appearing in Barricada, the official Sandinista newspaper, supporting actions of the Chinese government); 135 CONG. REc. H2844 (daily ed. June 20,
1989) (statement of Rep. Ballenger) ("A government that would casually dismiss this type of brutal
suppression cannot realistically be expected to meet its obligations for holding free elections.") and
Solidarity Forever, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at A16, col. 2 (quoting Chinese Xinhua news agency
report of Sept. 12, 1989 that a member of the Sandinista Directorate said in Beijing that Nicaragua
gives China "firm support in" "quelling of anti-government riots") with Cockburn, Nicaragua, Vietnam and Cuba Praise China? Dead Wrong, Wall St. J., June 15, 1989, at A13, col. I (refuting Wall
Street Journal'seditorial of June 7, 1989).
278. Cf. Posner, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 5 CONSr. COMMENTARY 17, 17
(1988) ("Most of what passes for constitutional scholarship is heavily tendentious commentary on
recent decisions by the Supreme Court.").
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is itself so hotly disputed. Moreover, even if one considers the appropriations clause to serve as a kind of vector of national policy (having both
direction and magnitude), congressional support for and opposition to
the Contras provide testimony to the inconsistency in foreign affairs that
2 79
the Framers feared from a plural Executive.
I do not mean to suggest that Professor Stith's undertaking is
doomed to a resulted-oriented analysis because she has chosen a politically controversial starting point. However, one need not be an adherent
of "original intent" to be skeptical that the events of the Iran-Contra
controversy (as opposed to, say, the text of the appropriations clause or
the history of debates of the Convention of 1787) reveal the probable
meaning of the appropriations clause, and that, in the course of construing that clause two centuries later, the illegitimacy of assisting the private
funding of the Contras emerges as a straightforward implication. I believe that one of Professor Stith's predecessors at Yale Law School, Eugene Rostow, has the clearer perspective on the appropriations clause
issues raised by the Iran-Contra Affair. He considers them to be rather
mundane:
Whether the Boland amendments are constitutional, and exactly what
they mean, are ... irrelevant to the ultimate question left by the IranContra episode: whether every penny received from the sales of arms
to Iran belonged to the United States, or whether the so-called "profits" from the sales fell into another category. That is an important
question, and not a very difficult question, but it does not account for
the political excitement engendered by the affair. There can be little
279. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 435-36 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). In 1983, Congress appropriated $24
million in military aid for the Contras. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1421, 1452 (1983). In 1984 and 1985, Congress eliminated the
military aid but appropriated $27 million in humanitarian aid. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 722(g)(1), 99 Stat. 254; Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat. 293, 324. In 1986, Congress appropriated $100 million
for both military and humanitarian purposes. Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1987,
§ 206(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-300 (1986). In 1987, Congress appropriated
$3.6 million for humanitarian purposes and $4.5 million for the transportation of humanitarian and
other assistance.. Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988-Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, tit. VI, § 111, 101 Stat. 1329-437
(1987). In 1988, Congress appropriated $16.5 million for military aid and $27.1 million for humanitarian purposes. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-463, §§ 9003,
9006(a)(1), 102 Stat. 2270, 2270-50, 2270-53 (1988). And, in 1989, Congress and the Bush Administration reached an agreement (discussed in greater detail earlier) by which Congress appropriated
$49.75 million through February 28, 1990 for humanitarian purposes, subject to the unilateral power
of Congress to halt funding after November 30, 1989. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIPARTISAN AcCORD ON CENTRAL AMERICA ACT OF 1989, H.R. REP. No. 23, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989)
[hereinafter REPORT ON BIPARTISAN ACCORD].
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doubt that the proceeds of the sales should have been paid to the
280
Treasury.

Professor Stith's pedagogical reliance on the Iran-Contra Affair threatens
to deflect attention away from an attempt to interpret, as neutrally as
possible, the history, text, and structure of the appropriations clause. In-

stead, the considerable political excitement engendered by the Iran-Contra Affair threatens to taint the dispassionate interpretation of the clause.

In this respect, Professor Stith's essay is rhetorically adept, for it enables
her to free ride in her explication of the appropriations clause on the
popular indignation over "trading arms for hostages" and on the animus
that many legal scholars evidently feel toward the institution of the Presidency 281 (and perhaps toward Ronald Reagan as a political figure). We
are tempted to agree with Professor Stith's theory on the appropriations
clause not because we are convinced that it is right, but because we know
that what happened in the Iran-Contra Affair was wrong and should not
be permitted to happen again.
A. Aggrandizement of CongressionalPower

Professor Stith asserts that Congress may prohibit presidential actions that do not cost taxpayers anything and thus cannot be said to re-

quire that "Money shall be drawn from the Treasury." She writes:
"Even where unauthorized spending by the Executive would impose no
additional obligation on the Treasury . . . , the Constitution prohibits

such spending if it is not authorized by Congress.

' 282

(At the same time

she asserts that no such limitation applies to the Legislature: "Congress
has constitutional power to govern by means that involve no cost to the
federalgovernment and no federal government action. ' 283) The scope of
280. E. RosToW, PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, OR CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH? 23 (Insti-

tute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Oct. 1989).
281. E.g., P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 153 (1978) ("The primary evil
revealed by the events of Watergate was the presidency: not the man but the office.")
282. Stith, supra note 2, at 1345 (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 1348 n.20 (emphasis added). Professor Stith gives as examples of this proposition the
ability of the federal government to coerce states to tax or regulate private conduct. Id. Apart from
implicitly endorsing the expansion of the coercive power of government at the expense of the individual, this line of reasoning ignores some of the most powerful language that the Constitution contains
regarding the legitimacy of government. Although Congress may avoid creating costs for the federal
government by coercing the states to tax and spend, by so doing it still clearly creates a cost for the
people, from whom all powers of the federal government (including those of Congress) are delegated.
See U.S. CONST. preamble ("We the People... do ordain and establish this Constitution"); U.S.
CONsy. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution ... are
reserved... to the people."); see also R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER

OF EMINENT DOMAIN 331 (1985) ("Representative government begins with the premise that the
state's rights against its citizens are no greater than the sum of the rights of the individuals whom it
benefits in any given transaction.").
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congressional power and oversight of the President created by the appropriations power is plenary in Professor Stith's opinion, such that "all
activity of the executive branch-all actions undertaken by and in the
name of the United States government-must be authorized and paid for
2' 84
pursuant to the Constitution.
At this point in her interpretation of the appropriations clause, Professor Stith performs a legerdemain that cannot escape notice. She defines a governmental activity to be "authorized and paid for pursuant to
the Constitution" only after Congress has authorized it and appropriated

funds for it. Thus, her derivation of the Principle of Appropriations
Control implies a startling morphology of the Constitution: Because
Professor Stith asserts that only Congress has the power to appropriate
funds, she concludes that it can decline to "authorize" the President to
perform any of the activities of the Executive Branch that the Framers

specified in article II. In other words, the President is a constitutional
amanuensis who may perform his duties and exercise his few discretionary powers only to the extent that Congress authorizes him to do so by
permitting him to draw money from, or make obligations on, the Treasury.2 85 Even if the President would only trivially burden the Treasury by
taking a particular action-such as delivering a speech advocating a par-

ticular policy 286-he may not act unless Congress "authorizes" him to do

287
so, since Professor Stith declares it to be an "indispensable function"
of the appropriations clause for Congress to decide whether "under our
constitutional scheme ...the specific activity is ...within the realm of
' 288
authorized government actions.
284. Stith, supra note 2, at 1348 (emphasis added).
285. This diminution in the role of the President would be even greater than that created by the
statutory elimination of the impoundment power, which Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed
argued in 1973 would transform the President into the nation's "Chief Clerk." See Impoundment of
AppropriatedFunds by the President: Joint Hearingson S. 373 Before the Subcomm. on Impoundment ofFunds of the Senate Comm. on Goy't Operationsand the Subcomm. on Separation ofPowers
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1973).
286. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
287. Stith, supra note 2, at 1381.
288. Id. at 1361. It is informative that the Confederate Constitution substantially expanded the
President's power over spending: "Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury except
by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses, taken by yeas and nays, unless it be asked and estimated for
by some of the heads of departments and submitted to Congress by the President ....
" CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.9 (1861), reprinted in 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY, 1861-1865, at 37, 43-44 (A. Nevins & J. Richardson eds. 1966);
see also E. COULTER, THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 1861-1865, at 28 (1950) ("Con-

gress could not ...make any appropriations without a two-thirds majority unless asked for in the
Presidential budget.") (emphasis added). In other words, the seven states that adopted the Confederate Constitution less than 75 years after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution changed the appropriations clause contained in the 1787 document in a manner antipodal to Professor Stith's
Principle of Appropriations Control. Jefferson Davis observed that even a Northern newspaper, the
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This reasoning reveals a major weakness in Professor Stith's theory

of the appropriations power. She repeatedly refers to "our constitutional
order, ' 28 9 yet the meaning of this phrase remains obscure, and the significance of the text and history of the appropriations clause-and of the
enumerated duties and prerogatives of the President in article If-seem
incidental. Consequently, Professor Stith is able to make the following

assertion: "If Congress permits the Executive access to the public fisc
without effective appropriations control, then the Executive alone defines

the scope and character of the public sphere, especially in areas that inherently require significant executive discretion. ' '290 What about the text
of the Constitution? Before there was a tripartite federal government,

there were the Framers, who surely thought that one important purpose
of their undertaking in Philadelphia in 1787 was to define "the scope and
character of the public sphere. ' ' 291 Thus, it simply does not follow, as
Professor Stith asserts, that the President will have dictatorial powers to

delineate the extent of the federal government unless Congress keeps him
on a strict allowance.
Despite her concern over the President exercising too much power
to define the extent and scope of the public sphere, Professor Stith creates
a double standard by which Congress is free to govern the nation (in

some unspecified manner with an equally unspecified degree of accountability) without the President's participation or his agreement that its ac-

tivities are within Professor Stith's "realm of authorized government
New York Heraldof March 19, 1861, praised this and other structural modifications that the Confederacy had made to the U.S. Constitution in drafting their own document. 1 J. DAVIS, THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 263 (1881). On the public finance of the Confederacy, see generally R.

LESTER, CONFEDERATE FINANCE AND PURCHASING IN GREAT BRITAIN

(1975); R. TODD, CONFEDERATE FINANCE (1954).
289. Or "our constitutional structure" or "our constitutional scheme." Stith, supra note 2, at
1344, 1346 (twice), 1353 n.48 ("our democratic order"), 1358, 1360, 1361. It is unclear whether
Professor Stith considers "our" to refer to the views of the Framers, or rather the views of some
contemporary group of constitutional thinkers. I presume, for example, that she has something
different in mind from what Justice Scalia does when, dissenting in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 647, 683 (1989), he refers to "our constitutional structure" as something that would not permit
"improvisation" regarding the separation of powers.
290. Stith, supra note 2, at 1345 (emphasis added).
291. By comparison, the framers of the Confederate Constitution defined the public sphere more
narrowly than the extent of the United States public sphere of 1861 in the sense that the Confederate
post office-to take one example-was to have been subsidized by the national government only
until March 1, 1863. CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (1861), reprinted in 1 THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY, 1861-1865, at 37, 42 (A. Nevins & J.
Richardson eds. 1966). The U.S. Constitution is considerably more open-ended about public ownership or subsidization of the Post Office. See Priest, The History of the PostalMonopoly in the United
States, 18 J.L. & ECON. 33, 50-51 (1975) ("It is conceivable that the authors of the Constitution
intentionally drafted a postal clause that was vague, to allow Congress the option at some later date
of withdrawing from management or of relaxing the monopoly .... Congress, if it wishes ... may
simply establish offices and designate postal routes.") (footnotes omitted).
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actions." She writes that "the Constitution does not require that all
forms of national governance involve activity by the executive branch;

Congress may exercise its constitutional powers in ways other than creating executive authority to act in the name of the United States. ' 292 This
is a mysterious proposition: What could Congress do that on the one
hand would be an act of "national governance" but on the other hand
would not be "undertaken by and in the name of the United States government"? That the power to execute national policy resides in the Executive Branch pursuant to article II simply adds to the mystery, for I

doubt that Professor Stith has in mind ministerial acts so bland as the
sanctioning of Members of Congress. 293 I doubt as well that she merely
has in mind Congress's power to conduct investigations. 294 To the con-

trary, Professor Stith strongly implies that the appropriations clause authorizes Congress to direct foreign affairs. 295 I suspect, therefore, that

Professor Stith envisions "national governance" by Congress legitimately
to include the numerous versions of the Boland Amendment;2 96 then
Speaker of the House Jim Wright's negotiations on Capitol Hill with
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega; 297 and the appropriations rider
forcing the President to close the Palestine Liberation Organization's
mission in the United States,2 98 notwithstanding that article II imposes
on the President the duty to "receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers. ' 299 I do not believe that such congressional attempts at "na292. Stith, supra note 2, at 1348.
293. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969).
294. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135, 174 (1927). See generally I CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY, 1792-1974,
supra note 242; J. HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE 4 (1976).

295. Stith, supra note 2, at 1383 & n.198. Similarly, Professor Stith hints that "national governance" undertaken unilaterally by Congress permits the Legislature to assign greater prosecutorial
functions to independent agencies. Id. at 1383 n.199. In this regard, she posits: "The faithful execution clause should not be understood as a separate grant of power to the President." I1d. at 1347
n.15.
296. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 26, at 395-407, 489-500; see also Malbin, Legalism
versus PoliticalChecks and Balances: Legislative-Executive Relations in the Wake ofIran-Contra,in
THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 159, at 273, 275-77.
297. Lewis, Ortega Proposes Truce but Rebels Object to Terms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1987, at
Al, col. 6; see also Roberts, Reagan-Wright Argument Grows on CentralAmerican Policy Role, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at Al, col. 2 (reporting President Reagan's anger over Speaker Wright's
negotiations with Daniel Ortega).
298. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1003, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406.
299. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers of United States,
7 Op. Att'y Gen. 209 (1855) ("As the President appointed negotiating agents of himself, and ministers proper with consultation of the Senate alone, so he reduced or discontinued a mission in his
discretion .... ); Marcus, Bush Must Protectthe Presidency,Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1989, at A18, col. 3
("specified U.S. Consulates [were required to] remain open when the president wanted to close them,
though the Constitution clearly states that the president alone is to determine how and with whom
the U.S. maintains diplomatic relations").
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tional governance" can be extrapolated from the history, text, and structure of the appropriations clause, particularly when, as Professor Stith
initially concedes, that clause is not an independent grant of power to
3 °°
Congress.
B. Interference with the President'sAbility to Perform His Duties and
Exercise His Prerogatives Under Article II
Apart from aggrandizing the power of Congress at the President's
expense, Professor Stith's Principle of Appropriations Control also
would undermine the President's ability to perform his duties and exercise his prerogatives under article II. This eventuality is apparent in
three seemingly contradictory paragraphs in Professor Stith's article in
which she derives and defines her constitutional principle.
1. A President Without ConstitutionalRemedies. Professor Stith
first asserts that "Congress is obliged to provide funds for constitutionally mandated activities," including "independent constitutional activities of the President. ' 30 1 That position I share and is unassailable, as
explained in Part I. However, only four sentences later Professor Stith
pulls the rug out from under this congressional obligation, revealing that
she regards it to be unenforceable and thus ineffectual: "Even where the
President believes that Congress has transgressed the Constitution by
failing to provide funds for a particular activity, the President has no
constitutional authority to draw funds from the Treasury to finance the
activity. "302
I find this suggestion impossible to accept. If Professor Stith's interpretation of the appropriations power is correct, Congress could, for example, effectively deny blacks the right to vote by denying the President
the necessary funding to enforce the fifteenth amendment, and neither
the President nor the Supreme Court could do anything to protect those
voting rights. The President, acting in his official capacity, could "not
spend one minute to make one phone call" ' 30 3 to enforce that constitutional right. Obviously, such a result would contradict the principle in
Lovett and in President Hayes' veto messages of 1879-80. For the simple
reason that Congress has no authority to enact a law suspending the fifteenth amendment, it could not achieve the same result through clever
use of its appropriations power. By enlarging the powers of Congress,
Professor Stith loses sight of the fact that the Framers' justification for
300.
301.
302.
303.

Stith, supra note 2, at 1348.
Id. at 1350-51.
Id. at 1351 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1361.
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the separation of powers was to protect individual liberty and achieve
collective strength.
But suppose that Professor Stith is correct and the President has no
constitutional authority to withdraw funds from the Treasury to finance
his execution of the law, or to perform his other duties and exercise his
prerogatives. What recourse does that leave the President? Evidently
none, for Professor Stith asserts that Congress is entitled to the last word
in disputes with the President over appropriations to fund the perform-

ance of executive functions: "If a court determines that Congress's failure to provide funds is unconstitutional, one would expect Congress to
abide by this judicial decision and appropriate funds accordingly. If
Congress fails to do so, however, a court has no more constitutional authority than does the President to mandate withdrawal from the Treasury. '' 304 At first encounter, this position might seem to be a strict
interpretation of Hamilton's view that the judiciary "has no influence

over either the sword or the purse.

' 30 5

But it becomes clear that this is

not Professor Stith's position at all, since she believes that the federal
courts do have the authority to order state legislatures to appropriate
funds for programs necessary to "effectuate federal constitutional guarantees," such as for school desegregation. 30 6 To paraphrase Justice Pow-

ell, I would infer from this assertion that Professor Stith's Principle of
304. Id. at 1351 n.34. In Professor Stith's defense, it should be noted that Thomas Jefferson
similarly said: "If the legislature fails to pass laws for a census, for paying the judges and other
officers of government, for establishing a militia, for naturalization as prescribed by the constitution,
... the judges cannot issue their mandamus to them ...
" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William
C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprintedin 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 160 (P. Ford ed.
1899). As I explain in Part VI, however, Jefferson's solution to there being an absence of appropriations for a desired course of conduct was simply to incur debts in the name of the federal government
anyway.
Professor Stith does not attempt to reconcile her view of Congress's supreme power to interpret
the appropriations clause with the Supreme Court's intimation in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), and its overt assertion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), that it
has the last word in interpreting the Constitution. Even if one does not agree with the Court, it is
too facile for Professor Stith to ignore this issue, particularly when it is so central to the validity of
her thesis. Compare A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 264 (1962) ("[U]nder Marbury
v. Madison ... the Court is empowered to lay down the law of the land, and citizens must accept it
uncritically. Whatever the Court lays down is right, even if wrong, because the Court and only the
Court speaks in the name of the Constitution.") and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 595 (1982) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The judiciary may, as this case proves, have to
intervene in determining where authority lies as between the democratic forces in our scheme of
government.") with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 n.155 (1964) (to equate judicial authority to interpret the Constitution with judicial exclusiveness is to confuse Marbury v. Madison
with statements in Cooper v. Aaron).
305. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
306. Stith, supra note 2, at 1351 n.34 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989)); see also Wermeil, Test of Power: Can a FederalJudge)?aise
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Appropriations Control would relegate the states to "precisely the trivial
role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would occupy. ' 30 7 In
light of the language of the tenth amendment, however, and given that
the states created the federal government (and not vice versa), I cannot
understand how Professor Stith could conclude that a federal court has
such power to compel appropriations at the state level but not the federal
level.
Professor Stith supports her view of limited presidential recourse by
quoting the statement in Hart's Case that "absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its
exercise of this great power only to the people. ' 30 8 For further support,
Professor Stith looks to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which has relied on Hart's Case in saying that
the appropriations clause "is not self-defining and Congress has plenary
power to give meaning to the provision. '30 9 But these statements cannot
be read to imply that Congress is free to interpret its appropriations
power in a way that encroaches on the duties or prerogatives of another
branch. Even if Congress were answerable "only to the people" when it
interprets the appropriations clause, it was for the benefit of the people
that the Framers separated power among the three branches. Therefore,
even "plenary power" cannot encompass the power to usurp.
Professor Stith carries the argument further: When Congress refuses to fund "an inherent executive activity," the President's sole recourse is to unleash on Congress the "[p]olitical processes contemplated
by the Constitution," particularly "elections and impeachment. 310° Evidently, a humbled President should ask Congress to impeach the majority of its members, all of those who cast votes against funding the
disputed Executive functions. The suggestion is unrealistic as a matter of
politics, and probably also as a matter of constitutional law. 31' Professor
Stith's suggestion that the election process provides a remedy is too facile
as well. It presumes that an election would serve as a plebiscite on a
single, relatively abstruse issue, whereas most national elections seem to
PropertyTaxes? One in MissouriDid, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1989, at A1,col. 1 (Judge Russell G. Clark
"nearly doubled Kansas City's property tax to pay for school desegregation").
307. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
308. Stith, supra note 2, at 1386 n.212 (quoting Hart v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 459,484 (1880),
afid, 118 U.S. 62 (1886)).
309. Stith, supra note 2, at 1392 n.253 (quoting Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 194 & n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
310. Stith, supra note 2, at 1351-52 & n.36.
311. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT 220 (1973) ("[L]egislators are not impeachable for their
legislative acts-that is, where they vote collectively on bills and the like-assuming always that
individual votes in consequence of bribery and corruption are distinguishable.").
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focus on a variety of issues. In addition, it would delay resolution of the
question until the next election cycle. Even then, there likely would be
debate over whether the election results constituted a "mandate" from
3 12
the voters (whatever that would mean).
Professor Stith supports her argument by quoting an opinion by Attorney General William P. Rogers. In fact, Attorney General Rogers'
opinion flatly contradicts Professor Stith's implied premise that the separation of powers does not limit Congress's appropriations power. She
quotes the following language: "Conceivably, under [the appropriations
clause] Congress could refuse to appropriate any funds at all to implement legislation, however essential the appropriation might be for the
country's welfare. The remedy in such a case would be political. ' 313 She
does not mention, however, that on the same page Attorney General
Rogers stated: "Congress may not use its powers over appropriations to
attain indirectly an object which it could not have accomplished directly. ' 314 And on the following page, the Attorney General, citing
United States v. Klein, 315 stated that "the power to appropriate... cannot be exercised without regard to constitutional limitation. ' 3 16 Klein
involved the President's issuance of a pardon-an entirely discretionary
317
power conferred by article II. As Attorney General Rogers observed,
the Court in Klein stated that "it is clear that the legislature cannot
change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can
change a law."' 31 8 Given that Attorney General Rogers believed that
Congress may not use its appropriations power to restrict the President's
exercise of discretionary power, it follows a fortiori that he believed that
Congress may not use the appropriations power to restrict the President's
ability to discharge duties over which article II permits the Executive no
discretion at all. Indeed, Attorney General Rogers concluded that when
a "constitutional duty and right of the President" is involved, "the Constitution does not permit any indirect encroachment by Congress upon
this authority of the President through resort to conditions attached to
appropriations. '3 19 This conclusion hardly supports Professor Stith's
312. In addition, it is possible that the plural nature of decisionmaking in Congress will make the
electoral process a less satisfactory check on violations of the separation of powers than it is for a
unitary Executive. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427-28 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961);
Sidak, supra note 154, at 2091-92.
313. Stith, supra note 2, at 1352 n.36 (quoting Cutoff of Funds, supra note 193, at 526) (brackets
supplied by Professor Stith).
314. Cutoff of Funds, supra note 193, at 526.
315. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
316. Cutoff of Funds, supra note 193, at 527.
317. Id.
318. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148.
319. Cutoff of Funds, supra note 193, at 530.
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suggestion that the Attorney General already has conceded that Congress may use its appropriations power however it likes and then declare,
when it is at loggerheads with the Executive Branch, that such an interpretation of the appropriations clause as it affects article II duties and
prerogatives was a political question all along.
Even if one overlooks this problem, why is the converse of Professor
Stith's argument not equally plausible as a political matter? The statutory mechanism by which Congress guards its appropriations power is
the Anti-Deficiency Act, which prohibits any officer or employee of the
United States from making expenditures or incurring obligations either
in excess of available appropriations or in advance of appropriations, unless he has legal authorization for making them. 320 "The manifest purpose of the Anti-Deficiency Act," opined Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti in 1980, "is to insure that Congress will determine for what purposes the Government's money is to be spent and how much for each
purpose. ' 321 But clearly nothing in the Act permits Congress, in reaching its determination of government spending, to refuse to fund activities
that the Constitution guarantees, including those it guarantees by imposing a duty on the President to perform certain functions. 322 Suppose, for
example, that Congress refuses to fund the President's performance of
something that Professor Stith would agree is an "inherent executive activity," such as the enforcement of criminal laws against members of
Congress who had accepted bribes. The President balks. He announces
that he considers it unconstitutional for Congress to refuse to fund the
activity; he will perform the activity even without appropriations for it;
and he will pardon any Executive Branch officer prosecuted under the
Anti-Deficiency Act for incurring obligations on the Treasury in the performance of the activity. One could reverse Professor Stith's argument
and assert that Congress's recourse against the President is limited to the
"[p]olitical processes contemplated by the Constitution. '323 If Congress
thinks the issue is important enough, let it try to impeach the President
320. An officer or employee of the United States Government... may not ... make or
authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation
or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or ... involve... [the] government in a contract
or obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized
by law.
31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
321. Applicability of Anti-deficiency Act upon a Lapse in an Agency's Appropriation, 4A Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 16, 19-20 (1980).
322. See Note, CongressionalUnderappropriationfor Civil Juries: Responding to the Attack on a
ConstitutionalGuarantee, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 237, 251 (1988) (arguing that the seventh amendment
obligates Congress to appropriate funds for civil jury trials in federal court in cases in which a jury
trial would have been available at common law when the Constitution was ratified).
323. Stith, supra note 2, at 1352 n.36.
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or prevent his re-election on the ground that he has spent public funds to
perform an "inherent executive activity" without receiving Congress's
permission beforehand.
2. A Dispensable President. After asserting that the President
lacks constitutional authority to obligate the Treasury, Professor Stith
suggests in the next of these three puzzling paragraphs the rule that Congress may defund the President's exercise of his constitutional duties as
long as they are not "indispensable constitutional duties. ' 324 Evidently,
in the view of Professor Stith, the Framers were ambivalent about some
of the duties they imposed on the President in article II. Some of the
duties must have been merely ceremonial or precatory-in short, "dispensable." Indeed, Professor Stith states at an earlier point in her argument: "In contrast to the forthright and wide-ranging enumeration of
legislative powers in article I, the enumeration of presidential powers in
article II is remarkably vague and emphasizes the formal, almost ceremonial, aspects of presidential leadership. '325
a. Does textual specificity denote the relative significance of presidentialpowers? Professor Stith's vision of a President having some dispensable and some indispensable duties suffers from two misconceptions
about constitutional construction. The first relates to the textual specificity of the Constitution as a whole (as opposed to the specificit3i of article
II compared with that of, say, article I), and it harkens back to Chief
Justice Marshall's famous remark in McCulloch v. Maryland, "we must
never forget.., that it is a constitution we are expounding. '326 A constitution could not possibly be written like a book of statutes in Marshall's
view:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of the proclivity of a
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
327
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.
324. Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
325. Id. at 1347 n.14.
326. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
327. Id. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816), Justice Story wrote:
"It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide
for minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means by which those powers should be
carried into execution." Another decision by the Marshall Court stated:
A practical knowledge of the action of any one of the great departments of the government, must convince every person that the head of a department, in the distribution of its
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Thus, one purpose served by resorting to textual generality throughout
the Constitution is to avoid daunting complexity. This consideration
calls to mind Madison's observation in The FederalistNo. 37: "All new

laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by
a series of particular discussions and adjudications. '328
Justice Story made a related point about the need to adapt to unfore-

seeable circumstances.

Discussing textual generality in Martin v.

Hunter'sLessee, he wrote that the Constitution's "powers are expressed

in general terms" because "the instrument was not intended to provide
merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a
long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable
purposes of Providence. ' 329 This consideration of futurity would seem
to be an example of one of the "sources of vague and incorrect defini-

tions" that Madison labeled generally as "indistinctness of the object"

330
when briefly addressing textual specificity in The Federalist.
Finally, Judge Richard Posner has observed, while reading the general language of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth

amendment, that, "[p]articularizing not only would have been time-consuming but might have sparked debilitating controversy, since it is easier
to agree on generalities than on particulars. ' 33 1 This may be what
duties and responsibilities, is often compelled to exercise his discretion. He is limited in the
exercise of his powers by the law; but it does not follow that he must show a statutory
provision for every thing he does. No government could be administered on such principles. To attempt to regulate, by law, the minute movements of every part of the complicated machinery of government would evince a most unpardonable ignorance on the
subject.
United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 14 (1833); see also Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651,
658 (1884) (discussing the principle, in interpreting the Constitution, that "what is implied is as
much a part of the instrument as what is expressed ... is a necessity, by reason of the inherent
inability to put into words all derivative powers"); Stone, The Common Law in the UnitedStates, 50
HARV. L. REv. 4, 22-26 (1936).
328. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
329. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 326-27. Judge Robert Bork has made a related point about the framers of the fourteenth amendment taking "refuge in the majestic and ambiguous formula: the equal
protection of the laws." Bork, NeutralPrinciplesandSome FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 14 (1971).
330. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
331. R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 226-27 (1988). In a related vein, Judge Posner has
asserted that attempting to define "reasonable doubt" for juries in criminal cases is "likely to yield
barren tautologies." United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
It is useful to compare these judges' insights on the specificity of the Constitution with Professor
Oliver Williamson's analogous insight about the specificity of contracts. It is possible (in theory) to
write contracts that describe all foreseeable contingent states of the world and then prescribe outcomes between the parties with respect to each such contingency. However, the transactions costs of
doing so are high. See Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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Madison meant when he described in The Federalist No. 37 the "embarassment" that "no language is so copious as to supply words and
'332
phrases for every complex idea.
Professor Stith does not consider any of these arguments favoring
open-ended rather than specific language throughout the Constitution. It
is not clear that a more explicit articulation of the duties and prerogatives
contained in article II would have evidenced an intent by the Framers to
make the President "more" powerful.
When Professor Stith does explicitly address the relevance, of textual
specificity, she argues that the dividing line between legislative power and
executive power should be drawn in Congress's favor because article I is
more specific than article II in defining the powers conferred on the respective branch. This reasoning, however, presumes that the authors of a
national constitution would have equal difficulty in defining legislative
and executive responsibilities. But they would not. Such parity of definition is illusory; the quest for symmetry leads to a flawed conclusion.
"The powers of the President are not as particularized as those of Congress," wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter in Youngstown. "But unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers. ' 333
It is not difficult to understand why Justice Frankfurter's is the
more persuasive view. The degree of textual specificity in a statute or
constitution is an increasing function of the predictability of the tasks
entrusted to a particular actor. For example, the Delaware corporate
code devotes considerably more text detailing the responsibilities of the
board of directors of a Delaware corporation than those of its officers;
indeed, there is no discussion at all of the responsibilities of a chief executive officer. 334 Yet, it would contradict common perceptions to conclude
on that basis that the CEO of a Delaware corporation is weak and ceremonial, and the board of directors is strong and substantive.
Similarly, it is difficult to define exhaustively every kind of problem
that the President of the United States will be called upon to address as
Therefore, it may be more efficient for the parties to eschew specificity in their enumeration of rights
and duties under the contract in innumerable contingent situations, and to rely instead on an alternative mechanism for ensuring that neither party will act opportunistically with respect to the other;
such mechanisms include vertical integration and credible commitments. 0. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 69 (1985); WiUiamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The
Governance ofContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 236 (1979); cf Gilson, Value Creationby
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 262 (1984) (discussing the value
of boilerplate in corporate acquisition agreements as a means of producing homogeneous expectations in heterogeneous circumstances).
332. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 224, 229 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
333. 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opinion).
334. Compare DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141 (1989) (duties of directors) with id. § 142 (detailing minimal duties of corporate officers).

1238

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 1989:1162

the figure whose constitutional purpose it is to execute the policies of the
federal government. Indeed, Hamilton noted in Pacificus No. 1 that
"[t]he different mode of expression employed in the constitution, in regard, to the two powers, the legislative and the executive serves to confirm [the] inference" that "[t]he difficulty of a complete and perfect
specification of all the cases of Executive authority would naturally dictate the use of general terms-and would render it improbable that a
specification of certain particulars was designd [sic] as a substitute for
those terms, when antecedently used. ' 33 5 An exhaustive definition of Executive action is inherently difficult to produce in the abstract, for the
Executive is the branch called upon to act in the face of greatest uncertainty. One factor contributing to this uncertainty in the lack of agenda
control.336 The President cannot screen out decisions on the basis of justiciability the way the Judiciary can, nor does he have the luxury of time
inherent in the bicameral process of the legislature. 337 Executive action,
like jazz, is structured improvisation.
b. Who decides? Another problem with Professor Stith's vision
of "dispensable" presidential duties relates to the old question of the authority of one branch to interpret the Constitution and bind the other
branches by that interpretation. Who decides which duties are indispensable for the President to perform? Professor Stith's earlier remarks
about Congress's freedom to ignore the Judiciary in disputes with the
President over appropriations necessary to fund the performance of an
"inherent executive activity" imply that Professor Stith would have Congress define for the President the parts of his job that are "indispensable."
Yet this conclusion would contradict the legal presumption that when
one of the three branches acts, it acts within its constitutional power.3 38
Indeed, it is telling that Professor Stith does not properly view her "indispensability" caveat as carte blanche for Congress to encroach on any Executive function it deems to be "dispensable"; instead, she views the
caveat as a necessary limitation on Congress's appropriations power, al335. A. HAMILTON, supra note 120, at 76, 80.
336. The literature on agenda control has largely focused on the agenda process within Congress, and not between Congress and the President. See Riker & Weingast, ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative Choice: The PoliticalConsequences ofJudicialDeference to Legislatures,74 VA. L.
REv. 373, 386-88 (1988).
337. See, eg., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (legislative power operates more slowly than does executive power).
338. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge
Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), reprintedin 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140. 141 (P.
Ford ed. 1899) (Each branch of the government "has an equal right to decide for itself what is the
meaning of the constitution in the case submitted to its action; and especially, where it is to act
ultimately and without appeal.") (emphasis added).
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beit a limitation for which she believes no apology to Congress is necessary, since the caveat's practical constraint on legislative power is so
negligible. "Although Congress may not completely frustrate the exercise of the President's constitutional duties," Professor Stith concludes,
"this is but a marginal circumscription of Congress power over the purse
' 339
and its other legislative power.
C. Neutrality in Application
Jeane Kirkpatrick has said that "in considering a constitutional system and placement of power in the system, you should begin by imagin' ' 34 °
ing that your bitterest opponents might eventually control it.
Perhaps I unfairly presume that Professor Stith would approve of the
examples cited in Part IV of how Congress has used the appropriations
clause to veto Executive action and enervate the Presidency. However,
the few examples that Professor Stith offers of how her Principle of Appropriations Control would be applied in specific cases tend to reinforce
rather than rebut that presumption and demonstrate how her Principlewhether or not it is neutral in derivation and definition-would lack neutrality in application 341 and thus could be used to permit unappropriated
efforts to advance certain preferred political objectives of Congress.
Consider, for example, Professor Stith's discussion of the Anti-Deficiency Act's ban on voluntary service to the government. 342 She writes:
[T]he naked words of the rule against voluntary service would appear
to prohibit all donated personal service to the government except to
the extent authorized by Congress (or as necessary in an emergency).
Like the rule against deficiencies, the prohibition on voluntary service
would appear to be a part of a larger Principle of Appropriations Control. The government cannot accept unauthorized voluntary service
because all resources available for government activity-all factors of
production in the business of "producing"
federal government activ343
ity-must be authorized by Congress.
Professor Stith's statement of the rule against voluntary service appears
to be a neutral principle in its derivation and definition. How neutrally
would that principle be applied?
In a much publicized episode, Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard
Law School offered his services free of charge to-Mr. Lawrence Walsh,
the special independent counsel investigating possible criminal wrongdo339. Stith, supra note 2, at 1352 (emphasis added).
340. Kirkpatrick, Commentary, in THE FErERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 159, at 44, 44.
341. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-53 (1990) (defending theory of neutral
principles); Bork, supra note 329 (same).
342. Stith, supra note 2, at 1372-73 (discussing 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982)).
343. Id. at 1374-75.
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ing relating to the Iran-Contra Affair. The Wall Street Journal's editors
denounced Mr. Walsh, asserting that it would violate the Anti-Deficiency Act for the Justice Department to accept Professor Tribe's offer. 344 Professor Stith disagrees: "If Professor Tribe's services were
clearly intended to be gratuitous, there was no violation of the rule
against voluntary service under the prevailing interpretation of that
rule. '34 5 Although she considers this prevailing interpretation by the
Comptroller General and the Attorney General to be "a curious construction, '346 Professor Stith does not say whether it is right or wrong.
She acquiesces to it notwithstanding that it would violate her principle
that "all factors of production in the business of 'producing' federal government activity ... must be authorized by Congress," 347 and that the
legal test for whether the federal government could accept voluntary
services would become positively delphic, turning on the donor's subjective intent either to be gratuitous or self-serving. It would seem that in
the course of accepting or rejecting a gift of professional services, the
federal government would have to resolve (at least implicitly) one of the
thorniest questions in moral philosophy-namely, whether altruistic behavior is ever undertaken without the expectation of reciprocal altruism
3 48
or some other economic benefit.
But would the same principle apply if the donor were not Professor
Tribe but rather Judge Robert Bork, and the controversy were not the
prosecution of Executive Branch officials but the drafting of the amicus
349
brief for the United States in Webster v. Reproductive Health Service?
In that event, would the Anti-Deficiency Act's prohibition on voluntary
service have to be interpreted more rigorously, such that it would no
longer suffice for the government to accept voluntary services merely
upon the donor's word that he honestly expected nothing in return for
lending his expertise to the Justice Department? Professor Stith's accept344. Crovitz, Walsh Is Above the Law, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 34, col. 4.
345. Stith, supra note 2, at 1373 n.152.
346. Id. at 1373.
347. Id. at 1374-75. Of course, Congress might "authorize" the acceptance of voluntary services
in a specific instance by passing a resolution of both houses. But unless presented to the President,
and either signed or enacted by override, this resolution could not be a constitutional means by
which to selectively repeal the voluntary service provision of the Anti-Deficiency Act.
348. Compare R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 159-60 (1981); Landes & Posner, Sal.
vors, Finders, Good Samaritans,and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study ofLaw and Altruism, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) and Posner,GratuitousPromises in Economics and Law, 6 J.LEGAL STUD.
411 (1977) with T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970).
349. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); cf Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Courtofthe United States: HearingsBefore the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary(pt. 2), 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1299 (testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe regarding Judge Bork's criticisms of
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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ance of the peculiar interpretation of the Anti-Deficiency Act's ban on
voluntary service that permits Professor Tribe to donote his services

causes me to doubt how neutrally her Principle of Appropriations Control would be applied in other politically controversial cases. For example, would the Principle of Appropriations Control enable Congress to
forbid the President to assist private parties seeking to fund efforts of the
350 If
African National Congress to abolish apartheid in South Africa?
one extends Professor Stith's assessment of the Iran-Contra Affair, the
answer obviously would be that Congress could do so. However, if Professor Stith's assessment of Professor Tribe's situation is the guide, the

answer is ambiguous at best.
D.

The Tacit Threat of Impeachment
Whether Professor Stith is correct or I am correct about the Presi-

dent's implicit power to fund the performance of his duties and the exercise of his prerogatives, is not just an academic exercise, because the

answer implies whether the President acts within his constitutional powers or commits an impeachable offense when he spends without congres-

sional permission. Knowing or willful violations of the Anti-Deficiency
Act are punishable by a fine not exceeding $5,000, imprisonment not exceeding two year, or both. 351 Certainly, the President's intentional viola-

tion of the Act could constitute a "high Crime" subjecting the President
to the risk of impeachment. 352 Thus, Congress's reliance on the Anti-

Deficiency Act to defend its appropriations power is tantamount to reliance on the implied threat of impeachment, as Professor Stith recog350. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 102, 100 Stat. 1086,
1090 (policy toward African National Congress); id. § 312, 100 Stat. at 1103-04 (policy toward use
of violence or terrorism); ia § 603, 100 Stat. at 1114-15 (establishing civil and criminal penalties for
violations of "provisions of this Act").
351. 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The Comptroller General has interpreted the precursor to the
current Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1976), in a manner that would subject the President to criminal penalties if he intentionally expended federal funds to perform a constitutional duty
forbidden by an appropriations bill:
When an appropriations act specifies that an agency's appropriation is not available for a
designated purpose, and the agency has no other funds available for that purpose, any
officer of the agency who authorizes an obligation or expenditure of agency funds for that
purpose violates the Anti-Deficiency Act. Since the Congress has not appropriated funds
for the designated purpose, the obligation may be viewed either as being in excess of the
amount (zero) available for that purpose or as in advance of appropriations made for that
purpose. In either case the Anti-Deficiency Act is violated.
60 Op. Comp. Gen. 440, 441 (1981). For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion regarding violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, see Applicability of Anti-Deficiency Act Upon a Lapse in an
Agency's Appropriation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 20 (1980).
352. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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nizes. 35 Indeed, the CongressionalRecord contains recent remarks by
Representative William Broomfield that acknowledge this assertion of
354
power.
Clearly that threat of impeachment must lack any constitutional legitimacy, since Congress could vitiate the separation of powers if it was
allowed to threaten the President with criminal prosecution and removal
for attempting to perform certain duties or exercise certain prerogatives
assigned to the Presidency by the Constitution, but to which Congress
objected. As Professor Henry Black argued in 1927, because "the grant
of executive powers to the President necessarily implies that he shall be
enabled to exercise them without any obstruction or hindrance, it follows
that he cannot be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is
in the discharge of the duties of his office. ' '35 5 Hamilton made a similar
point in 1795 in his Explanation concerning the appropriations clause, in
response to allegations that he, his successor at the Department of the
Treasury, and President Washington had all engaged in an "intentional
violation of the Constitution, of the law, and of their oaths of office" by
the manner in which they had disbursed funds from the Treasury to pay
Washington's salary. 356 He wrote:
Hard would be the condition of public officers if even a misconstruction of constitutional and legal provisions, attended with no symptom
of criminal motive, carrying the proof of innocence in the openness
and publicity of conduct, could justly expose them to the odious
charges which on this occasion are preferred. Harder still would be
their condition if, in the management of the great and complicated
business of a nation, the fact of miscalculation, which is to constitute
their guilt, is to be decided by the3narrow
and rigid rules of a criticism
57
no less pedantic than malevolent.
Article II is an authorization by law-law that has supremacy over any
statute-by which the President may encumber the Treasury for the minimum amount reasonably necessary for him to perform his constitutional
353. Stith, supra note 2, at 1353 n.48 (discussing "impeachments of officials in England for mis-

application of appropriated funds"). Cf Fisher, supra note 6, at 764-65 (arguing that the President's
solicitation of funds from foreign governments and private citizens to assist his implementation of
foreign policy would be an impeachable offense).
354. E.g., 133 CONG. REC. E4196 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1987) ("Congress has ample powers of the
purse to put an end to any [military] expedition it wishes to. And it can impeach any president who
flagrantly disregards its will on the expenditures of public monies.") (extension of remarks of Rep.
Broomfield, Ranking Minority Member on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, quoting Yoder, War
Powers Resolution Doesn't Apply in Gulf, Atlanta Const., Oct. 20, 1987, at A23, col. 1).
355. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 81, at 121 (4th ed. 1927).
356. A. HAMILTON, supra note 87, at 123.
357. Id. at 152. See also Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
the Foreign Relation Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES,
Doc. 1806 (Nov. 21, 1989).
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duties and exercise his constitutional prerogatives. 358 To conclude otherwise would require one to make the false presumption that Congress
could amend article II through the enactment of a mere statute, the AntiDeficiency Act.
VI.

NEcEssITY

AND THE RULE OF LAW

Professor Stith's Principle of Appropriations Control would empower Congress to deny the appropriations necessary for the President to
perform his constitutional obligations. Her view is not fundamentally
different even when the President concludes that he must, in the absence
of appropriations, expend funds and incur obligations in order to respond
to an emergency. Under those circumstances, Professor Stith still believes that the President violates the appropriations clause, but that the
defense of necessity might excuse his violations. However, the President
bears the risk that his defense of necessity will be rejected. In times of
genuine crisis, therefore, Professor Stith's version of the appropriations
power would inhibit the President from acting with decision and
dispatch.
I disagree with Professor Stith's vision of the separation of powers.
A President who obligates the Treasury when responding to a crisis need
not throw himself upon Congress's mercy. As I argued in Part I, the
President has an implied power of the purse to perform the duties and
exercise the prerogatives specified in article II.
This Part begins by examining the public necessity rationale that
Professor Stith offers as an exception to her Principle of Appropriations
Control. I argue that "necessity" is too ambiguous to constitute a reliable constitutional principle and indeed was used by President Jefferson to
justify action of doubtful constitutionality. As a result, I conclude by
showing that Professor Stith's defense of necessity would diminish the
likelihood that the President would be constrained by the rule of law.
A.

The Defense of Necessity: Salus Populi Maxima Lex

Professor Stith minces no words that the President is powerless to
perform his duties and exercise his prerogatives in the absence of appropriations, even if it would be unconstitutional for Congress to refuse to
fund that Executive action: "Congress may itself violate the Constitution
by failing to provide funds for presidential activities independently au358. The Comptroller General has opined in numerous cases that a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act does not occur when a statute requires an agency to take specific actions that create
obligations exceeding its appropriations. See 44 Op. Comp. Gen. 89, 90 (1964); 39 Op. Comp. Gen.
422, 426 (1959); 31 Op. Comp. Gen. 238, 239 (1955); 28 Op. Comp. Gen. 300, 302 (1948); 15 Op.
Comp. Gen. 167, 169 (1935).
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thorized by the Constitution. A presidential claim of such a violation,
however, does not give the President constitutional authority to spend in
the absence of appropriation." '3 59 This reasoning would imply, for example, that President Hayes was wrong about the inviolability of his power
to protect the voting rights of black citizens when Congress would deny
36
him the money to do so. 0
Even Professor Stith appears uncertain about the implications of so
broad an assertion. Perhaps sensing the implausibility of her position,
she hedges by summoning the defense of necessity: Although presidential "[s]pending in the absence of appropriations is ultra vires," there is
nonetheless a vast but nebulous exception to the Principle of Appropriations Control "where an emergency exists."'3 61 In an emergency, "the
President might decide that principles more fundamental than the Constitution's appropriations requirement justify spending. '3 62 Professor
Stith cites as an example President Lincoln's expenditure of $2 million in
advance of appropriations at the outbreak of the Civil War and while
Congress was out of session, which Lincoln considered necessary to save
the federal government from overthrow. 363 She then quotes approvingly
the following assertion made in Professor Lucius Wilmerding's 1942
study of the appropriations power (a study that in turn paraphrases
Thomas Jefferson, without attribution): "There are certain circumstances which constitute a law of necessity and self-preservation and
''3 64
which render the salus populi supreme over the written law.

359. Stith, supra note 2, at 1362 n.89.
360. Professor Thomas McGarity presumably would join Professor Stith's argument: "The
President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed does not imply an obligation on the
part of Congress to appropriate any particular level of funding to aid the President." McGarity,
PresidentialControlofRegulatoryAgency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 443, 474 (1987). Evidently, so too would Professor Laurence Tribe: "[T]he President surely may not spend unappropriated funds in order to 'execute the laws.' In large part, then, it is up to Congress to provide the
means whereby the President can discharge his duty; the President may not arrogate congressional
powers by reference to this clause." L. TRIBE, supra note 120, at 187 n.7.
361. Stith, supra note 2, at 1351.
362. Id.
363. See Proclamation of Abraham Lincoln (Apr. 15, 1861), reprintedin 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3214 (J. Richardson ed. 1897); Lincoln's Letter to Congress, supra note
134, at 3278, 3279.
364. Stith, supra note 2, at 1351-52 n.35 (quoting L. WILMERDING, supra note 166, at 12).
Jefferson wrote of circumstances that "constituted a law of necessity and self-preservation, and rendered the salus populi 'supreme over the written law." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B.
Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), reprintedin 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 279, 281 (P. Ford ed.
1898) [hereinafter Jefferson's Letter to Colvin].

Vol. 1989:1162]

PRESIDENT'S POWER OF THE PURSE

1245

1. Salus populi maxima lex. The welfare of the people is the
highest law. 365 In English law, the maxim can be traced at least as far
back as Sir Edward Coke's commentaries 366 and Locke's Second Treatise
of Government.367 But the fact that the maxim is old does not mean that
it is rigorous. As a legal maxim, it was not necessarily limited to instances in which the Executive was asserting authority in the absence of
written law. The maxim has been used as a rationale for the expansive
exercise of the police power 368 and the power of eminent domain, 369 and
for the New Deal era cases that gutted the contract clause 370 in the
course of affirming the federal government's moratorium on mortgage
foreclosures.3 7 ' Less explicitly, the maxim also seems to have influenced
372
the common law reasoning of the "private necessity" cases in tort law

in which a private party in distress would be excused from trespassing on
another's property, provided (in some cases) that he subsequently pay the

marginal cost of his use (such as the cost of repairs to the property necessitated by his use).
Of course, the common law is by definition unwritten law.3 7 3 Therefore, if the rationale of salus populi has affected the common law in a
pervasive manner, then its influence would seem to be, from a positive

perspective, a vague shorthand for some more grandiose efficiency norm
or social welfare principle such as the Pareto principle with HicksKaldor compensation.3 74 Thus, perhaps salus populi animates all common law defenses of necessity, whether they are for trespass, breach of
375
contract, or homicide.

365. Sometimes the maxim appears as saluspopuli est suprema lex Eg., West River Bridge Co.
v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 545 (1848) (Woodbury, J., concurring).
366. 13 E. COKE, INsTruTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (1642).
367. J. LOCKE, supra note 124, § 158, at 419-20.
368. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Matthews, 165 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1897) (quoting Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877)); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 585 (1900) (Gray, J.,
dissenting).
369. Dix, 47 U.S. at 535-36.
370. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
371. Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 64 S.W.2d 835, 839-40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (citing Blaisdell
v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 448, 249 N.W. 334, 893 (1933), aft'd, 290 U.S. 398
(1934)). But see Chicago Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 743-44 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook & Posner, JJ., concurring) (criticizing modem contract clause jurisprudence);
Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. Rv. 703, 735-38 (1984)
(same).
372. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); Ploof v. Putnam,
81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); see also Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 18 (1988) (discussing private necessity cases).
373. See generally M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (1713) (C.

Gray ed. 1971).
374. See, eg., R. POSNER, supra note 348, at 11-15.
375. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d ed. 1960).
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But that question is separate from the question of how salus populi
entered and influenced, American public law. Even on this narrower
question, saluspopulimight be as abstract as the preamble's statement of
"promot[ing] the general Welfare" "in Order to form a more perfect
Union. ' 376 For example, in Ex Parte Milligan counsel argued: "The
maxim is revolutionary and expresses simply the right to resist tyranny
without regard to prescribed forms. ' 377 Thus, even in American public
law, the concept must be disambiguated before it can be useful for Professor Stith's purposes. Within the field of constitutional law, salus
populi may have entered American thinking on separation of powers
through Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, 378 which Jefferson admired,
although with some skepticism.3 79 Montesquieu wrote: "When that
political law which has established in the kingdom a certain order of
succession, becomes destructive to the body politic for whose sake it was
established, there is not the least room to doubt but another political law
may be made to change this order; and so far would this law be from
opposing the first, it would in the main be entirely conformable to it,
since both would depend on this principle, that, THE SAFETY OF THE
'3 80
PEOPLE IS THE SUPREME LAW."
Reliance on this Jeffersonian concept of unwritten law to adumbrate
a theory of the appropriations power in an argument so deeply concerned
with the Iran-Contra Affair is ironic, for it was during the congressional
inquiry of that matter that Fawn Hall, the secretary to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North at the National Security Council, testified (in a remark
later stricken from the record) that she believed her assistance in shredding classified documents was justified because "sometimes you just have
to go above the written law."'38' Ms. Hall's remark embodies the Jeffer* 376. U.S. CONST. preamble; see St. George Tucker, The General Welfare, $ VA. L. REV. 167

(1922).

377. 71 U.S. 2, 81 (1866) (argument of counsel).
378. C.L. DE S. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 171, book 26, ch. 33, at 368.
379. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph (May 30, 1790), reprintedin 16
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 448, 449 (J. Boyd ed. 1961); see also N. CUNNINGHAM, IN
PURSUIT OF REASON: THE LIFE Of THOMAS JEFFERSON 16, 29-30 (1987).

380. C.L. DE S. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 171, book 26, ch. 23, at 368 (capitalization in
original).
381. Butterfield, Key North Memo Altered by Hall, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at AI5, col. 10;
see also Safire, Waitingfor the Docudrama, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1987, at A17, col. 1. One member
of the Iran-Contra Committee recognized this similarity between Ms. Hall's testimony and Jefferson's theory ofsaluspopulL IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 26, at 667 (supplemental views of
Congressman Henry Hyde). Judge Gerhard Gesell, however, made clear in his charge to the jury
that he rejected the saluspopuliexcuse, saying that "neither the president nor any of the defendant's
superiors had the legal authority to order anyone to violate the law." Lardner, North Not Authorized
to Break Law, Jury Told, Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 5; Abramson, Gesell's Instructionsto
Jury in North Case Could Play PivotalRole in Deliberations,Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1989, at B9, col. 1.
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sonian theory of public necessity-the same theory upon which Professor
Stith relies implicitly, if not explicitly, to provide the authority for the
sole exception to her Principle of Appropriation Control.
Jefferson was an enthusiastic advocate of the saluspopuli argument.
In 1807, when the British warship Leopard attacked the American frigate Chesapeake, President Jefferson ordered the procurement of military
supplies in the absence of appropriations--out of "anxiety for the safety
of our country"-and thereafter sought congressional ratification for the
expenditures, 38 2 which Congress promptly granted on the rationale of
salus populi.38 3 "To have awaited a previous and special sanction by
law," wrote Jefferson, "would have lost occasions which might not be
retrieved. ' 38 4 Judge Abraham Sofaer has remarked critically on the expedient to which Jefferson resorted: "Rather than attempting to legitimize his orders under the Constitution, he justified the purchases on the
ground of emergency, trusting in the legislature to condone his
385
conduct."
Throughout his two terms as President, Jefferson embraced a broad
theory of salus populi, one not limited to spending necessary to effect the
President's duties as Commander in Chief. The most notable instance of
action predicated on that belief was Jefferson's expenditure of $15 million
in 1803 to purchase the Louisiana Territory from France. 386 Responding
by letter to a publisher's question in 1810, after the conclusion of his
Presidency, Jefferson asserted to John Colvin that an executive officer at
times has a duty to disobey the law:
The question you propose, whether circumstances do not sometimes
occur, which make it a duty in officers of high trust, to assume authorities beyond the law, is easy of solution in principle, but somewhat embarrassing in practice. A strict observance of written law is one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger,
are higher obligations. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence
to written law would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, prop-

382. T. Jefferson, Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Oct. 27, 1807), reprinted in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 413, 414-15,
383. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 832, 840, 848 (1807).

416 (J.
Richardson ed. 1897).

384. T. JEFFERSON,supra note 382, at 416.
385. Sofaer, supra note 81, at 22.
386. T. Jefferson, Third Annual Message to Congress (Oct. 17, 1803), reprintedin 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 345, 346 (J.
Richardson ed. 1897); see also L. FISHER, supra note
36, at 229 (Jefferson purchased Louisiana even though amount he agreed to pay exceeded instruc-

tions set forth by Congress).
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erty, and all
those who are enjoying them with sacrificing the end to
387
the means.

These remarks resemble Lincoln's after the outbreak of the Civil War.
However, the reasoning they follow differs significantly from Lincoln's.
And these differences expose the fallacy of Professor Stith's reliance on a
Jeffersonian excuse of salus populi for unauthorized presidential action.
In the sentences immediately following the passage quoted above,
Jefferson sought to illustrate his general proposition by citing several examples of the need for General Washington and others to destroy private
property while battling the British during the Revolutionary War. But
Jefferson them gave a quite different example of private necessity: "A
ship at sea in distress for provisions, meets another having abundance,
yet refusing a supply; the law of self-preservation authorized the distressed to take supply by force. ' 388 This example is curious because it
posits no danger of foreign invasion or domestic rebellion. The harm to
be averted is loss of life, but not a loss of life caused by the action of a
government or an action in defiance against a government. Put differently, Jefferson's example of private necessity is not even what Montesquieu envisioned in his remark on salus populi when he spoke of a
"political law ...becom[ing] destructive to the body politic."
It is also significant that Jefferson condoned unauthorized presidential spending not merely when national defense was immediately at stake,
as it was perceived to be in the Chesapeake incident, but also when attractive opportunities arose, such as the opportunity to buy territory west
of the Mississippi for purposes of long-term security or, simply future,
westward expansion. 389 In particular, Jefferson supported the unauthorized acquisition of all of the Louisiana Territory for $15 million in April
1803, even though he had only received authorization from Congress in
January 1803 to obligate the Treasury in the amount of the $2 million for
the acquisition of New Orleans or West Florida. 390 Jefferson explained
his views in 1810:
387. Jefferson's Letter to Colvin, supra note 364, at 148. John Colvin was editor of the Republican Advocate in Fredericktown, Maryland. See THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 606 n.1 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944).
388. Jefferson's Letter to Colvin, supra note 364, at 147.
389. I disagree, therefore, with Professor Lobel, who argues on the basis of Jefferson's 1810 letter
to Colvin that "[t]he Jeffersonian position implicitly argues that reading the Constitution to provide
for broad emergency power in the executive is unwise, because it would inevitably lead to vast assertions of executive power unjustified by actual emergencies." Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline ofLiberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1396-97 (1989). I do not read Jefferson's Letter to Colvin,
supra note 364, to indicate any reluctance whatsoever on Jefferson's part to assert great Executive
powers in the name of necessity.
390. See, e.g.,
R. WALTEES, supra note 101, at 152-54.
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Suppose it had been made known to the executive of the Union in the
autumn of 1805, that we might have the Floridas for a reasonable sum,
that that sum had not indeed been so appropriated by law, but that
Congress were to meet within three weeks and might appropriate it on
the first or second day of their session. Ought he, for so great an advantage to his country, to have risked himself by transcending the law
and making the purchase? The public advantage offered, in this supposed case, was indeed immense: but a reverence for law, and the
probability that the advantage might still be legally accomplished by a
delay of only three weeks, were powerful reasons against hazarding the
act. But suppose it foreseen that a John Randolph would find means
to protract the proceeding on it by Congress, until the ensuing spring,
by which time new circumstances would change the mind of the other
party. Ought the executive, in that case, and with that foreknowledge,
to have secured the good to his country, and to have trusted to their
justice for the transgression of the
law? I think he ought, and that the
39 1
act would hav'e been approved.
Jefferson's reasoning is troubling. His example would be equivalent to
President Reagan, thinking there would be immense public advantage to
funding the Contras, personally authorizing the diversion to the Contras
of the public revenues received from the secret sale of arms to Iran, despite the clear refusal of Congress to appropriate funds for the Contras.
Professor Stith's necessity exception is further undermined by the
fact that Jefferson's discussion of the President's power to justify unauthorized spending on the grounds of salus populi does not even mention
article II of the Constitution. This omission is consistent with Judge
Sofaer's assessment of Jefferson's predilection, as illustrated by the Chesapeake incident, not to predicate his unappropriated spending on any
claim of superseding constitutional authority. Unlike Lincoln, who
sought to derive his exercise of Executive prerogative from the text or
structure of the Constitution, or from the simple purpose for the document's existence, Jefferson evidently believed that politics, not the Constitution, provided the effective check on abuse of presidential action. He
wrote in his 1810 letter to Colvin:
It is incumbent on those only who accept of great charges, to risk
themselves on great occasions, when the safety of the nation, or some
of its very high interests are at stake. An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one who should do it in cases for which
they were not intended, and which involved the most important consequences. The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but
himself
the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw 392
on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives.
391. Jefferson's Letter to Colvin, supra note 364, at 147.
392. Id.
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Professor Jules Lobel asserts that "President Thomas Jefferson adhered
to the view that the Constitution carefully limited executive emergency
power and therefore openly acknowledged that certain emergency actions were unlawful, requiring public ratification by Congress. ' 393 I disagree. Jefferson's letter to Colvin supports a contrary conclusionnamely, that Jefferson believed that the President's power to spend came
from some unwritten source rather than the text of the Constitution, and
that such an assertion of presidential power was held in check not by the
rule of law, but rather by the countervailing political power of Congress.
B. Every Tyrant's Excuse
Ultimately, salus populi maxima lex is an empty box. Who defines
what serves the public welfare? What lesser societal interests, as reflected
in laws that a President will disobey, are worth sacrificing? Is the maxim
applicable to more than instances of foreign attack or domestic rebellion,
as Jefferson evidently believed? And, given that there are certain efficiencies created by delegating decisions to those with superior information or
other comparative advantages, what stops a President from delegating
these salus populi determinations to the Fawn Halls and Ollie Norths of
the Executive Branch?
It is dangerous and unnecessary to construct a rationale for Executive power based on "higher law," which is to say law that resides in an
"unwritten constitution. ' 394 If the welfare of the people is the highest
law, it is also every tyrant's excuse-a point made forcefully in 1948 in
Professor Clinton Rossiter's bluntly titled book, ConstitutionalDictatorship.395 The law of necessity, wrote Professor Rossiter, "is little better

than a rationalization of extra-constitutional, illegal emergency action. '39 6 The vagueness of saluspopuli, particularly the Jeffersonian variety, places a broad field of presidential action outside any governing law
or constitutional principle. Yet, the whole reason for having a constitution and constitutional law is to bring government action within the rule
of law.
Thus, Professor Stith's reliance on the defense of necessity is inconsistent wih the rule of law. She says that Congress should be able to tell
the President, "Go ahead, break the law if you think it is necessary."
393. Lobel, supra note 389, at 1392 (emphasis added).

394. See Corwin, The 'igher Law" Background ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw (pts. 1 & 2),
42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1929); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
395. C. ROSsITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES (1948).
396. Id. at 11 & n.7.

Vol. 1989:1162]

PRESIDENT'S POWER OF THE PURSE

1251

(Conveniently for Congress, her Principle of Appropriations Control
would guarantee that the President would have to break the law routinely just to perform many of his ordinary article II duties.) "If we
approve of your lawlessness after the fact," Congress would then tell the
President, "we won't impeach you; but if we don't, we will." As Lucius
Wilmerding put it in 1943, and as Professor Stith evidently agrees: "The
high officers of the government, and a fortiori the President, have a right,
indeed a duty, to do what they conceive to be indispensably necessary for
the public good, provided always that they submit their action to Congress
397
to sanction the proceeding. ,
Euphemized as "ratification after expenditure, ' 398 this reasoning expands the legislative veto to encompass every action for which the President has a duty to perform but for which Congress has not appropriated
money. It is an invitation not only for Congress to usurp Executive
power, but also for the President to become a tyrant-for he routinely
would have to operate "above the law" (which is to say, without regard
for the law) and subsequently use political power to prevent his impeachment. One of the reasons that Alexander Hamilton opposed excessive
specificity in the Constitution was his belief that "fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed" would breed disrespect
for those restrictions that ought to be observed. 39 9 He believed that
"every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of
rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for
other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is
less urgent and palpable."' 4
Moreover, reliance on congressional "ratification after expenditure"
is troubling as a matter of jurisprudence and very possibly is unconstitu397. L. WILMERDING, supra note 166, at 19 (emphasis added).
398. Id. at 18-19 n.31 (quoting 68 CONG. REc. 2979 (1923) (remarks of Rep. Chindblom)); cf
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(justifying Lincoln's seizure of railroads during the Civil War in part because "his order was ratified
by the Congress"); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1863) ("[I]f the President had in any
manner assumed powers which it was necessary should have the authority or sanction of Congress,
[then] on the well known principle of law, "omnisratihabitioretrotrahituret mandato equiparatur,'
this ratification has operated to perfectly cure the defect.").
399. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 167 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
400. Id. Professor Stith's necessity exception is, therefore, an invitation to expand the power of
the state relative to the individual. See P. JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE
TWENTIES TO THE EIGHTIES 14-17 (1983); F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); F. HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 190. That the Principle of Appropriations Control would create this danger is doubly ironic in view of Professor Stith's assertion that the Principle
is integral to drawing the "distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere" that "[tihe
Constitution presupposes" and to "permit[ting] expansion of the public sphere only with legislative
approval." Stith, supra note 2, at 1345.
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tional. As a jurisprudential matter, it is elemental that the rule of law
requires that legislation exhibit prospectivity and generality.40 1 The

granting of retroactive approval to specific actions by the President is
obviously neither prospective nor general. This same deficiency raises

constitutional issues. Justice Holmes described legislative action as that
which "looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a

new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its
power.'' 4 2 By this standard, "ratification after expenditure" looks more
like an adjudicative determination than a legislative one. Thus, the

source of legitimacy for such action is hardly self-evident among the enumerated powers of Congress; to the contrary, such action raises the same

concerns as those reflected in the Framers' express prohibition against
40 3
Congress enacting ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.

Viewed in these terms, Professor Stith's necessity exception is sim40 4
ply lawless action with a political check after the fact.
CONCLUSION

No principle is more elemental to the logic of the Constitution than
the separation of powers. 40 5 However, much constitutional scholarship
since Watergate has been predicated on the belief that a metamorphosis
from a unitary Executive to a plural Executive would be salutary. 40 6 The
Framers did not start from that premise. Such a metamorphosis is
plainly contrary to the history, text, and structure of the Constitution.
"The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day," wrote Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown. 407 "It does come, however slowly, from
401. See, eg., J. RAZ, supra note 25, at 214-16, 219.
402. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). Justice Holmes was distinguishing legislation from "judicial inquiry," which he said "investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist." Id.; see also,
e.g., Wi~lapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1949) (distinguishing between
"rulemaking" and "adjudication").
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
404. As Professor Rossiter observed, "Hitler could shout 'necessity' as easily as Lincoln." C.
ROSSITER, supra note 395, at 12. The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, for
example, was rationalized on the basis of "[p]ressing public necessity." Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See also Ex ParteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 76 (1867) ("Nothing that
the worst men ever propounded has produced so much oppression, misgovernment, and suffering, as
the pretense of state necessity. A great authority calls it the tyrant's plea; and the common honesty
of all mankind has branded it with infamy.") (argument of counsel).
405. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
406. E.g., P. KURLAND, supra note 281, at 169 (Watergate revealed "the failure of Congress to
perform adequately its function as a check on the executive"). For an eloquent warning of the
dangers of this premise, and a spirited rebuttal of it, see Rostow, supra note 175.
407. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence
in even the most disinterested assertion of authority."''4 8
Behind the pretext of protecting taxpayers from a spendthift President, Professor Stith's Principle of Appropriations Control would have
Congress control decisions that the Constitution said should be made by
a unitary Executive. In its extremity, Professor Stith's theory would go
so far as to tell the President that he cannot protect the constitutional
rights of citizens if Congress should withhold the money necessary for
him to take such action.
I do not claim that mine is the last word on the appropriations
clause. In particular, more thought is needed on the question of a feasible limiting principle for unappropriated spending by the President. The
one clear lesson that scrutiny of this provision affords is that its text is
one of the "great silences" 4 9 in the Constitution. Particularly because
the clause can generate conflicts over the separation of powers, its probable meaning must be evaluated in light of the history and structure of
the Constitution and in light of whether a particular interpretation of the
clause (such as Professor Stith's Principle of Appropriations Control)
would produce implausible results at odds with other portions of the
Constitution. I have attempted to show that the conventional understanding of Congress's "power of the purse" has virtually no support in
the historical records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Federalist Papers, or other contemporaneous writings of the Framers.
Unlike Professor Stith, I consider Congress's misuse of the appropriations power to be a grave constitutional problem. The Framers would
not have assigned to the President such responsibilities as the making of
treaties, the commanding of the armed forces, and the faithful execution
of laws if they expected that Congress could selectively veto the execution of these functions by defunding them. There must exist an implied
power for the President to obligate the Treasury, at least for the minimum amount necessary for him to perform the duties and exercise the
prerogatives that article II imposes on his office. To conclude otherwise
would require embracing the unlikely proposition that thrift was an object more precious to the Framers than was the perfection of a Constitu4 10
tion that "diffuses power the better to secure liberty.

408. Id.
409. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (Jackson, J.); see also
Schauer, An Essay on ConstitutionalLanguage, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797 (1982).
410. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).

